标签： Suriname

In a response to a recent nuance added to his earlier claim that Suriname’s tax legislation does not include a formal fiscal ringfence, legal expert Siegfried Kenswil has systematically refuted the counterargument put forward by Shyamnarain, breaking down the two core pillars of the opposing position and explaining why their interpretation does not hold up under close legal examination.

Shyamnarain’s counterargument rests on two key legal provisions: Article 19 of Suriname’s Petroleum Act and Article 19.2.1 of the model Production Sharing Contract (PSC). Kenswil first addresses the status of Article 19 of the Petroleum Act, clarifying that this article is exclusively a registration and compliance requirement, not a substantive tax rule. The first clause of Article 19 mandates that all petroleum contractors maintain an office in Paramaribo, while the second clause requires this office to be registered in line with national legal requirements. Kenswil notes that both the 1990 explanatory memorandum to the original Petroleum Act, which explicitly links this provision to the Code of Commerce and the Trade Register Act, and the 2022 legislative amendment confirm this framing: Article 19 exists only to ensure contractors meet existing tax filing and payment obligations, not to impose new deduction limits for individual fields or contracts. Reading a fiscal ringfence into this provision is a creative interpretation, but it is not legally defensible, Kenswil argues.

Turning to the second pillar of the counterargument, Article 19.2.1 of the model PSC, Kenswil emphasizes that this provision explicitly defers all tax rules to the 1922 Income Tax Act – legislation that does not include any fiscal ringfence provision. While Article 19.2.1 outlines guidance for allocating revenues and costs for contract purposes, all formal tax assessment is carried out under the terms of the national income tax law, not the contract itself. This means the PSC cannot create an independent fiscal regime, a position that the 2022 legislature explicitly confirmed: petroleum contracts cannot grant tax privileges that are not already established in statutory law, and all tax-related terms in PSCs are bounded and governed by Article 9(1) of the Petroleum Act.

A critical point of confusion that Kenswil unpacks is the difference between a contractual cost recovery ringfence and a statutory fiscal ringfence. The ringfencing outlined in the PSC is a commercial mechanism that limits which costs can be offset against oil revenues from each individual commercial field. This is fundamentally different from a fiscal ringfence that would isolate tax liabilities for tax assessment purposes. Further, Kenswil points out that PSC ringfencing applies per commercial field, while Shyamnarain’s argument applies it per contract block. The Petroleum Act explicitly draws a distinction between these two terms: a field is defined as a geologically bounded hydrocarbon accumulation, while a block is the formal contract area, and the law explicitly notes their boundaries do not always align. Shyamnarain’s argument incorrectly conflates contractual cost recovery with tax assessment, and fields with blocks, Kenswil says.

Kenswil also pushes back on Shyamnarain’s warning that his original claim could spark unnecessary disputes between industry parties. He notes that since the first PSCs were implemented in Suriname, all tax filings have been submitted without fiscal ringfencing, and have consistently been accepted by the Suriname Tax Administration without objection. There has been no existing dispute over this issue until now. This long-standing practice has a clear practical basis: a foreign company operating across multiple blocks is still a single tax payer under Suriname law, requiring a single unified tax filing. Both Staatsolie, Suriname’s state oil company, and the Suriname government are well aware that the same contractor company typically signs multiple PSCs for different blocks. The Tax Administration’s administrative and operational systems are not structured to split a single legal entity into multiple separate permanent establishments or branches, each with isolated tax liabilities per block.

Kenswil concludes that the current debate over fiscal ringfencing is only being created by claims that the mechanism applies to PSCs that have been operational for many years. Existing contracts also include formal stabilization clauses and guarantees that protect contracting parties from retroactive regulatory changes. A shifting interpretation by implementing authorities does not qualify as a formal legislative change that can be applied retroactively to existing contractual relationships, he adds.

Hardly four months have passed since the passing of former VHP leader Chan Santokhi, and the battle for control of Suriname’s major political party is already in full swing. Though the timing of this early power play may seem unseemly to some observers, it reflects the unforgiving rhythm of modern politics, with multiple factions already positioning themselves to take the party’s top post.

At least three distinct groups have already emerged as contenders for the VHP leadership, with more potential candidates widely believed to be waiting in the wings. While official party rules mandate that leadership elections must be held no later than May 29, 2027, the stakes of this contest stretch far beyond the title of party chair. Whoever claims the leadership will get the rare opportunity to steer the VHP back to national power ahead of the 2030 parliamentary elections – a vote that will be held two years after Suriname expects to begin large-scale commercial oil extraction from its offshore seabed, a development that is projected to transform the country’s economic and political landscape. No major party wants to be stuck in opposition when that economic shift arrives, and the VHP, which saw its hopes for a second consecutive governing term dashed in recent elections, is more eager than any to return to power. That is why the campaign for leadership has effectively launched years before the official vote.

