Carib Scope

分类： world

  • Chinese-linked crime networks funnelling millions out of T&T

    Chinese-linked crime networks funnelling millions out of T&T

    Over the course of the past 10 years, transnational criminal networks allegedly tied to Chinese organized crime have steadily embedded themselves deeper into the socio-economic fabric of Trinidad and Tobago, broadening their illegal footprint across a spectrum of illicit activities ranging from drug and human trafficking to large-scale money laundering. According to multiple anonymous intelligence and law enforcement sources who spoke with local outlet Sunday Express, these criminal operations generate hundreds of millions of dollars in illegal proceeds, a large share of which is siphoned out of the Caribbean nation and moved back to China through sophisticated, well-disguised channels.

    Media coverage spanning multiple years has consistently documented the rising influence of these networks across the Caribbean, where they operate smuggling rings, unregulated underground gambling venues, immigration fraud schemes, and sham corporate front organizations that conceal illicit cash flows and shadowy business dealings. A 2022 investigative report from ProPublica highlighted testimony from a U.S. military official to Congress, which identified Chinese money launderers as the “number one underwriter” of drug trafficking activities across the Western Hemisphere, bringing global attention to the growing control of Chinese organized crime over drug-related money laundering in the region.

    Interviews with current and former law enforcement officials and financial industry insiders, all granted anonymity to protect their safety and professional standing, confirm that this trend has continued to accelerate exponentially, with criminal operations growing both in geographic reach and operational complexity across Trinidad and Tobago and the broader Caribbean. Senior intelligence sources note that illegal criminal proceeds are increasingly laundered through seemingly legitimate local businesses, outpacing the capacity of domestic law enforcement to detect and disrupt these activities as they grow in scale and sophistication.

    In its 2023 annual public report, Trinidad and Tobago’s Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU) flagged a growing volume of suspicious money laundering transactions and highlighted suspected tax evasion schemes carried out by foreign nationals operating in the country. A senior source with deep ties to the FIU confirmed to Sunday Express that the report’s findings disproportionately focus on financial activities linked to Chinese nationals, though the document does not explicitly single out Chinese citizens as a group. The source explained that the overrepresentation of Chinese-linked transactions reflects the actual prevalence of suspicious activity involving these networks, rather than targeted bias, and the findings are framed as part of broader trends in illicit financial activity.

    The FIU source detailed common methods used by these networks to move illicit funds out of the country. One widespread tactic involves employees of Chinese-owned businesses—including restaurants, casinos, and supermarkets—using their personal local bank accounts to deposit cash collected by their employers. Debit cards linked to these accounts are then sent to China, where the funds can be withdrawn directly, avoiding the formal cross-border wire transfer process that would trigger regulatory scrutiny.

    Trade-based money laundering (TBML) is another widely used technique, the source added. One common TBML scheme involves inflating invoice values for imported goods: for example, a trader importing goods with a true value of $100,000 from China may use a falsified invoice listing the value as $300,000, allowing the extra $200,000 in illicit funds to be wired to China under the guise of legitimate trade payment. A second TBML tactic involves misrepresenting the content of cargo shipments: bills of lading list legal goods that do not match the actual cargo, which may include contraband, illicit proceeds, or materials linked to other criminal activities. This method often requires collusion with corrupt local customs officials to pass through border checks undetected.

    Sources also warn of growing collusion between local Chinese business owners and transnational Chinese Triad criminal networks. Triads provide upfront capital for Chinese nationals to open businesses and purchase real estate in Trinidad and Tobago, eliminating the need for applicants to seek loans from local financial institutions that would trigger formal background and financial scrutiny. This allows criminal networks to expand their control over local assets without drawing early attention from regulators.

    Despite the sophisticated concealment tactics, these activities have not evaded detection entirely. The Financial Investigation Branch (FIB) of the Trinidad and Tobago Police Service (TTPS) is currently conducting multiple ongoing investigations into Chinese-linked money laundering networks and the local money mules they use to route illicit funds, launched following referrals from the FIU. However, investigators face significant structural barriers, most notably a persistent language barrier. Currently, investigators must rely on translation services provided by the Chinese Embassy for case-related materials, and there are ongoing concerns that the translations provided may not be fully accurate, hampering investigative progress.

    Another common channel for moving illicit funds out of the country uses bulk shipments of scrap iron as cover for large volumes of U.S. currency bound for China, according to a senior police source from a specialized anti-crime unit familiar with the operations. Compressed bundles of U.S. cash are disguised as blocks of wood and mixed into scrap iron shipments, with individual shipments often containing 8 to 9 such bundles totaling millions of dollars in illegal proceeds. While the source could not provide an exact cumulative total for the amount of funds moved through this method over the past decade, they confirmed that estimates run into hundreds of millions of U.S. dollars.

