Carib Scope

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  • Laatste Amerikaanse troepen verlaten Irak; milities weigeren wapens neer te leggen

    Laatste Amerikaanse troepen verlaten Irak; milities weigeren wapens neer te leggen

    As the final contingent of US troops packs their equipment to leave Iraq, Baghdad faces two interconnected critical deadlines that will shape the country’s security and political landscape for years to come. However, most powerful Shiite militias have already made clear they have no intention of laying down their arms, leaving major unanswered questions about what Iraq will look like after the full US military withdrawal.

    The US-led international coalition is accelerating its drawdown of forces, according to a senior anonymous US military official, who spoke on condition of anonymity because he was not authorized to speak publicly on the matter. All remaining US troops stationed in northern Iraq, numbering in the hundreds, will complete their withdrawal by the September 30 deadline. Most troops will be redeployed to Jordan and other regional countries, and key military equipment including air defense systems will be relocated alongside personnel.

    The timeline of US military engagement in Iraq stretches back more than two decades: the US invaded Iraq in 2003, ousted longtime leader Saddam Hussein, withdrew all forces in 2011, then returned in 2014 at the request of the Iraqi government to combat the rise of the Islamic State (IS) terror group. With the IS threat largely diminished after years of counterterrorism operations, Washington and Baghdad reached a 2024 agreement to gradually end the US combat mission. Last year, US troops withdrew from bases across most of Iraq, leaving only a small presence in the semi-autonomous Kurdistan region in the north.

    After the full withdrawal is complete, the US will open negotiations for a “normal bilateral security cooperation” framework with Baghdad’s central government, the official confirmed, though the exact structure of this future partnership remains undecided. The official noted that the counterterrorism base in Erbil, the capital of Iraqi Kurdistan, has lost strategic importance for US forces as the IS threat has receded. While northern Iraq was never used as an offensive launchpad during the period of heightened US-Iran tensions, US troops stationed there were repeatedly targeted by attacks from Iran and Iranian-aligned Iraqi militias. This withdrawal will therefore “reduce our exposure” to such attacks, the official added.

    The Iraqi government tied the US withdrawal to a separate ultimatum requiring all armed militias to disarm by the same September 30 deadline. Iraqi Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi promised after his July meeting with US President Donald Trump at the White House that the disarmament of Iraq’s powerful armed factions would be finalized before the end of September, aligning with the coalition’s withdrawal timeline.

    However, Iraqi government officials have sent conflicting signals about whether September 30 is a firm disarmament deadline. Government spokesperson Sabah al-Numan said last week that discussions and dialogue are still ongoing, and the disarmament issue will not be resolved until after the international coalition completes its withdrawal. Qasim al-Araji, the prime minister’s security advisor, clarified that September 30 is only the deadline for coalition troop withdrawal, not for militia weapons handover.

    For many observers of Iraqi politics, the failure of the September 30 disarmament goal is already a foregone conclusion. “On September 30, no armed groups will have disarmed. I think that is clear to anyone who follows Iraqi politics,” said Iraqi analyst Sajad Jiyad during a recent workshop hosted by the Washington-based think tank Atlantic Council.

    While a small number of less influential militias have agreed to hand over weapons, the most powerful factions with close ties to Iran — including Kataib Hezbollah, Harakat al-Nujaba and Kataib Sayyid al-Shuhada — have either outright rejected the disarmament demand or attached conditions the Iraqi government is highly unlikely to meet in the near term. These conditions include bringing the Kurdish Peshmerga security forces in northern Iraq under full central Iraqi military control, and expelling Iranian Kurdish opposition groups and the PKK, which maintain bases in the northern border region.

    One senior official with a pro-Iranian Iraqi militia put the position even more bluntly: “After these preconditions are set, discussion will shift to regulating weapons holdings, not surrendering them. The factions have absolutely made no decision to give up weapons, and we have not handed over any weapons to date.”

    Forcing full disarmament by military means is widely seen as an enormous challenge for Baghdad. The militias are organized under the “Iraqi Islamic Resistance,” an umbrella group of roughly 10 hardline Shiite armed factions that together command around 50,000 fighters and possess advanced weaponry including long-range rockets and air defense systems. The group has claimed responsibility for dozens of rocket and drone attacks targeting Israel and US forces in Iraq and Syria over the past several years.

