标签: Suriname

苏里南

  • Laatste Amerikaanse troepen verlaten Irak; milities weigeren wapens neer te leggen

    Laatste Amerikaanse troepen verlaten Irak; milities weigeren wapens neer te leggen

    As the final contingent of US troops packs their equipment to leave Iraq, Baghdad faces two interconnected critical deadlines that will shape the country’s security and political landscape for years to come. However, most powerful Shiite militias have already made clear they have no intention of laying down their arms, leaving major unanswered questions about what Iraq will look like after the full US military withdrawal.

    The US-led international coalition is accelerating its drawdown of forces, according to a senior anonymous US military official, who spoke on condition of anonymity because he was not authorized to speak publicly on the matter. All remaining US troops stationed in northern Iraq, numbering in the hundreds, will complete their withdrawal by the September 30 deadline. Most troops will be redeployed to Jordan and other regional countries, and key military equipment including air defense systems will be relocated alongside personnel.

    The timeline of US military engagement in Iraq stretches back more than two decades: the US invaded Iraq in 2003, ousted longtime leader Saddam Hussein, withdrew all forces in 2011, then returned in 2014 at the request of the Iraqi government to combat the rise of the Islamic State (IS) terror group. With the IS threat largely diminished after years of counterterrorism operations, Washington and Baghdad reached a 2024 agreement to gradually end the US combat mission. Last year, US troops withdrew from bases across most of Iraq, leaving only a small presence in the semi-autonomous Kurdistan region in the north.

    After the full withdrawal is complete, the US will open negotiations for a “normal bilateral security cooperation” framework with Baghdad’s central government, the official confirmed, though the exact structure of this future partnership remains undecided. The official noted that the counterterrorism base in Erbil, the capital of Iraqi Kurdistan, has lost strategic importance for US forces as the IS threat has receded. While northern Iraq was never used as an offensive launchpad during the period of heightened US-Iran tensions, US troops stationed there were repeatedly targeted by attacks from Iran and Iranian-aligned Iraqi militias. This withdrawal will therefore “reduce our exposure” to such attacks, the official added.

    The Iraqi government tied the US withdrawal to a separate ultimatum requiring all armed militias to disarm by the same September 30 deadline. Iraqi Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi promised after his July meeting with US President Donald Trump at the White House that the disarmament of Iraq’s powerful armed factions would be finalized before the end of September, aligning with the coalition’s withdrawal timeline.

    However, Iraqi government officials have sent conflicting signals about whether September 30 is a firm disarmament deadline. Government spokesperson Sabah al-Numan said last week that discussions and dialogue are still ongoing, and the disarmament issue will not be resolved until after the international coalition completes its withdrawal. Qasim al-Araji, the prime minister’s security advisor, clarified that September 30 is only the deadline for coalition troop withdrawal, not for militia weapons handover.

    For many observers of Iraqi politics, the failure of the September 30 disarmament goal is already a foregone conclusion. “On September 30, no armed groups will have disarmed. I think that is clear to anyone who follows Iraqi politics,” said Iraqi analyst Sajad Jiyad during a recent workshop hosted by the Washington-based think tank Atlantic Council.

    While a small number of less influential militias have agreed to hand over weapons, the most powerful factions with close ties to Iran — including Kataib Hezbollah, Harakat al-Nujaba and Kataib Sayyid al-Shuhada — have either outright rejected the disarmament demand or attached conditions the Iraqi government is highly unlikely to meet in the near term. These conditions include bringing the Kurdish Peshmerga security forces in northern Iraq under full central Iraqi military control, and expelling Iranian Kurdish opposition groups and the PKK, which maintain bases in the northern border region.

    One senior official with a pro-Iranian Iraqi militia put the position even more bluntly: “After these preconditions are set, discussion will shift to regulating weapons holdings, not surrendering them. The factions have absolutely made no decision to give up weapons, and we have not handed over any weapons to date.”

    Forcing full disarmament by military means is widely seen as an enormous challenge for Baghdad. The militias are organized under the “Iraqi Islamic Resistance,” an umbrella group of roughly 10 hardline Shiite armed factions that together command around 50,000 fighters and possess advanced weaponry including long-range rockets and air defense systems. The group has claimed responsibility for dozens of rocket and drone attacks targeting Israel and US forces in Iraq and Syria over the past several years.