    These networks build up large supplies of U.S. cash through their network of legitimate-seeming local businesses, including grocery stores, restaurants, and casinos, before channelling the currency overseas through these smuggling routes. In a high-profile raid last year, Trinidad and Tobago Special Branch officers shut down an alleged criminal hub at a San Fernando mall linked to Chinese organized crime. During the operation, police seized more than $2 million in cash, 36 undocumented immigrants from China and Venezuela, multiple illegal firearms, and a large stockpile of ammunition. The mall’s proprietor, who held a valid local firearms license, was charged with ammunition possession violations and granted bail ahead of trial. Intelligence sources confirm the mall had long been used as a meeting location for Triad members, Chinese business owners, and corrupt local immigration officials to negotiate criminal deals.

    Multiple sources explained that the networks use a “colour coding” system to label their business operations, allowing involved Chinese business owners to quickly identify which criminal boss controls the laundering operations tied to each specific business. This internal organizational system helps avoid territorial disputes and keeps operations compartmentalized to reduce the risk of detection.

    Senior intelligence also notes that many Chinese business owners connected to the networks rent large warehouse spaces across Trinidad and Tobago to store counterfeit consumer goods including knockoff footwear, apparel, cigarettes, and unregulated pharmaceutical drugs. These goods are sold exclusively for cash, and the illicit proceeds are then converted to U.S. currency and smuggled out of the country with the assistance of corrupt local Trinidadians and bribed law enforcement officers. The source added that the networks rely on violent enforcement to eliminate internal rivals and external obstacles, smuggling in hitmen from outside the country to resolve disputes and remove threats to their operations.

    While many of these businesses appear to be routine, legitimate commercial operations to outside observers, senior financial analysts warn that they cause severe, ongoing harm to Trinidad and Tobago’s economy and institutional integrity. Beyond draining hundreds of millions of dollars in capital out of the country each year, the networks undercut local legitimate businesses through unfair competition, embed criminal influence into everyday commercial transactions, and erode regulatory oversight.

    Senior financial sources explain that while the operations may create a superficial illusion of economic growth, they are riddle with abusive and illicit practices including systematic tax evasion, exploitative low wages, and illegal currency market manipulation. A particularly damaging impact has been the networks’ large-scale purchases of U.S. dollars on the black market, which has significantly worsened the country’s ongoing foreign exchange shortage, a crisis that already harms legitimate local businesses that struggle to access sufficient U.S. dollar reserves for legitimate trade.

  • Ghana and Antigua and Barbuda Begin 90-Day Visa-Free Travel

    Ghana and Antigua and Barbuda Begin 90-Day Visa-Free Travel

    Ghanaian passport holders have gained new visa-free travel access to three countries across the Caribbean, Africa and South Asia, following the entry into force of reciprocal agreements officially announced by Ghana’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The most expansive of the new policies grants Ghanaian travelers the right to visit Antigua and Barbuda without a pre-departure visa for stays of up to 90 days. For the other two partner nations – the Maldives and Zambia – Ghanaian citizens may also enter without visa approval, with a maximum permitted stay of 30 days in both countries. All three agreements cover every category of Ghanaian passport, including ordinary travel passports, official service passports and diplomatic passports. Critically, the arrangements are fully reciprocal, meaning eligible citizens of Antigua and Barbuda, the Maldives and Zambia enjoy the same visa-free entry privileges when traveling to Ghana, aligned with the same stay duration terms outlined for Ghanaian travelers. While the new pacts eliminate visa requirements, travelers still must meet all basic entry rules for their destination. This includes holding a valid passport that meets the host country’s validity standards, complying with standard immigration screening processes, and adhering to any prevailing public health or entry regulations in place at the time of travel. Anyone planning to work, enroll in educational programs, or establish permanent residence in a destination country is still required to apply for and obtain the appropriate specialized permits before their arrival. Ghana’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs outlined the core objectives driving the new agreements, noting that the policy changes are designed to cut down on travel barriers for citizens of all four countries, while deepening diplomatic, economic and people-to-people ties between Ghana and each partner nation. The official announcement of the new visa-waiver rules was made on September 8, coinciding with the date the agreements formally entered into force. Local Ghanaian media outlet Graphic Online first published detailed reporting on the terms and implications of the new policies after the official announcement.

  • BRICS roept op tot kalmte in Midden-Oosten en benadrukt belang van wereldwijde handel

    BRICS roept op tot kalmte in Midden-Oosten en benadrukt belang van wereldwijde handel

    Against a backdrop of soaring global geopolitical tension driven by overlapping conflicts in the Middle East and Ukraine, the 2026 BRICS Summit convened in New Delhi this weekend, bringing together leaders of the 11-member bloc of major emerging economies to address shared global challenges and chart a new course for collective influence in the international order.