    Beyond their military power, the militias have deep and entrenched economic interests across Iraq’s construction, real estate, and currency exchange sectors, giving them powerful incentives to retain their autonomy and armed status.

    Most of these militia factions are formally part of the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), an umbrella organization that was officially integrated into Iraq’s national security forces in 2016 and nominally falls under the authority of the prime minister. However, many of the most powerful factions operate with near-total autonomy and maintain close strategic and political ties to Iran.

    A senior Iraqi government official outlined the administration’s current strategy: the government aims to bring all armed factions under the full command of the Iraqi army. Baghdad hopes factions will transfer high-risk “dynamic weapons” such as rockets and long-range systems to the central command of the PMF, before the independent factions are dissolved and integrated into the PMF and national army structure.

    Concerns are growing over the security outlook for Iraq’s semi-autonomous Kurdistan region following the US withdrawal. While the drawdown removes a key target for attacks from the area, analysts warn it will not end the threat of violence. Mohammed A. Salih, a non-resident senior fellow at the US-based Foreign Policy Research Institute and an expert on Kurdish and Iraqi affairs, noted that Iran and its aligned groups have already targeted other sites in the Kurdistan region unrelated to US troops, including bases of exiled Iranian Kurdish opposition groups, energy infrastructure, and even the office of Kurdistan Regional Prime Minister Masrour Barzani.

    “The withdrawal will further expose the Kurdish region and make it an easier target for attacks,” Salih said.

    Kurdistan Regional Government officials declined to comment on the record, but Barzani has publicly stated his concern that the removal of US air defense systems will leave the region far more vulnerable to attack. In response, al-Numan said last week that the Iraqi central government is finalizing purchases of new air defense systems from South Korea, Turkey, and the United States, which will be deployed according to a carefully crafted military plan to ensure full protection of Iraqi airspace, including the Kurdistan region.

  • Dominica-flagged ship caught in Houthi attack as Human Rights Watch raises war-crimes concerns

    Dominica-flagged ship caught in Houthi attack as Human Rights Watch raises war-crimes concerns

    On August 5, 2026, a ballistic missile explosion took place just meters away from the oil tanker *Daisy*, a commercial vessel registered under the flag of the Commonwealth of Dominica, as it transited westward through the strategically vital Gulf of Aden. The Yemen-based Houthi movement quickly issued a statement claiming full responsibility for the strike, asserting their weapon had directly hit the tanker and forced it to reverse course. However, independent maritime accounts have painted a far more nuanced picture of what unfolded that afternoon.

    Local time around 5:30 PM, the *Daisy*’s captain reported a deafening explosion in the immediate vicinity of the vessel, according to data from the United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations (UKMTO). The regulatory body confirmed the blast’s shockwave caused only superficial damage to the hull, and all crew members emerged from the incident unharmed. Maritime security firm Vanguard Tech further clarified the explosion occurred roughly 40 meters off the tanker’s port side, placing the incident 95 nautical miles southeast of Aden, Yemen. To date, the Houthi claim of a direct missile hit and forced course reversal has not been verified by any independent third party.

    While the *Daisy* was able to continue its scheduled voyage to Djibouti without further incident, the attack has sent ripples across global maritime and geopolitical circles, particularly for the small Caribbean island nation of Dominica. Thousands of kilometers removed from the Middle East conflict, Dominica maintains an open ship registry that places hundreds of commercial vessels under its flag, plying every major international trade route including the high-risk waters surrounding the Arabian Peninsula. The Gulf of Aden, which links the Indian Ocean to the Red Sea via the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, carries roughly 10 percent of global trade annually, making it one of the world’s most economically critical yet increasingly dangerous maritime corridors.

    The incident gained new gravity more than a month later, when Human Rights Watch (HRW) released a formal assessment on September 15, 2026, concluding that recent Houthi attacks on commercial shipping in the region – including the strike on the *Daisy* – likely constitute war crimes under international humanitarian law. HRW researchers documented that the Houthi movement had knowledge, or should have had knowledge, that the *Daisy* and three other targeted vessels (the *Encelia*, *Tihamah*, and *Amzan*) were civilian commercial ships carrying non-military cargoes. The organization noted the Houthis have failed to produce any credible evidence to prove the vessels qualified as legitimate military targets, a requirement under international law for attacks on shipping in conflict zones.