    Beyond their military power, the militias have deep and entrenched economic interests across Iraq’s construction, real estate, and currency exchange sectors, giving them powerful incentives to retain their autonomy and armed status.

    Most of these militia factions are formally part of the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), an umbrella organization that was officially integrated into Iraq’s national security forces in 2016 and nominally falls under the authority of the prime minister. However, many of the most powerful factions operate with near-total autonomy and maintain close strategic and political ties to Iran.

    A senior Iraqi government official outlined the administration’s current strategy: the government aims to bring all armed factions under the full command of the Iraqi army. Baghdad hopes factions will transfer high-risk “dynamic weapons” such as rockets and long-range systems to the central command of the PMF, before the independent factions are dissolved and integrated into the PMF and national army structure.

    Concerns are growing over the security outlook for Iraq’s semi-autonomous Kurdistan region following the US withdrawal. While the drawdown removes a key target for attacks from the area, analysts warn it will not end the threat of violence. Mohammed A. Salih, a non-resident senior fellow at the US-based Foreign Policy Research Institute and an expert on Kurdish and Iraqi affairs, noted that Iran and its aligned groups have already targeted other sites in the Kurdistan region unrelated to US troops, including bases of exiled Iranian Kurdish opposition groups, energy infrastructure, and even the office of Kurdistan Regional Prime Minister Masrour Barzani.

    “The withdrawal will further expose the Kurdish region and make it an easier target for attacks,” Salih said.

    Kurdistan Regional Government officials declined to comment on the record, but Barzani has publicly stated his concern that the removal of US air defense systems will leave the region far more vulnerable to attack. In response, al-Numan said last week that the Iraqi central government is finalizing purchases of new air defense systems from South Korea, Turkey, and the United States, which will be deployed according to a carefully crafted military plan to ensure full protection of Iraqi airspace, including the Kurdistan region.

  • Forse boetes voor dumpen afval en verwaarlozen percelen

    Forse boetes voor dumpen afval en verwaarlozen percelen

    PARAMARIBO – Suriname’s top law enforcement official has formally enacted a new schedule of fixed fines for common environmental violations, aiming to crack down on unsustainable practices that damage public spaces and community health.

    Starting immediately, anyone caught dumping waste illegally or failing to maintain their private land faces penalties ranging from 1,000 to 10,000 Surinamese dollars (SRD), according to the official order signed by Prosecutor General Garcia Paragsingh on September 15. The new fine schedule codifies penalties for violations already listed in the Police Penal Code and the Code of Criminal Law, bringing clarity and consistent enforcement to environmental regulation.

    Penalty amounts are scaled based on the severity of each offense. For illegal dumping, the fine increases with the volume of waste found on site, while fines for unmaintained private land are tied to the size of the plot, both falling within the 1,000 to 10,000 SRD bracket. A flat 1,000 SRD fine applies to two separate offenses: failing to maintain the roadside verge adjacent to a private property, and burning household or garden waste. A higher fixed fine of 3,500 SRD is set for leaving abandoned vehicles, scrapped vehicle parts, or other obstructions on public road verges.

    With the official signing of the fine schedule, all penalty amounts are now formally enforceable. The Public Prosecution Service of Suriname has issued a public call for all residents to abide by the new regulations, emphasizing that collective compliance is critical to building a clean, healthy, and safe living environment for all communities. The full text of the approved fine schedule is available for public review on the Public Prosecution Service’s official website.

  • Inheemse genezers uit Suriname, Guyana en Brazilië richten regionaal netwerk op

    Inheemse genezers uit Suriname, Guyana en Brazilië richten regionaal netwerk op

    Indigenous knowledge-holders and traditional healers from Suriname, Guyana, and Brazil have marked a historic milestone by establishing the Regional Network of Traditional Knowledge and Healers, a first-of-its-kind collaborative body aimed at securing greater formal recognition for Amazonian traditional medicinal plant knowledge and healing practices within national public health systems.