    Hosted by Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, the summit launched on Saturday and wrapped up on Sunday, marking the handover of the BRICS rotating gavel to India. High-profile attendees included Chinese President Xi Jinping, making his first visit to India in seven years, Russian President Vladimir Putin, and Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian. Other participating leaders included South African President Cyril Ramaphosa, Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed, and Indonesian President Prabowo Subianto. The United Arab Emirates sent its Abu Dhabi Crown Prince as representative, while founding member Brazil was represented by Foreign Minister Mauro Vieira. Senior leaders from key global institutions, including World Health Organization, World Trade Organization, and UN Secretary-General António Guterres also joined the gathering.

    In a landmark joint declaration adopted by all member states, BRICS leaders first prioritized the escalating crisis in the Middle East, expressing deep alarm over the ongoing spiral of tensions and calling on all parties to exercise maximum restraint. The statement specifically warned against intentional strikes on civilian infrastructure and nuclear facilities, and reaffirmed the bloc’s longstanding position on the Palestinian issue. Members issued a firm rejection of the forced displacement of Palestinian people and any attempt to alter the geographic or demographic status of occupied Palestinian territories. The declaration also called for an immediate end to Israeli military operations in Gaza, voiced full support for the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees (UNRWA), and backed full UN membership status for an independent Palestinian state.

    Beyond regional conflict, the joint declaration outlined a broader agenda focused on strengthening global economic resilience, expanding cooperation among non-Western economies, and countering what members frame as unfair Western-dominated global governance structures. Key priorities included expanding cross-border alternative payment systems to reduce reliance on Western-dominated financial infrastructure, deepening collaborative research and governance frameworks for artificial intelligence, and unified opposition to unilateral sanctions and protectionist trade tariffs that disrupt global commerce.

    In his remarks following his arrival in New Delhi on Saturday morning, President Xi emphasized that the ongoing conflict in the Middle East runs counter to the core interests of the entire global community, noting the catastrophic human and economic losses the crisis has already inflicted across regions. A day before the summit officially opened, Prime Minister Modi held bilateral talks with President Putin, where the two leaders agreed to deepen bilateral strategic and economic ties, and later met with Iranian President Pezeshkian to discuss critical issues of maritime navigation freedom and the safety of commercial shipping crews. During a closed-door plenary session, Egyptian President el-Sisi echoed these concerns, stressing that regional instability and disruptions to navigation in the Middle East have already caused severe spillover damage to the global economy, international trade flows, and global energy supplies.

    Founded in 2009 as a cooperative forum for emerging economies seeking greater representation in global institutions long dominated by Western powers, BRICS has expanded significantly in recent years to 11 current members, growing its footprint as a leading voice for the Global South. However, the 2026 summit also laid bare the significant internal divisions that challenge the bloc’s unified action. Longstanding regional tensions between members Iran and the United Arab Emirates, who stand on opposite sides of ongoing confrontations between Iran, Israel and the United States, have created rifts over how to frame the Middle East conflict. A recent meeting of BRICS foreign ministers failed to produce a unified statement on the crisis, despite the bloc’s unified condemnation of U.S. and Israeli airstrikes on Iran last year. Beyond regional splits, BRICS also faces external pressure: successive U.S. administrations have imposed sweeping tariff measures on multiple BRICS members and labeled the bloc an anti-American actor, while the bloc’s finance ministers have pushed back against these measures, arguing they violate core WTO trade rules.

    As chair, India has navigated these competing interests to push for a unified declaration, while working to strengthen the bloc’s collective influence on the global stage. Against the persistent backdrop of Middle East conflict, BRICS faces growing urgency to mitigate global economic damage and secure critical commercial shipping lanes, all while advancing its long-term goal of building alternative trade and financial systems to counter Western dominance. Despite internal challenges that make unity an ongoing struggle, the 2026 New Delhi summit has made clear the bloc’s enduring ambition to emerge as a stronger, more influential voice for the Global South in an increasingly fractured global order.

  • Security : Vladimir Paraison at the 5th UN Police Chiefs’ Summit (Speech)

    Security : Vladimir Paraison at the 5th UN Police Chiefs’ Summit (Speech)

    On the sidelines of the 5th United Nations Police Chiefs’ Summit (UNCOPS 2026) held in New York, Haiti’s top security leadership has delivered a urgent call for coordinated multilateral action to confront the cascading security crisis destabilizing the Caribbean nation and the broader region.

    Leading the Haitian delegation to the September 2026 summit was Public Security Minister Patrick Pélissier, with senior security figures joining the delegation including Acting Commander-in-Chief of the Haitian National Police (PNH) Vladimir Paraison, Armed Forces of Haiti (FAd’H) Commander-in-Chief Lieutenant General Derby Guerrier, PNH Chief Inspector General Frédéric Leconte, and Presidential Security Coordinator Inspector General Jacques Joël Orival.