    “Deliberate or reckless attacks against civilian crews violate core principles of the laws of war, and can be prosecuted as war crimes,” explained Niku Jafarnia, HRW’s lead researcher on the case. The organization emphasized that while its legal assessment is authoritative, it does not equate to a formal judicial conviction; no international court has yet issued a ruling on the *Daisy* incident. HRW has also called on the Houthi movement to immediately halt all unlawful attacks on civilian shipping in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden.

    The strike on the *Daisy* comes as part of a marked escalation of Houthi attacks on commercial shipping in the region. In July 2026, the group announced a self-declared maritime embargo against Saudi Arabia, and claimed responsibility for at least nine separate attacks on vessels between July 20 and August 24, four of which have been confirmed by independent authorities. This expansion of attacks beyond the Houthi’s traditional Red Sea operating area has raised the risk profile for all civilian vessels transiting the region, regardless of their nationality or connection to the ongoing Middle East conflict.

    For small island flag states like Dominica and other Caribbean nations, the incident has exposed a critical gap in global maritime security: how can vessels registered in states thousands of kilometers from conflict zones be protected when they transit high-risk international waters? Unlike military or large commercial fleets backed by major powers, most ships registered in small open registries lack armed escorts or dedicated security support, leaving them vulnerable to spillover from distant conflicts.

    Though the *Daisy* escaped without casualties or major structural damage, the incident serves as a stark warning for the global shipping community. In an era of unprecedented interconnectedness, where a vessel can carry the flag of a Caribbean island and transit waters off the coast of Yemen, the ripple effects of regional conflict extend far beyond the borders of the states directly involved. What began as a close call for one tanker and its crew has now become a central case in the growing global debate over protecting civilian shipping amid rising geopolitical tensions.

  • Dominican authorities launch Operation LM2 against cocaine trafficking network

    Dominican authorities launch Operation LM2 against cocaine trafficking network

    Authorities in the Dominican Republic have carried out a major coordinated crackdown on a transnational criminal syndicate smuggling massive volumes of cocaine to consumer markets in the United States and Europe, capping off a multi-year investigation with dozens of raids, large drug seizures and the arrest of one of the network’s top leaders.

    Officially dubbed Operation LM2, the enforcement action was a joint effort between the Dominican Public Prosecutor’s Office and the National Drug Control Directorate (DNCD), mobilizing a team of 13 specialized prosecutors and more than 150 trained DNCD law enforcement agents. To cut off escape routes and prevent evidence destruction, the agency carried out simultaneous search operations across three key regions: Greater Santo Domingo, Hato Mayor, and Santiago.

    When the dust settled from the raids, investigators had seized 168 packages of contraband confirmed to be cocaine, alongside a haul of illicit assets that included luxury high-end vehicles, a heavy-duty truck, a large sum of undeclared cash, multiple illegal firearms, and reams of documentary evidence linking the assets and suspects to the trafficking operation.

    One of the most high-profile captures was José Miguel Ceballos Rosario, widely known by his alias “El Viajero”, who law enforcement officials have named as a key leader of the organized trafficking network. Investigators note that multiple other high-value suspects connected to the ring remain at large, and have issued a public call for these fugitives to turn themselves in through official legal channels to avoid further legal repercussions.

    A closer inspection of the syndicate’s operations revealed a sophisticated smuggling concealment strategy: the 168 seized cocaine packages were hidden inside 31 solid metal tubes and bars stored at a compound in Villa Vásquez, Montecristi, which investigators confirmed served as a central collection and processing hub for the network. The site also held hundreds of cardboard boxes, custom cutting and shaping tools, and other specialized materials used to package and hide the illegal drugs before shipment.

    According to official investigation briefings, the network regularly moved multi-ton quantities of cocaine to the U.S. and European markets, using two common concealment tactics to evade border inspections: hiding drugs inside shipping boxes with custom-built false bottoms, and embedding contraband within heavy metal structural components. To further launder their operations and avoid suspicion, the syndicate operated both a network of legitimate front companies and untraceable shell corporations, making drug shipments appear to be legal commercial cargo.