Deputy party chair Asis Gajadien was the first to openly declare his candidacy, and has already begun holding discussions with prominent party members across the country to build support. Party board member Mahinder Jogi has taken a different approach, putting forward party secretary Ganeshkoemar Kandhai as his preferred candidate rather than running himself. Jogi argues that Kandhai brings both the high-level governance experience and deep institutional knowledge of the VHP needed to rebuild the party after its electoral defeat. Like Jogi, Kandhai also has deep grassroots roots as the head of the Kwatta agricultural cooperative.

A third faction, the Lelydorp group led by Partap Bissumbhar, has also made its bid for power explicit, with “renewal” as its central rallying cry. The group not only calls for a new party chair, but also demands a complete overhaul of the VHP’s existing governance culture, arguing that most current party leaders should be removed from leadership roles. This faction is also lobbying extensively across the country to win over rank-and-file party members to its side.

Observers expect more candidates to enter the race in coming months, with interim party chair Glenn Oehlers already publicly indicating he has developed an appetite for the top job.

Across all factions, there is widespread agreement on one core goal: restoring the VHP to its position as Suriname’s largest political party. The agreement ends there, however, as fundamental questions remain unanswered about how that goal will be achieved. Is simply putting forward new faces enough to win back power? Or does the party first need to confront the reasons for its recent electoral defeat honestly?

That question is proving to be the most difficult one for the party to address, as it requires assigning political responsibility for the loss. Was the failure the fault of cabinet ministers who implemented the government’s policies? Of Santokhi, the public face of the administration? Or of the VHP’s parliamentary faction, which was tasked with overseeing the government, gathering feedback from the public, and raising internal alarms when policies began to falter?

Notably, these tough questions have only become open for discussion now that the party leadership is vacant. While Santokhi was alive, internal differences of opinion were almost always kept private, and party members uniformly closed ranks whenever the VHP faced external pressure. This is not a unique dynamic for the VHP – nearly all political parties rely on this reflex to preserve unity during periods of stress. But after an electoral defeat and the departure of a long-time leader, the true strength of a party’s internal democracy is put to the test. Will the VHP dare to engage in critical self-examination, or will criticism be limited to individual leaders while the problematic internal culture remains untouched? Many analysts argue that this is the greatest challenge facing the next party chair: not just uniting the fractious party, but reinventing it for a new political era.

Behind the public announcements and media narratives, the real battle for VHP leadership is being waged not in press conferences or party rallies, but in the party’s 300-plus local grassroots branches. These branches will soon elect new local leadership, and it is at this level that alliances are forged, support is organized, and long-term political relationships are built through constant grassroots outreach: attending community events, personal meetings, and local gatherings. It is these local branches that will ultimately decide which candidates have enough broad support to even appear on the ballot for the national leadership election. Under party rules, any candidate list put forward outside of the sitting national board must secure the support of at least 30 percent of local branches to qualify for the official vote. As political observers of the VHP have long noted: whoever wins the local branches, wins the party.

In the end, this is the great paradox of the VHP’s leadership race. Everyone is already looking ahead to the 2030 national parliamentary election, which will be the ultimate political prize, but the path to that prize runs first through the party’s hundreds of local grassroots branches. While Suriname’s first commercial offshore oil is still yet to be pumped, the race for the VHP’s political jackpot has already been well underway.

A leading United Nations human rights expert has laid out a nuanced perspective on the intersection of universal human rights standards and global cultural diversity during a recent public lecture, challenging common misconceptions that universal rights require uniform cultural practices across nations.

Prof. mr. dr. Yvonne Donders, a member of the UN Human Rights Committee and professor at the University of Amsterdam, delivered the keynote address at an event organized by Stichting Projekta in partnership with Geneva-based Centre for Civil and Political Rights (CCPR). The lecture, held at Spice Quest, drew a diverse cross-section of attendees eager to explore the often-debated relationship between global human rights norms and local cultural traditions.

Opening her remarks, Donders emphasized that the universal application of human rights does not demand identical cultural frameworks across all societies. “Universality is not uniformity. Equality inherently includes the right to be different,” she told the audience. She went on to explain that culture and cultural identity form a core component of human dignity, a principle that is formally recognized and protected under the international human rights system.

Donders argued that universal human rights create a structured framework that inherently accommodates cultural variation, leaving intentional space for diverse practices and identities. However, she stressed that cultural tradition cannot be invoked as an unlimited defense for practices that cause harm to individuals or marginalized groups, pointing to cases where children and other vulnerable populations are systematically disadvantaged by harmful cultural customs. “Culture is not static – it is constantly evolving,” she noted, adding that outdated harmful practices do not need to be fully eliminated entirely in all cases, but can be adapted to align with basic human rights standards.