    In his keynote address to the assembly, Paraison spoke on behalf of Haiti, framing the country’s ongoing security fight as a sovereign mission to reclaim full control of its national security landscape. He opened by outlining the foundational threat driving Haiti’s instability: transnational regional drug trafficking that has eroded governance and fractured stability across the island, with Haiti bearing the brunt of the crisis.

    To counter this threat, Paraison argued for a fundamental shift in Haiti’s security strategy, emphasizing that outdated, isolated operational models are no longer sufficient. He called for investment in cutting-edge technological infrastructure for border management, including purpose-built maritime vessels equipped with advanced real-time intelligence capabilities that allow for rapid information sharing and coordinated interception operations between frontline units and command decision-makers.

    Paraison stressed that the era of unilateral police action has passed, pointing to the UNCOPS platform as a critical framework for regional security collaboration. This multilateral space, he noted, enables strategic pooling of critical human, logistical, and technological resources across regional police forces — a synergy that is non-negotiable for defeating transnational criminal networks.

    A core point of Paraison’s address centered on the systemic imbalance fueling Haiti’s crisis: while Haiti abides by international arms controls and lacks a domestic defense industry, criminal gangs operating across its territory benefit from a steady, unimpeded flow of advanced heavy weaponry. He emphasized that the bravery of Haitian security forces on the front lines cannot alone resolve a crisis whose roots stretch far beyond Haiti’s national borders. Unchecked arms smuggling, he said, continues to fuel terrorist activity and prevent any path to lasting stability, requiring urgent multilateral commitment to close cross-border trafficking routes.

    In a striking rebuke of diluted framing of the crisis, Paraison called on the international community to abandon language that minimizes the severity of the threat facing Haiti. The armed groups operating in the country are not merely loose collections of delinquents, he argued: through their brutal tactics and deliberate campaign of civilian terror, they qualify as full-fledged terrorist organizations. What Haiti is confronting today, he added, is not isolated street crime, but the expanding reach of a global hybrid criminal network. This network, fueled by the dangerous convergence of arms trafficking, drug smuggling, and money laundering, poses a threat not only to Haiti’s national stability but to the entire Caribbean region’s security.

    To embed this priority in global governance, Paraison urged that United Nations Police priorities be systematically integrated into the core agenda of all major international forums focused on peace and global security. Only through robust, coordinated collective action, he said, can the international community build a more secure global order.

    Paraison concluded his address by reiterating Haiti’s deep gratitude to the international community, and specifically the United Nations, for ongoing support through the Global Security Fund (GSF) in Haiti’s relentless campaign against criminal networks. Even as it welcomes international partnership, he reaffirmed, the Haitian government maintains that national security remains the primary sovereign responsibility of Haitian state institutions. Mandated by the Haitian Constitution, the Haitian National Police and Armed Forces of Haiti are working tirelessly to restore peace, public order, and freedom of movement for all Haitian citizens, and the country remains confident that it will ultimately succeed in this mission.

    “Let us work towards a secure world, a better Haiti,” Paraison said, closing his address.

  • Dominica confirms receiving five Colombian deportees from US

    Dominica confirms receiving five Colombian deportees from US

    BASSETERRE, St. Kitts — In a recent public statement addressing growing regional scrutiny over immigration cooperation between Caribbean nations and the United States, Prime Minister Roosevelt Skerrit of Dominica has officially confirmed that the country recently accepted five Colombian nationals deported from the U.S. — all of whom have already completed their transfer back to Colombia.

    The disclosure came on September 9, amid ongoing questions across the Caribbean about bilateral agreements between regional governments and Washington D.C. to temporarily host deportees who are not citizens of the receiving nations. Skerrit outlined to reporters that the process began when U.S. authorities shared an initial list of prospective deportees with Dominica. After reviewing the documentation and requesting additional background information, the Dominica government declined to accept any individuals from this first round of names.

    “They did not accept those names, and they subsequently sent us a second list of people to choose from,” Skerrit explained. From this revised roster, Dominica approved five Colombian citizens for temporary entry. All five have since departed Dominica for their home country, a process Skerrit described as completed in very short order. “So there were five Colombians who came in, and in quick time they left Dominica, and they went to Colombia. It was very fast, and so at present we have no third-country nationals in Dominica,” the prime minister added.

    To manage the logistics of the temporary transfer, the International Organization for Migration (IOM) was contracted to coordinate the process on behalf of the Dominica government, Skerrit confirmed. All costs related to housing, food and care for the deportees during their stay were fully covered by funding from the U.S. government. The five individuals were accommodated at a local hotel for the duration of their brief stay, with all basic needs met during that time.

