标签： Guyana

On Thursday, October 22, 2026, retired Captain John Flores, head of Guyana’s Maritime Rescue Coordination Centre (MRCC) under the Maritime Administration (MARAD), announced that the national maritime search and rescue agency will commission a cutting-edge direct satellite distress signal reception system next week. This upgrade will eliminate the need to rely on the Cheddi Jagan International Airport Control Tower to relay emergency alerts between vessels in distress and response teams.

Once the new infrastructure enters service, MRCC will no longer require third-party intermediaries to receive distress calls, Flores, a former commander of the Guyana Defence Force Coast Guard, confirmed to the ongoing Commission of Inquiry (COI) investigating the deadly July 18 capsizing of the MV Barima ferry.

Flores detailed that during the immediate search and rescue operation following the MV Barima tragedy, MRCC was forced to rely on a patchwork of outdated and fragmented communication tools: cellular phone networks, consumer Starlink internet, direct outreach to nearby commercial vessels, and coordination through the local Georgetown Lighthouse. Multiple witnesses have already testified before the inquiry about the critical communication gaps exposed by the disaster, including overreliance on basic Very High Frequency (VHF) radios, consumer messaging apps like WhatsApp, and the complete lack of dedicated VHF communication links between maritime rescue teams and aviation assets.

Contrary to assumptions that the upgrade was a direct response to the MV Barima incident, Flores clarified that the communication overhaul was mandated years earlier by an international compliance audit. The contract to upgrade MRCC’s radio and satellite infrastructure, which requires all technical components to meet strict standards set by the International Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue Manual (IAMSR) and the International Maritime Organisation (IMO), was awarded back in March 2025. All required hardware, including new High Frequency (HF) radio systems and purpose-built satellite receivers, has already been shipped to Guyana. Up next, MRCC will conduct mandatory hands-on training for response staff to familiarize them with the new equipment. Flores noted that agency personnel are already fully certified to operate the Global Maritime Distress and Safety System (GMDSS), an existing international maritime emergency framework.

Beyond the core communication upgrade, the Guyanese government is also planning to establish a network of sub-regional MRCC hubs along the country’s full coastline to expand rescue coverage and cut response times. When asked by COI lead commissioner Retired Rear Admiral Hayden Pritchard for formal documentation outlining the communication improvement plans, Flores directed the inquiry to MARAD Director-General Stephen Thomas, who holds the full master set of agency-wide planning documents.

The catalyst for the upgrade dates back to a 2018 IMO mandatory compliance audit of Guyana’s maritime sector. The audit identified two major critical gaps: first, MARAD had failed to submit required updates to the IMO on the status and capabilities of the country’s national search and rescue infrastructure, and second, the government had not developed formal cooperation frameworks between national SAR services and passenger ferries that regularly operate out of Guyanese ports. The audit requested additional documentation to verify that Guyana had completed required corrective actions to address these gaps, but the requested materials were never submitted, meaning the IMO has not been able to confirm any progress on fixing the identified deficiencies.

Flores also told the inquiry that MRCC does not typically hold up-to-date contact information for crew and passengers on board government-operated ferry services, a revelation that adds another layer of scrutiny to the country’s maritime safety regulations ahead of the COI’s final report.

Three months after the deadly capsizing of the MV Barima ferry off Guyana’s Essequibo Coast, a public Commission of Inquiry (COI) into the July 18 tragedy has uncovered worrying deficiencies in the communication infrastructure of the country’s Maritime Administration (MARAD).

The inquiry, convened to investigate the causes and response to the incident that claimed lives off the coast 10 miles from mainland Guyana, convened Wednesday to hear testimony from key maritime figures, including senior MARAD staff and first responders who participated in the immediate search and rescue operation. Retired Rear Admiral Hayden Pritchard of the Trinidad and Tobago Defence Force, one of five independent maritime experts appointed by President Irfaan Ali to lead the probe, delivered a stark assessment of MARAD’s current communication setup after reviewing details provided by acting Harbour Master Romain Seurattan.

Seurattan told the commission MARAD currently relies on a basic suite of tools: desktop computers, Very High Frequency (VHF) radios, cellular phones, and handheld portable radios. After reviewing the list, Pritchard, drawing on decades of maritime experience, characterized the agency’s communication capabilities as unacceptably sparse for a regulatory and response body responsible for commercial and passenger ferry traffic along Guyana’s coast.

When invited to offer his own recommendations for upgrading and expanding the existing equipment to close gaps, Seurattan declined to comment on what upgrades would be appropriate for the agency, noting he could not speak to systemic changes at the leadership level. He instead confirmed that recommendations for improvements had previously been submitted to his senior leadership, and offered to share a copy of the earlier document with the commission. Seurattan also told the inquiry that major maritime incidents are rare at Guyana’s ports, and when they do occur, incident reports are routinely passed up the chain of command to the Director General of Maritime Safety.

Further testimony from a frontline MARAD staff member reinforced Pritchard’s concerns about communication failures. Shamar Morrison, a trainee pilot who participated in the search and rescue operation after the MV Barima capsized, told the commission that weak, unreliable signal often makes inter-vessel and ship-to-shore communication at sea a major challenge. To address this persistent issue, Morrison formally recommended the agency adopt SpaceX’s Starlink satellite internet system to expand connectivity across Guyana’s maritime domain.

Morrison also added that during the rescue mission, he had no ability to communicate with airborne aircraft supporting the operation, and confirmed that the pilot boat he was aboard lacked a VHF aviation band tuned to connect with Guyana Defence Force Air Corps aircraft. He could not say whether the MV Barima itself carried equipment to communicate with military aircraft.