The lecture was followed by a discussion that touched on emerging modern challenges to the balance between human rights and cultural expression. Dutch Minister of Education, Science and Culture Dirk Currie raised questions about the impact of social media, widespread digitalization, and artificial intelligence on cultural preservation and human rights protections. In response, Donders acknowledged that digital transformation has expanded public access to cultural content from around the world, but warned that it also brings significant new risks. She highlighted the rapid spread of disinformation online as a major concern, and noted that artificial intelligence systems can often amplify existing societal biases because the algorithms that power them are rarely fully neutral.

A key segment of the event focused on the legal obligations that governments assume when they ratify international human rights treaties. Donders explained that while participation in UN human rights agreements is a voluntary choice for sovereign states, ratification creates a binding requirement to align national legislation and policy with the standards outlined in the treaties. She pushed back against the common argument that some human rights standards are incompatible with local societal contexts, stating: “Countries cannot hide behind the claim that certain rights do not fit their society or lack public support indefinitely.” Governments, she said, have a responsibility to actively demonstrate progress toward implementing these rights, naming human rights education in schools, anti-discrimination action, bias reduction, and open public dialogue as core tools to advance this goal.

The discussion also addressed the critical role of civil society organizations in upholding human rights standards. Donders stressed that legal mechanisms alone are not sufficient to guarantee effective human rights protection. Civil society groups, she explained, play an indispensable role by raising public awareness, fostering open public debate, and holding governments accountable through the submission of shadow reports that monitor compliance with international human rights obligations.

The event was part of an ongoing partnership between Stichting Projekta and the CCPR, an organization that works with national governments to support effective implementation of international human rights agreements around the world.

On Monday, Andy Burnham officially took office as the seventh Prime Minister of the United Kingdom in just 10 years, marking another major shift in the country’s turbulent political landscape. Following his formal audience with King Charles III at Buckingham Palace, the new Labour Party leader unveiled an ambitious, if still outline-only, plan to reshape British politics and tackle the ongoing cost-of-living crisis, anchored by a 10-year strategy to build what he calls “a new economy.”

Stepping into a role shaped by years of successive leadership turnover, Burnham openly acknowledged his government’s potentially fragile position and stressed the urgent need for a break from Britain’s recent fractured political trajectory. “We are going to change politics – it will be less about scoring points, and more about working together and finding solutions,” he stated in his first public address as prime minister. He has pledged to decentralize state power, devolve greater responsibility to local communities, and use robust government intervention to bring essential living costs back within reach for ordinary households.

A former mayor of Greater Manchester, Burnham succeeds Keir Starmer, who stepped down after two years in office and one landslide general election victory, amid mounting internal party tensions and public criticism. Starmer delivered his farewell address on Monday, saying “My work is done. I leave with my head held high and proud of what we have achieved.”

The handover of power followed longstanding royal protocol with the traditional “kissing hands” ceremony at Buckingham Palace, though the practice of kissing the monarch’s hand was not observed during this meeting. Burnham said he is “very conscious” of the rapid turnover of leadership at 10 Downing Street, and called on his generation of political leaders to “improve the game” and rebuild public trust in British democratic institutions.

Burnham ran unopposed for the Labour Party leadership, securing the backing of 379 out of 403 sitting Labour members of parliament. He inherits a daunting slate of pressing challenges: a stagnant, slow-growing national economy, the persistent cost-of-living crisis that has squeezed millions of households, overstretched public services stretched to breaking point, and complex global diplomatic priorities including the ongoing wars in Ukraine and the Middle East.

In his inaugural speech as prime minister, he also committed to ending homelessness across the United Kingdom and breaking up a political system that he argues has been marked by bad policy choices – including widespread privatization – since the 1980s.

Critical observers are eagerly awaiting the full details of Burnham’s flagship 10-year plan, which he is set to formally present on Tuesday. Joshi Herrmann, founder of Manchester-based news platform The Mill, noted that the plan will only deliver on its promises if the government can unlock substantial, sustained economic growth.

Beyond policy proposals, widespread attention is also focused on the composition of Burnham’s first cabinet. Major changes are expected at key top posts, including Chancellor of the Exchequer, Foreign Secretary, and Home Secretary.

Starmer leaves Downing Street with a number of notable legislative and policy achievements, including strengthened worker protections, reductions in childhood poverty, and increased defense spending. Even so, maintaining stable, consistent governance proved an uphill battle during his tenure, amid ongoing internal divisions and external pressures.

As Burnham moves into 10 Downing Street, he carries an inbox full of urgent, unresolved policy files and the defining mission of restoring public faith in politics for a nation that has long craved stability and tangible progress after a decade of constant upheaval.