    Contrary to assumptions that this was a one-off arrangement, Skerrit clarified that the transfer falls under a standing agreement between Dominica and the U.S., which anticipates the arrival of between five and eight third-country deportees each calendar quarter. The prime minister emphasized that his administration has adopted a strict, cautious approach to vetting all prospective deportees, placing particular priority on verifying full background information before approving any transfers.

    In the case of the five Colombians, Skerrit confirmed that none of the individuals had any prior criminal records. He framed their situation as a common consequence of irregular migration, noting that the men had traveled to the U.S. seeking improved economic opportunities before they encountered immigration enforcement and removal proceedings. “I guess we’re just people trying to make a better living in the United States, and they found themselves in difficulties and had to be sent out, but none of them had any criminal records,” Skerrit said.

    The agreement between Dominica and the U.S. comes amid a broader push by the administration of U.S. President Donald Trump to ramp up enforcement of American immigration laws and accelerate the removal of individuals residing in the country without legal authorization. Beyond direct deportations back to an individual’s country of origin, the U.S. has negotiated agreements with multiple third-party nations, including several Caribbean states, to facilitate temporary accommodation for deportees who cannot be immediately transferred to their home countries.

    Most of these regional agreements cap the number of deportees accepted at any given time and require that all individuals admitted have no serious criminal history, matching the framework that Skerrit outlined for Dominica’s arrangement. Despite these safeguards, the agreements have sparked public debate and concern across parts of the Caribbean, including in St. Kitts and Nevis, with critics questioning the potential impacts of accepting third-country nationals and the long-term commitments regional governments have made to the U.S. on immigration policy. For Dominica, however, Skerrit’s statement makes clear that all deportees admitted under the most recent transfer have already departed, leaving the island currently with no third-country nationals in temporary residence.

  • FLASH : Nearly a hundred Haitians expelled from the USA have lived through hell

    FLASH : Nearly a hundred Haitians expelled from the USA have lived through hell

    On Thursday, September 10, 2026, a U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) deportation flight carrying Haitian migrants descended into chaos after multiple avoidable disruptions left dozens of repatriated people subjected to inhumane treatment and overwhelmed Haitian migration authorities scrambling to provide basic support. What was supposed to be a scheduled midday arrival at Cap-Haitien’s Hugo Chávez International Airport turned into a 7-hour delayed landing after sunset, in the middle of torrential rain, and long after all Haitian government offices had closed for the day.

    The journey of these migrants began at 7:34 a.m. when Global X charter flight 6122 first departed Alexandria, Louisiana, headed for a stopover in South Florida. What followed was hours of unexplained holding at Opa-locka airport, with the plane only departing for Haiti at 5:10 p.m. It finally touched down in Cap-Haitien at 7:05 p.m. Compounding this delay was the fact that all 98 deportees on board had been kept in shackles for more than 13 hours before they even landed, a period that does not include their total flight time.

    In addition to the unanticipated delay, ICE violated pre-existing agreements with Haiti’s National Migration Office (ONM) by adding 27 extra deportees to the flight without any prior notification, pushing the total number of returnees from the planned 71 to 98. The sudden increase stretched the ONM’s already tight operating budget to breaking point, turning what should have been a standard reception process into an arduous, underfunded emergency.

    Prior to this flight, Haitian authorities had planned to increase the standard reentry assistance stipend for deportees from the longstanding $80 to $200 per person, to help returnees cover travel and basic living costs after arriving back in Haiti. But the unplanned surge in numbers, paired with the late-hour arrival, left the agency without enough funding to deliver the increased stipend or even cover temporary accommodation for the group.

    Jean Négot Bonheur Delva, Director General of the ONM, explained the structural issues created by ICE’s disregard for agreed protocols. “The cut-off time for receiving a plane is 1:00 or 2:00 PM, as it takes us two to three hours to provide assistance to these migrants. In Haiti, we work from 8:00 AM to 4:00 PM,” Delva said in a media statement.

    Despite the severe logistical challenges and poor weather, Haitian on-ground staff managed to provide all 98 returnees with a hot meal and the official documentation forwarded by U.S. authorities. The group of returnees included a diverse cross-section of people with longstanding ties to the U.S.: 15 had entered the country through the Biden administration’s humanitarian parole program, dozens were active asylum seekers, one was a legal U.S. green card holder, and 50 had been residing in the U.S. under Temporary Protected Status (TPS). Two young children were also on the flight: a 3-year-old U.S. citizen and a 6-year-old born in Brazil.

    Delva confirmed that mobilized ONM staff did not finish processing all deportees and leave the airport until after 2:00 a.m. the next day. “This has a cost,” Delva emphasized, noting that the agency also incurred unexpected costs for emergency bus requisition to transport the group. “It’s a problem for us; it’s demoralizing.”