    Operation LM2 is not an isolated bust: it grew directly out of a long-running investigation that first targeted a connected trafficking cell dismantled during earlier raids in La Vega and Monseñor Nouel. That earlier operation, carried out in 2023, resulted in the seizure of 392 cocaine slabs, three high-powered military-grade rifles, multiple vehicles, and specialized packaging machinery used to hide the drugs.

    The full investigation timeline stretches back to July 2023, when authorities first stumbled on the network’s activities during a raid on a rural farm in Jayaco. During that search, they found hundreds of pre-prepared cardboard boxes, dozens of which already had false bottoms holding hidden cocaine. Investigators also executed a search warrant on a private residence in Rincones de La Vega that the syndicate was using as a secondary drug collection center.

    That 2023 operation led to the arrest of three core members of the network: Basilio Saturria Mosquea, Danckeline De La Cruz, and José Luis Santana Vargas. All three were prosecuted by the Dominican Public Prosecutor’s Office, and ultimately sentenced to 15 years of prison each by the Collegiate Court of La Vega. The court also ordered the full confiscation of all assets connected to the group’s trafficking activities.

  • CDDH says at least 50 Dominicans allegedly traveled to Russia to fight in war

    CDDH says at least 50 Dominicans allegedly traveled to Russia to fight in war

    A prominent Dominican human rights organization has uncovered a troubling pattern of deceptive military recruitment that has sent hundreds of Dominican citizens to Russia to fight in an ongoing conflict, with dozens of travelers knowing they would serve as combatants and many more lured by false promises of legitimate work. The Dominican Committee for Human Rights (CDDH) has released new findings detailing that between June and August 2026 alone, at least 200 Dominicans made the journey to Russia: 50 of these individuals departed with full knowledge they would be recruited into military combat roles, while an additional 150 were tricked into traveling after being offered what they believed were legal, well-paying civilian jobs.

    Carlos Manuel Sánchez Díaz, the CDDH’s regional coordinator for the country’s Southern Region, shared the organization’s findings in an interview with Infobae, outlining the key drivers that push young Dominicans to accept these offers. Chronic economic instability, widespread lack of formal employment opportunities across low-income communities, and recruiters’ promises of life-changing financial compensation have made the recruitment pitches particularly compelling, Sánchez Díaz explained. The deals offered to recruits include upfront payments ranging from $8,000 to $16,000 U.S. dollars, with life insurance policies that promise the recruits’ families payouts of up to $400,000 to $500,000 if the recruit is killed during combat.

    The CDDH has even documented cases where entire families encouraged young relatives to take the opportunity, swayed by the massive financial incentives on offer. One of the most high-profile cases documented by the organization involves a 22-year-old Dominican blacksmith and welder who connected with recruiters through social media platforms. According to his sister, the young man arranged all his travel details in secret, hiding his plans from his family until after he had arrived in Russia. He later reached out to his relatives via WhatsApp to reveal he was already serving as a soldier in the country, and confirmed he had traveled alongside several other young Dominican men, some from neighboring small communities. Since that initial contact, the family has been completely unable to reach him. When his relatives called the phone number he had used to contact them, a Russian-speaking man who identified himself as the 22-year-old’s military commanding officer told them there was no working signal in the area where the young man was stationed, and offered no further information about his whereabouts.

    The CDDH has pinpointed a set of recruitment hotspots across the Dominican Republic where the organization says most of the recruitment activity is concentrated. These high-risk areas include Haina, El Carril, the National District, Santo Domingo province, Higüey, San Pedro de Macorís and San Juan de la Maguana. Sánchez Díaz also alleged that a portion of the entire recruitment operation is coordinated from neighboring Colombia, with recruiters using encrypted digital communications to avoid detection and disguising military contracts as agreements for construction work or international cultural exchange programs to hide the true military purpose of the trips.

    On August 24, 2026, CDDH representatives and family members of the recruited Dominicans filed formal complaints with the Dominican Attorney General’s Office, submitting physical contracts, recruiter phone numbers, and other supporting evidence of the illegal operation. The organization also notified other senior Dominican government authorities about the recruitment network, but as of the CDDH’s latest update, no official response has been received from any state body. The human rights group further claims that recruited Dominicans already in Russia have been subjected to strict communication restrictions and coercive reprisals after details of their participation became public. CDDH investigators also note they have received unconfirmed reports that at least one Dominican recruit has already been killed in a drone strike, though neither Dominican nor Russian government officials have independently verified the death.