    The founding of the network took place during a four-day convening held from September 8 to 11, 2026, at Iwokrama River Lodge, located deep within Guyana’s protected Iwokrama Rainforest. Representatives of Indigenous communities from all three Amazon-bordering nations gathered to share ancestral expertise on traditional therapies, medicinal plant use, and culturally rooted health practices, building on two prior regional knowledge exchange events organized over the past four years. The gathering was coordinated by the Amazon Conservation Team Guianas (ACT Guianas), a Suriname-registered non-governmental organization that has partnered with Indigenous and tribal groups across the Guiana Shield since 2002 to support territorial stewardship and cultural preservation.

    Core objectives of the new network include creating a unified regional platform anchored in shared ethical protocols, clear communication frameworks, and a coordinated advocacy agenda to push for respectful recognition of traditional medicine by national governments and public health institutions. Beyond formal establishment, participants used the convening to share successful healing practices across bordering communities, reflect on lessons learned from prior collaborative efforts over the past four years, strengthen ethical and consistent standards for traditional healing across the region, and explore pathways toward formal integration of traditional practices into national healthcare systems.

    A central focus of the gathering was learning from Brazil’s decades-long policy framework for integrating Indigenous health into national care, a model that Suriname and Guyana are examining for potential adaptation. Brazil first enshrined a decentralized Indigenous Health Subsystem into its national Unified Health System (SUS) in 1999, structured around regional Indigenous health districts that require policy to center the unique local realities and cultural identities of Indigenous peoples, covering not only clinical care but also sanitation, food security, housing, environmental protection, and health education. Since 2006, Brazil has also maintained a national policy for integrative and complementary practices within SUS, which formally recognizes medicinal plant use and phytotherapy as valid care options. As of 2024, more than 23,000 Brazilian health teams offer these integrative practices across roughly 21,000 primary health care centers nationwide.

    The gathering opened with a sacred spiritual cleansing ritual led by Adele John, a young apprentice healer from Guyana’s Surama Village, setting a culturally rooted tone for the days of collaboration. Following opening ceremonies, participants engaged in immersive forest learning activities around the Iwokrama site and breakout working sessions to draft a three-year strategic roadmap for the new network. A key ceremonial highlight of the forum was the formal signing of the network’s founding charter by official representatives from all three participating countries.

    The Iwokrama International Centre for Rainforest Conservation and Development (IICRCD), which hosted the event at its river lodge facility, expressed full support for the initiative. “We are delighted to host the ACT team and Indigenous healers from across the region,” a center spokesperson said. “We endorse the establishment of this network and wish them every success in building an Indigenous knowledge platform for the region and advocating for the integration of Indigenous medicinal knowledge into national health systems.”

    ACT Guianas, which is headquartered in Paramaribo, coordinates conservation and cultural preservation initiatives across Suriname, Guyana, French Guiana, and northern Brazil, working directly with Indigenous communities to strengthen their capacity to manage and protect their ancestral territories.

    The launch of the new network aligns with a growing regional movement to center Indigenous traditional knowledge as a critical component of sustainable development and accessible, culturally appropriate healthcare. As early as August 2025, during the Fifth Presidential Summit of the Amazon Cooperation Treaty Organization (ACTO), Suriname highlighted the essential role of Indigenous and local community traditional knowledge in protecting the Amazon biome. In March 2025, Suriname hosted the national Traditional and Integrative Health Systems Conference, co-organized by Medische Zending Primary Health Care Suriname and ACT Guianas, where the Ministry of Public Health signed a memorandum of understanding with four partner organizations including ACT Guianas to advance collaboration on integrative health. By the end of 2024, Suriname’s National Assembly had already received a draft bill to establish a regulatory authority, OTIMSI, tasked with overseeing the development of traditional and integrative medical systems across the country.

  • Oproepen AI-ontwikkeling te vertragen leiden tot stille koude oorlog

    Oproepen AI-ontwikkeling te vertragen leiden tot stille koude oorlog

    In September 2026, a growing rift over artificial intelligence development has erupted between the world’s two largest economies, sparked by a leading American AI chief’s urgent call for safety slowdowns and new export restrictions that have drawn sharp pushback from Beijing. The controversy began when Dario Amodei, CEO of leading AI developer Anthropic, published a weekend essay sounding the alarm over the accelerating pace of frontier AI development, warning that unregulated progress could bring catastrophic global risks within a year.