    The September 10 flight is part of a recent surge in ICE deportations of Haitian nationals from the United States, following the termination of Haiti’s TPS designation, according to prior reporting on the ongoing repatriation operation.

  • BRICS-top: Daagt de groep echt een door het Westen gedomineerde wereld uit?

    BRICS-top: Daagt de groep echt een door het Westen gedomineerde wereld uit?

    This weekend, leaders of the BRICS bloc of major emerging economies will convene in New Delhi for their annual summit, hosted by India. The gathering, taking place on September 12 and 13, comes as the group continues to grapple with deep internal divisions over a regional conflict that has roiled global markets and strained international alliances this year, marking the bloc’s third attempt to reach a unified consensus on the crisis.

    Russian President Vladimir Putin arrived in New Delhi on Friday, setting the stage for talks that will test the bloc’s ability to bridge competing interests. The conflict at the center of divisions is the U.S.-led military campaign against Iran, which joined BRICS as a new member in 2024 alongside the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Ethiopia, and Indonesia. The rift has pitted Iran against the UAE, laying bare the competing geopolitical priorities that have long hampered coordinated action within the 11-nation bloc.

    Founded in the aftermath of the 2008 global financial crisis and the collapse of the WTO’s Doha Development Round, BRICS was created to challenge the post-WWII Western-led international order that emerging economies argued systematically sidelined the interests of the Global South. Nearly 20 years after its formation, analysts agree the bloc has succeeded in making the global order more multipolar, but it has struggled to build a cohesive alternative framework to replace Western-dominated institutions.

    Many experts argue that measuring BRICS success by its ability to replace Western-led institutions misses the point of the bloc’s core mission. “We tend to underestimate every BRICS initiative because it is not the revolution we expected,” note Octavio Oliveira and Enzo Godinho, Brazilian researchers at the University of São Paulo’s BRICS Studies Group. “While it lacks the institutional capacity of the United Nations to address major geopolitical issues, its very existence provides a critical platform for Global South nations to amplify their voices and pursue cooperation outside Western frameworks.”

    Analysts emphasize that BRICS was never intended to fully displace the Western order, only to offer Global South countries greater negotiating power and alternative pathways for development. “What unites BRICS members above all is the desire to grow their economies through international trade and put an end to the West’s moral lecturing on human rights and democracy,” explains Sean Burges, an associate professor of international studies at Carleton University in Canada. Reform and greater autonomy, rather than overthrowing the liberal international order, are the bloc’s core priorities. Burges questions: “Why would BRICS want to take over the global governance responsibilities of the G7?”

    To date, BRICS has delivered tangible alternative channels for trade and investment centered on national development and poverty reduction. China’s model of unconditional development assistance and Brazil’s push for direct currency swaps between central banks are prime examples, Burges says. These initiatives have driven a sharp increase in economic exchange within BRICS and across the broader Global South, while the shift away from aid conditionalities has even pushed traditional Western-dominated institutions like the World Bank and IMF to reform their own practices.

    Geopolitical analyst Guy Burton points out that the definition of “the West” has shifted dramatically since BRICS was founded in the early 2000s, creating a more ambiguous landscape for the bloc’s challenge. “The West is fracturing, with the transatlantic alliance between the U.S. and Europe wobbling, so it is unclear exactly what BRICS is challenging — America or Europe,” Burton notes.

    While BRICS holds enormous collective economic weight — representing nearly half of the global population, 40 percent of global purchasing power, 44 percent of global oil production, and roughly a quarter of total world trade, with projected 2025 growth of 3.7 percent compared to just 1 percent for the G7, per IMF data — analysts agree its collective global influence remains far more limited than its size suggests.

    The bloc’s New Development Bank (NDB), its flagship multilateral financial institution, had only approved around $39 billion in lending by the end of 2024 — equal to just a few months of the World Bank’s total lending commitments. The NDB also raises the majority of its capital in U.S. dollars, and analysts say it has introduced little structural innovation, sharing many core characteristics with existing Western-led multilateral development banks.

    The single biggest barrier to BRICS challenging Western economic dominance is the continued global dominance of the U.S. dollar. “Despite widespread rhetoric around de-dollarization initiatives, most BRICS trade is still settled in dollars, and most members hold large dollar reserves, which reinforces the dollar’s position as the global reserve currency and limits members’ policy autonomy,” Oliveira and Godinho explain. While China has promoted wider use of the renminbi and Saudi Arabia has opened up to trade in non-dollar currencies, the dollar faces no serious near-term challenge, a trend Burton expects will hold for at least the next decade. Still, Imran Khalid, a geostrategic analyst, notes that while BRICS as a whole has not abandoned the dollar, individual members are gradually reducing their own dependence in a slow, largely irreversible shift.