    In response to the unfolding crisis, the CDDH is calling on Dominican national authorities to immediately activate formal diplomatic channels to locate all Dominican citizens currently in Russia, provide consular protection to those who want it, and facilitate the safe return of any recruit who wishes to come back to the Dominican Republic.

  • Cuba welcomes BRICS call to end economic, trade and financial measures

    Cuba welcomes BRICS call to end economic, trade and financial measures

    Against a backdrop of shifting global power dynamics and growing pushback against punitive unilateral measures, the 18th BRICS Summit, which gathered the bloc’s 11 member states in New Delhi from September 12 to 13, 2026, has issued a landmark call for the elimination of coercive economic, trade and financial sanctions imposed on Cuba.

    The expanded BRICS grouping, now counting Brazil, India, China, Russia, South Africa, Ethiopia, Egypt, Iran, Indonesia, the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia among its members, adopted a 140-point joint declaration that articulates clear concern over the steadily tightening unilateral blockade against the Caribbean island nation. According to an official statement released by the Cuban Embassy in Dominica, the declaration emphasizes the devastating ripple effects of these measures on Cuba’s domestic economy, critical energy infrastructure, and most importantly, the daily lives and well-being of the Cuban people.

    Beyond its stance on the Cuban blockade, the joint declaration also reaffirmed BRICS’ longstanding core commitments to a set of foundational principles: mutual respect between sovereign states, equal legal standing for all nations, collective solidarity, inclusive democracy, open dialogue, and consensus-driven decision-making for global governance.

    Cuba’s top diplomat, Minister of Foreign Affairs Bruno Rodríguez Parrilla, has publicly embraced and praised the bloc’s position, sharing his reaction to the declaration via a post on social media platform X. Rodríguez emphasized that the BRICS statement formally recognized the tangible harm caused by what he frames as the United States’ long-running hostile policy toward Cuba, spanning its damage to national economic stability, consistent disruption of energy access, and broad deterioration of humanitarian conditions across the country.

    During his formal address to the summit gathering, Rodríguez reiterated his unwavering condemnation of the decades-long economic, commercial and financial blockade, stressing that it has been ramped up to unprecedented intensity in recent years. He characterized the policy as a deliberate act of collective punishment targeting the entire Cuban population, noting that its indiscriminate reach has inflicted deep and widespread suffering on millions of ordinary Cuban families.

    Going further, Rodríguez described the ongoing measures as “a silent genocide that claims lives”, arguing that the overarching goal of the policy is to force political regime change in Cuba. He shared stark public health data to illustrate the humanitarian toll, stating that Cuba’s infant mortality rate has jumped from 4.0 to 9.9 per 1,000 live births, while the five-year survival rate for children diagnosed with cancer has dropped from 85 percent to 65 percent.

    “Inflicting human harm, suffering, and anguish is the objective of this cruel policy, which was deliberately designed for that purpose,” the Cuban foreign minister told summit attendees.

    In addition to addressing the blockade, Rodríguez outlined his vision for BRICS’ role in global affairs, noting that the bloc holds unique potential to advance peace, security, equitable development, and systemic justice across the Global South. He framed this contribution as an essential building block for creating a new, fair, and democratic multilateral global order that centers the needs and interests of lower-income and developing nations.

  • Pierre echoes need for stronger regional trade as Panama Canal disruption threatens import costs

    Pierre echoes need for stronger regional trade as Panama Canal disruption threatens import costs

    Unprecedented drought conditions amplified by the El Niño weather pattern have thrown operations at the Panama Canal into disarray, sending global shipping costs soaring and triggering urgent warnings across the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) over threatened import supplies. Regional leaders and private sector organizations are now pushing for localized, intra-regional strategies to buffer Caribbean economies from cascading cost increases that threaten to push higher prices onto everyday consumers.

    The crisis stems from far lower than average rainfall across the Panama Canal watershed between May and August 2026, with climate scientists projecting El Niño will further intensify dry conditions through the 2027 dry season. Low water levels have crippled the canal’s core lock operation system, which relies on sufficient water reserves to raise and lower vessels between different elevation levels. To conserve remaining water supplies, canal authorities have already cut the number of daily allowed vessel transits from 32 down from the usual 32, down from the original 34 slots.