Beyond infrastructure gaps, the trainee pilot detailed his role in the immediate rescue, where he pulled the ferry’s captain and first mate from the water, wrapping them in blankets to prevent life-threatening hypothermia after their extended time in the ocean. He told the commission he had received formal search and rescue and medical training through certifications from MATPAL and EnerMech Guyana, and had coordinated closely with Retired Coast Guard Commander John Flores, who leads MARAD’s Maritime Rescue Coordination Centre (MRCC). When laying out his rescue protocol training, Morrison noted he instructed his fellow response team members to avoid maneuvering rescue vessels too close to people in the water, to prevent accidental collisions that could leave survivors unconscious or unresponsive. Pritchard, responding to his account, acknowledged that Morrison appeared better trained for search and rescue operations than other members of the response team.

Morrison, who is scheduled to complete both practical and theoretical examinations to earn full MARAD pilot certification, also revealed a previously unreported instruction from senior political leadership during the rescue. He told the commission that Public Works Minister Juan Edghill, who was on site during the response effort, explicitly instructed rescue personnel to avoid taking photographs of the incident that could be leaked to the press. Morrison quoted Edghill as saying, “guys, just focus on what you’re doing and try not to release any pictures, because we don’t want to create any stir in the media.”

The ongoing COI is expected to continue hearing testimony from witnesses and experts in the coming weeks, before releasing a full public report on the causes of the capsizing and recommendations for regulatory and operational changes to prevent similar tragedies in the future.

A devastating maritime disaster that claimed 76 lives has exposed a cascade of systemic failures in training, regulation, and safety protocols at the U.S. Maritime Administration (MARAD), according to sworn testimony given to a formal Commission of Inquiry (COI) investigating the July 18 sinking of the MV Barima ferry.

The incident unfolded just after 10 p.m. roughly 10 miles off the Essequibo Coast, when the overloaded passenger ferry went down with 179 passengers and crew on board. To date, official counts confirm 76 people have died in the disaster, making it one of the deadliest maritime accidents in the region in recent decades. As the COI continues to piece together what led to the capsizing, senior MARAD officials have laid bare the agency’s longstanding gaps in basic safety and operational standards.

Christopher Clarke, MARAD’s chief engineer who has spent 20 years at the regulatory body, told investigators that the agency does not issue formal professional licenses to marine engineers. Instead, promotions and qualifications are issued solely via informal letters of appointment after basic in-house training. “When you complete the training, you get a letter from management confirming you attended, and then you’re promoted to second engineer or third engineer,” Clarke explained. His account was echoed by MARAD maritime officer Tremel Argyle, who told the COI he rose from the rank of ordinary seaman to his current position only after completing a short course and submitting his paperwork to the department, with no formal licensing process required.

Clarke also acknowledged he took part in repair work on the MV Barima roughly 18 years before the sinking, but could not recall whether the work was preventative maintenance or corrective repairs for existing damage. He also told investigators he could not remember key details about the vessel’s design, including the location of its onboard water tanks. Most alarmingly, Clarke confirmed that MARAD-operated vessels have no formal Planned Maintenance System (PMS) — a standardized protocol that outlines mandatory scheduled inspections and upkeep for all critical vessel systems. While he noted that engine oil and filter changes are conducted based on main engine working hours, there is no structured framework to track or address other potential mechanical failures over time. He also admitted that no regular safety drills are conducted for crew aboard any MARAD vessels, a core requirement for international passenger shipping safety.

Further testimony from MARAD Captain Anthony Williams, who was formally confirmed to his captain rank only in April 2026, raised additional red flags about the agency’s promotion and training standards. Williams told the COI he transitioned to a maritime command role from maintenance engineering just two years prior, earning a grade three boat master’s license via examination in 2024 before upgrading to a grade two license in 2025. Before his confirmation as captain, he only had experience piloting small pilot boats. Williams also admitted he has never received formal training in Search and Rescue (SAR) protocols, despite having taken part in a 2012 boat accident response at Crab Falls in Region Seven Cuyuni-Mazaruni.

When questioned about basic maritime navigation and safety knowledge, Williams declined to comment on his familiarity with the Douglas Sea Scale, the globally recognized 10-point system used to measure sea roughness and tidal current speed. He also told investigators there is no formal system in place for MARAD crews to access up-to-date information on coastal hydrological conditions, and could not recall any details about wind conditions in the area on July 19, just hours after the ferry capsized.

A former second engineer with the Transport and Harbour Department, who was seconded to MARAD for basic training and worked on the MV Barima back in 2010, confirmed that the vessel had a long history of mechanical issues. He told the COI he carried out repeated corrective mechanical maintenance on the vessel before its engine and crane were replaced, noting that “At that time, Barima still had a Blackstone engine, and most of the time the engine or the generator was under repair just to keep the vessel running.”

Recalling the night of the disaster, the former engineer said that at 12:20 a.m. on July 19, shore coxswain Mr. Benjamin contacted him to request the use of the survey tug MT Arau to assist the MV Barima after the ferry reported engine failure. Shortly after, he was informed the vessel had already capsized. Multiple vessels, including pilot boats HAKIWA and HAIMA, were deployed to the disaster zone for rescue operations, which recovered survivors and transported them to Pomeroon. Captain Williams, who commanded one of the response vessels, told the COI his crew did not recover any survivors, only arriving to find debris from the wreck floating across the water.

“When we got to the coordinates plotted on GPS, all we saw was wreckage floating,” Williams said. “Everything was there: ice boxes, gas bottles, book bags, clothes, shoes, all personal belongings. We even saw two or three empty life rafts bobbing on the water.”