    Even with these limitations, analysts argue BRICS’ economic contributions should not be discounted. The 2024 expansion that added major oil producers including Saudi Arabia, Iran, and the UAE has boosted the bloc’s collective influence, particularly in global energy markets. Chinese investments through the Belt and Road Initiative and other bilateral financing streams have also delivered concrete development and financing alternatives outside the traditional Bretton Woods system.

    The bloc’s greatest strength — its broad representation of Global South populations — is also its biggest weakness: deep internal divisions driven by competing national interests. In May, a BRICS foreign minister meeting in New Delhi failed to reach a consensus on the U.S.-Israel-Iran conflict, ending without a joint statement after Iran pushed to condemn U.S. and Israeli actions, a position the UAE refused to support. Notably, though, all major peace initiatives for the conflict have come from the Global South, not from Western capitals.

    Burges argues that BRICS expansion has widened, rather than narrowed, internal divisions. “Expansion increases representation of the Global South, but it dilutes the group’s cohesion,” he explains. Membership gave Iran a new global platform, but that does not mean all BRICS members align with Iran’s positions. “BRICS does not operate on a ‘one for all, all for one’ principle — members deliberately retain their freedom to act independently, which is the opposite of a tightly coordinated geopolitical bloc,” Burton says. While the original smaller BRICS grouping struggled to represent the full diversity of the Global South, expanded membership risks undermining collective action, even as Oliveira and Godinho view growing interest from new members as a positive sign of a shifting multipolar global order.

    In conclusion, analysts widely frame BRICS as more a platform for Global South autonomy than a direct challenger to the Western-led order. Without a common currency, unified trade tariffs, or collective defense commitments, it is not a conventional geopolitical bloc. Still, by creating alternative financing channels and facilitating trade outside Western institutions, it gives Global South nations greater room to maneuver between competing great power interests. Most importantly, experts note, it has already succeeded in weakening the effectiveness of Western political and economic pressure on individual developing nations.

  • Venezolaanse vissersboten krijgen na 19 jaren weer juridische basis

    Venezolaanse vissersboten krijgen na 19 jaren weer juridische basis

    After nearly two decades of operational ambiguity, Suriname and Venezuela have formally renewed their bilateral fisheries agreement, closing a long-standing legal gap that had threatened Suriname’s international seafood export access. The original 2007 agreement expired and was never updated, leaving more than 200 Venezuelan fishing vessels that have operated consistently in Suriname’s Atlantic waters without a formal bilateral regulatory framework.

    Confusion over the terms of the renewed deal spread late last week after Venezuela’s acting president Delcy Rodríguez issued an official statement following a meeting with Suriname’s president Jennifer Simons. Rodríguez claimed that 200 new fishing permits would be granted to Venezuelan vessels from the states of Nueva Esparta and Sucre to operate in a designated Atlantic corridor under Surinamese oversight. This wording led to widespread misunderstanding that Suriname would open its waters to 200 additional previously-unauthorized fishing boats.

    Parveen Amritpersad, Director of Suriname’s Fisheries Department, clarified the details in an interview with local outlet Starnieuws, stressing that no new vessels are being admitted to Surinamese waters. “This is not an expansion of foreign fishing access – we are simply formalizing the legal status of an existing fleet that has operated here for years,” Amritpersad explained. According to the Surinamese Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock and Fisheries (LVV), the renewal only updates the expired permits issued under the 2004 framework for the same group of vessels that have fished in the region consistently.

    For years after the original 2007 agreement lapsed, Venezuelan vessels continued to operate through a workaround: permits were issued to Surinamese seafood processing companies under national domestic regulations, and those companies then held working contracts with the Venezuelan fishing fleets. But this structure failed to meet international requirements, which mandate that foreign-flagged fishing vessels operate under a valid bilateral government-to-government agreement. Without this formal basis, Suriname risked sanctions on its seafood exports.

    The European Union had repeatedly flagged this gap to successive Surinamese governments, including it in official recommendations as a issue that required urgent correction to address unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing. Negotiations on renewal had stalled for years, in part due to political hold-ups on the Venezuelan side, but pressure from the EU accelerated finalization of the updated agreement.

    The new legal framework is critical to protecting Suriname’s key seafood export sector. Suriname is currently in ongoing talks with the European Commission to demonstrate its progress in combating IUU fishing, and international buyers now require strict proof that all fish caught for export operates under a valid regulatory regime with full traceability. This requirement extends to exports to the United States, where market access rules for seafood have tightened significantly in recent years.

    Under the terms of the renewed agreement, all participating Venezuelan vessels must comply with Suriname’s permit rules, including a requirement to land all catches at Surinamese ports for processing by local companies. Two major Surinamese processors, Deep Sea and Caribbean Seafood, already maintain long-term working relationships with the Venezuelan fleets, and all catches are required to be landed at the CEVIHAS port facility before processing and export.