    Water level restrictions have also forced ships to cut their maximum cargo loads to navigate shallower channels, while competition for the limited available transit slots has sent priority access prices skyrocketing. Reports confirm one shipping line recently paid a record-breaking $5.3 million to secure a priority passage slot. For carriers unable to secure a slot, the only alternative is rerouting around South America, a change that adds thousands of miles to voyages and drives up fuel, labor, and overall operating costs dramatically.

    Patrick Antoine, CEO and Technical Director of the CARICOM Private Sector Organisation (CPSO), explained that none of these added costs will be absorbed by shipping companies. “Auction premiums and low-water surcharges do not stay on the carriers’ books,” Antoine noted. “They are passed down the chain to importers, to distributors, and ultimately to the Caribbean consumer.”

    The CPSO first sounded the alarm over this growing crisis at the CARICOM Heads of Government Breakfast Meeting held in Saint Lucia back in July 2026, where it unveiled a comprehensive strategic plan titled Derisking CSME Imports. The plan outlines a clear framework for expanding intra-regional production and developing alternative regional supply corridors that can replace the long-haul imports that currently rely on the Panama Canal and are now facing major vulnerabilities.

    As the current Chair of CARICOM, Saint Lucia Prime Minister Philip J. Pierre has responded to the crisis by calling on all Caribbean nations to prioritize homegrown, regional solutions rather than relying on global supply chains that are increasingly exposed to climate-related disruptions. Speaking at a pre-Cabinet press briefing on Monday, in response to questions from the St. Lucia Times, Pierre emphasized that while Caribbean nations have no control over drought conditions or operations at the Panama Canal, they can take immediate action to strengthen regional trade ties that will reduce reliance on vulnerable external supply lines.

    “We need to get a ferry to move our food from one island to another; that’s the first step,” Pierre said, outlining his top priority for regional action. The prime minister laid out additional targeted steps for small island nations like Saint Lucia, which already struggles with low domestic agricultural output and persistent food security challenges. He added, “We have to increase our production and we have to strengthen the linkages between agriculture and tourism; that’s where the private sector must get together with the government in terms of creating these linkages, in terms of buying local, and in terms of getting our manufacturers to produce things so that they can sell.”

    Despite the significant risks posed by the ongoing Panama Canal crisis, Pierre expressed measured confidence that the Caribbean region has enough existing productive capacity to replace a sizable share of food imports through expanded intra-regional trade. “The first stage is seeing whether we can get this inter-island ferry going so that we can trade between ourselves because the region has some capacity to trade within itself,” he explained.

    Alongside long-term calls for expanded regional production and connectivity, the CPSO is urging Caribbean importers to take immediate short-term action to prepare for coming disruptions. The organization is advising importers to proactively engage with carriers and logistics providers now to plan for alternative routes, potential surcharges, and inventory adjustments for the remainder of 2026 and the 2027 dry season, when conditions are projected to worsen.

  • Seized at sea

    Seized at sea

    In a landmark strike against transnational drug trafficking, Trinidad and Tobago law enforcement agencies have intercepted a massive cocaine shipment off the country’s north-western coast, seizing more than 440 kilograms of the illegal narcotic valued at an estimated $204.5 million and taking four suspects into custody. The operation, carried out early yesterday morning by the Trinidad and Tobago Coast Guard (TTCG), targeted a small fishing vessel identified as the *FISH POT BOY* near Huevos Island, in the northern zone of the Gulf of Paria.

    According to official law enforcement details released to local outlet the *Express*, the interception unfolded at approximately 5:56 a.m., roughly 600 feet northeast of Umbrella Rock off Huevos Island. The intercepted vessel features a white hull, grey gunwale and grey interior, and is powered by three Yamaha 200-horsepower two-stroke outboard engines. When TTCG officers boarded the craft, they found four men — three Trinidadian nationals and one Venezuelan national — alongside 394 individually plastic-sealed packages holding a white powder substance.

    The vessel was immediately escorted to TTCG headquarters at Staubles Bay in Chaguaramas for a full search operation, and the Trinidad and Tobago Police Service’s (TTPS) Special Investigations Unit was called in to process the seizure. Forensic testing later confirmed the powder was cocaine. All four suspects, along with the contraband and the vessel, were transferred to TTPS and other relevant law enforcement bodies for ongoing investigation and legal processing.