  • Rodríguez vertrekt na tien overeenkomsten en afspraken

    Rodríguez vertrekt na tien overeenkomsten en afspraken

    Venezuela’s interim president Delcy Rodríguez has wrapped up an official one-day working visit to Suriname, returning to Caracas on Friday evening after a trip that has deepened ties between the two South American nations. Invited by Suriname’s president Jennifer Simons, Rodríguez and her delegation arrived in Paramaribo, Suriname’s capital, on Thursday evening, kicking off two days of diplomatic engagement.

    On Friday morning, Rodríguez received a formal ceremonial welcome at the Presidential Palace, where the two heads of state and their respective delegations held in-depth bilateral discussions covering a wide range of shared priority areas. By the end of the talks, the two sides had signed nine binding cooperation agreements and one joint statement, laying out a clear roadmap for expanded collaboration across multiple key sectors. The pacts cover agriculture and food security, fisheries and aquaculture, commercial aviation, tourism, oil and gas development, higher education, and specialized professional training.

    One of the most tangible outcomes of the visit centers on the fisheries sector. Rodríguez announced that 200 Venezuelan fishermen from the coastal states of Nueva Esparta and Sucre will be granted official permits to operate in an Atlantic fishing corridor designated and made available by the Surinamese government. Beyond fisheries, the two sides also reached agreements to launch new commercial air routes between the two countries and partner up to advance development of their shared oil and gas industries.

    During the negotiations, officials also addressed an ongoing legal matter involving Venezuela’s state-owned oil giant PDVSA. The issue centers on a third-party execution attachment placed on PDVSA assets located in Suriname, a dispute linked to the Petrocaribe regional energy compensation mechanism. As of the conclusion of Rodríguez’s visit, legal proceedings on this matter are still ongoing, with both sides confirming they will continue diplomatic engagement to find a resolution.

    In a forward-looking proposal, Suriname’s president Simons put forward a plan to convene meetings of the Suriname-Venezuela Political Consultation Mechanism and the Bilateral Joint Commission in the first half of 2027. These established bilateral frameworks are designed to flesh out technical details and drive progress on practical cooperation initiatives outlined during this latest summit.

    The official portion of Rodríguez’s visit concluded with a wreath-laying ceremony at the monument of Simón Bolívar, the iconic Venezuelan independence leader, located on Paramaribo’s Central Church Square. Following the ceremony, Simons hosted an official luncheon for Rodríguez and her entire delegation.

    Speaking at the conclusion of the visit, Rodríguez emphasized that both nations must now move forward with implementing the newly signed agreements to strengthen commercial integration and deepen long-standing bilateral ties. She also extended a formal reciprocal invitation to President Simons to visit Venezuela at a mutually convenient future date, opening the door for continued high-level diplomatic engagement between the two neighbors.

  • Here Is How Strong Belize’s Passport Is

    Here Is How Strong Belize’s Passport Is

    In the 2026 edition of the annual global passport ranking released by Passport Reports, Belize’s travel document has fallen eight positions to claim the 89th spot worldwide, marking a notable decline from its 81st place ranking in 2025.

    According to the report’s mobility scoring system, which measures a passport’s access to global destinations through simplified entry policies, Belize’s current mobility score stands at 101, down just one point from its 2025 score of 102. This relatively small dip in score has translated to a steeper drop in ranking amid shifting access policies for other nations around the globe.

    The 101-point score translates to visa-free travel, visa-on-arrival access, electronic travel authorization (eTA) approval, or other streamlined entry processes for 101 separate global destinations for Belizean passport holders. Breaking down the access categories, 58 of these destinations allow fully visa-free entry, 37 offer visa-on-arrival or other simplified entry arrangements, and an additional six destinations require an eTA approval before arrival. Combined, these accessible locations represent 51% of all tracked global destinations, leaving 97 destinations that require Belizean citizens to secure an advance travel visa before entry.

    Regional analysis of Belize’s passport access shows that the Caribbean remains the strongest region for the country’s travelers: Belizean passport holders enjoy 100% access to all Caribbean nations via visa-free, simplified entry, or eTA rules. In North America, Belize maintains a 90.9% access rate across the region, though both the United States and Canada still require advance visas for Belizean visitors. For key European destinations, the United Kingdom only requires an eTA for Belizean travelers, but all nations in the Schengen Area continue to require full advance visas for entry.

    The ranking shift highlights ongoing challenges for Belizean citizens seeking streamlined international travel, even as overall mobility access has remained largely stable in recent years. While regional access across the Caribbean remains unobstructed, major global economic and travel hubs still impose significant entry barriers that limit the passport’s overall global standing.