    To calculate the street value of the seizure, authorities used the local estimated retail rate for cocaine in Trinidad and Tobago, which stands at roughly $464,640 per kilogram. Applied to the 440.20-kilogram haul, that puts the total estimated retail value at approximately $204.5 million.

    Responding to the successful operation, Minister of Defence Wayne Sturge praised the ongoing work of the country’s law enforcement community, stressing that authorities are gaining ground in the fight against transnational drug cartels. Sturge acknowledged that the enormous profits of the illegal drug trade will continue to incentivize traffickers to attempt smuggling operations into Trinidad and Tobago, but emphasized that security forces will remain relentless in their efforts to intercept shipments and disrupt criminal networks.

    “Drug trafficking is lucrative for the cartels so they will continue to try to find ways to evade law enforcement. It is our job to be one step ahead of the cartels and to anticipate them. We are winning at this point and we will continue to do everything in our power to keep on top of our game,” Sturge said in an interview with the *Express*. He added that continued smuggling attempts are “par for the course” in this work, but agencies will sustain their aggressive anti-trafficking operations. This seizure marks one of the largest maritime drug busts in recent months for Trinidad and Tobago.

    In an official statement released yesterday, the TTCG reaffirmed its longstanding commitment to protecting the country’s territorial waters and maritime borders. “The Trinidad and Tobago Coast Guard remains committed to safeguarding the nation’s maritime domain, executing duties in accordance with our motto of Service Before Self,” the statement read.

    Yesterday’s high-value bust comes just two days after Prime Minister Kamla Persad-Bissessar announced a renewed, aggressive crackdown on drug and gun trafficking gangs. Speaking on Sunday, the Prime Minister targeted what she called “filthy, greedy” criminal networks operating out of upscale Trinidadian neighborhoods including Westmoorings, St Clair and Federation Park, which she accused of flooding the country with illegal narcotics and weapons. She also clarified that the government’s aggressive anti-crime campaign will not end when the current national state of emergency is lifted on September 17, noting that her administration is working closely with international law enforcement partners to target both local traffickers and wealthy criminal figures who believe they are beyond prosecution.

    This seizure is the latest in a string of major narcotics recoveries recorded since the Persad-Bissessar administration took office in May 2025. Since that time, combined operations by land and maritime law enforcement agencies have intercepted hundreds of millions of dollars worth of cocaine and marijuana across the country.

  • India helpt Nepal met elektriciteit

    India helpt Nepal met elektriciteit

    In a critical response to Nepal’s deepening energy crisis following last month’s devastating natural disasters, India has approved a temporary accelerated power export plan to help the neighboring Himalayan nation bridge its severe electricity deficit. India’s Ministry of Energy announced the new arrangement on Monday, outlining that up to 654 megawatts of power will be supplied to Nepal for 18 hours daily through the end of December 2026. The arrangement officially entered into force on September 13, with delivery scheduled from midnight to 6:00 PM local time each day.

    Under the agreed framework, the vast majority of the exported power – up to 600 megawatts – will flow through the 400 kV double-circuit Muzaffarpur–Dhalkebar transmission line, while an additional 54 megawatts will be transported via the 132 kV single-circuit Tanakpur–Mahendranagar link. Officials confirmed that the supply volume for the period starting January 2027 will be reviewed and adjusted in December 2026, based on Nepal’s progress in infrastructure recovery and domestic generation capacity.

    The energy crisis that prompted this cross-border support stems from a catastrophic ice and rock avalanche that struck the Nepal-Tibet border region on August 26. The avalanche triggered massive flooding along the Bhotekoshi and Trishuli river corridors, marking one of the deadliest natural disasters to hit central and northern Nepal in recent history. As of September 11, Nepalese authorities confirmed the disaster had claimed 1,385 lives, with more than 5,100 people still listed as missing. Roughly 900 of those unaccounted for are employees of local hydropower plants, a loss that has compounded the already severe disruption to the country’s electricity generation sector.

    At least 12 major hydropower projects were either completely swept away or suffered irreparable damage in the disaster. Notable affected facilities include the 216 MW Upper Trishuli-1, 111 MW Rasuwagadhi, 120 MW Rasuwa Bhotekoshi, and 60 MW Upper Trishuli 3A plants.

    Hydropower accounts for nearly all of Nepal’s domestic electricity production. Before the disaster, the country maintained a total installed generation capacity of roughly 4,200 megawatts, and regularly exported surplus energy to India. The disaster wiped out an estimated 550 megawatts of usable capacity, leaving Nepal with a domestic deficit of between 350 and 400 megawatts. Faced with this gap, Nepal was forced to immediately halt all power exports to India and begin sourcing emergency imports from its southern neighbor to meet domestic consumer and industrial demand.

    Beyond the immediate human and generation losses, the disaster has laid bare the significant structural vulnerabilities of hydropower infrastructure across the Himalayan region. Industry analysts point out that risk extends far beyond dam structures themselves: when entire river corridors are inundated, power plants, substations, transmission lines, access roads, and worker housing all become critical weak points that can disable entire generation systems. Recovery efforts have been further slowed by the fact that access routes and transmission networks needed to reach damaged plants were also destroyed in the floods.

    Electricity support is not the only assistance India has extended in the wake of the disaster. India has also deployed personnel and resources to support Nepal’s search, rescue, and early recovery operations, and has delivered more than 70 tons of emergency relief supplies to affected communities. Multiple other countries and international bodies have also pledged financial and material support, including the European Union, Germany, Switzerland, Sri Lanka, and the Maldives.

    The new emergency power arrangement builds on the already deepening energy partnership between India and Nepal. In 2024, the two nations signed a landmark long-term power trade agreement that paves the way for Nepal to export up to 10,000 megawatts of electricity to India over the next decade. Several additional cross-border transmission lines are currently under construction to support this expanded long-term collaboration.

  • CARICOM Group Raises Alarm Over Election Prep

    CARICOM Group Raises Alarm Over Election Prep

    As Haiti prepares to hold its first national election in more than a decade, a senior observer mission from the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) has sounded an urgent alarm over unresolved systemic and security challenges that threaten the credibility of the upcoming poll. The CARICOM Eminent Persons Group, which conducted an on-the-ground assessment of election preparations across Haiti between September 2 and 9, 2026, held wide-ranging consultations with key national stakeholders, including major political parties, civil society organizations, private sector leaders, and commanders of the country’s newly formed Gang Suppression Force. The vote is currently scheduled to hold its first round on December 13, 2026, marking a pivotal step toward ending Haiti’s years-long period of transitional, unelected governance.

  • Antigua and Dominica Record No US Tourist Visa Issuances in Early 2026 Data

    Antigua and Dominica Record No US Tourist Visa Issuances in Early 2026 Data

    Newly released official visa statistics have revealed stark variations in the number of U.S. B1/B2 temporary visitor visas issued across Caribbean and nearby South American nations during the first two months of 2026. Two Eastern Caribbean island nations — Antigua and Barbuda and Dominica — stand out with a recorded total of zero visas issued in this period, an outlier that has drawn attention amid otherwise uneven distribution across the region.

    At the opposite end of the spectrum, Trinidad and Tobago logged the highest volume of approvals, with 4,431 B1/B2 visas issued to its applicants. Neighboring Guyana followed with a total of 2,777 issued visas, while Barbados ranked third with 865 issuances recorded over the two-month window.

    For most other Eastern Caribbean territories, the number of issued visas fell far below the counts seen in larger regional economies. St. Kitts and Nevis recorded 238 approved visas, with St. Lucia close behind at 192. Grenada followed with 164 issuances, and St. Vincent and the Grenadines rounded out the regional count with 144.

    For context, the B1/B2 combined visa is the most common U.S. travel document for temporary entry, allowing eligible holders to travel to the United States for business purposes, leisure tourism, or a mix of both activities during their stay.

    Experts and immigration analysts caution against jumping to conclusions about the zero-issuance figures for Antigua and Barbuda and Dominica, noting that the raw data does not inherently mean all visa applicants from the two countries were rejected outright. Multiple administrative factors can impact how issuance statistics are compiled: classification conventions for pending or transferred applications can shift reported numbers, and many applicants choose to submit their applications at processing centers outside their home country, which can reallocate counts to other jurisdictions. Further official clarification is required to pinpoint the exact cause of the zero recorded figures and what they indicate for travel trends between the two nations and the U.S.