    Amodei warned that the most powerful next-generation AI systems could, in as little as six to 12 months, build a persistent botnet capable of seizing full control of the global internet, causing hundreds of billions of dollars in economic damage. Without binding safety guardrails, he argued, risks will only grow exponentially as models grow more powerful. He called for a deliberate slowdown in the development of the most advanced frontier AI systems, giving governments, researchers and regulators time to implement robust risk management frameworks.

    His stance quickly won backing from other major U.S. tech figures, including OpenAI CEO Sam Altman and Tesla and SpaceX CEO Elon Musk. Beyond safety concerns, Amodei framed Chinese AI advancement as a major strategic threat to the U.S. and the world, urging the White House to maintain strict restrictions on exports of cutting-edge AI chips and chip manufacturing equipment to China. He also called for new measures to crack down on what he claims is unauthorized “distillation” of U.S.-developed AI models by Chinese research labs.

    U.S. President Donald Trump, however, has pushed back on calls to slow AI development, dismissing many safety warnings as overblown while doubling down on his framing of AI as a zero-sum global competition. “We are ahead of China in AI. We are the most advanced country in the world, and frankly, I want to keep it that way — because whoever wins the AI race wins everything,” Trump stated Sunday, aligning with his administration’s long-standing hardline approach to technological competition with Beijing.

    China has hit back against Amodei’s proposals, accusing the U.S. of using AI safety as a cynical pretext to lock in its long-held technological dominance. On Monday, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Guo Jiakun called for a global approach to AI governance that is open, inclusive and collaborative. “Stoking unfounded fears, pushing confrontation and engaging in malicious competition will only disrupt global AI governance processes, and serve no one’s interests,” Guo said. The Chinese state-backed *Global Times* went further, labeling Amodei’s plan a Cold War-era tactic designed to stifle Chinese AI progress and preserve U.S. technological hegemony, calling the emerging “quiet AI Cold War” hypocritical and short-sighted.

    The current clash is unfolding against a well-documented backdrop of intensifying AI competition between the two powers. Experts note that while the U.S. still maintains leading positions in key segments of the AI race, China is rapidly closing the gap. Data from Stanford University’s 2026 AI Index Report shows U.S. private companies invested $285.9 billion in AI development in 2025, dwarfing China’s $12.4 billion in private investment. The U.S. also retains a clear lead in the production of the advanced semiconductors required to train cutting-edge large language models.

    Despite sweeping U.S. export restrictions on top-tier AI chips, Chinese firms have already proven they can develop competitive large AI models at a fraction of the cost of their U.S. rivals. In early 2026, Chinese AI startup DeepSeek made global headlines when it revealed it had trained its latest flagship model using less than $6 million worth of computing power from Nvidia H800 chips — a tiny fraction of the $100 million OpenAI reportedly spent to train its GPT-4 model back in 2023. The announcement sent shares of major U.S. tech firms tumbling, as it upended widespread assumptions about the cost barriers to cutting-edge AI development.

    The U.S. has enforced broad restrictions on Chinese access to advanced semiconductors and chip manufacturing technology for years, justifying the limits on national security grounds, arguing advanced AI chips could boost China’s military, intelligence and surveillance capabilities. The Trump administration has maintained bans on the most cutting-edge chips, including Nvidia’s Blackwell processors, while allowing limited exports of lower-power chips to the Chinese market.

    China, meanwhile, holds key advantages across other segments of the AI supply chain. It dominates global production of the critical rare earth metals required for advanced semiconductor manufacturing, and it generates more than twice as much electricity as the U.S., giving Chinese AI data centers access to abundant low-cost energy to power energy-intensive AI training and operations. In late 2025, China tightened export controls on five critical rare earth metals and restricted exports of specialized refining equipment for these resources, a move widely seen as a countermeasure to U.S. chip restrictions.

    Beyond the commercial and technological competition, both powers have faced scrutiny for their growing use of AI in military and surveillance applications, despite both framing their own AI policies as responsible. In June 2026, the Trump administration ordered a rapid expansion of AI use across U.S. intelligence and military operations. In March, the U.S. military confirmed it had deployed advanced AI tools to process intelligence during operations against Iran, though it emphasized human officials retain final authority over target selection. That confirmation came amid calls for an independent investigation into a bombing of a school in southern Iran that killed 156 people, most of them children.

    Multiple independent reports have also documented extensive Israeli reliance on AI for target selection, surveillance and operational planning during its ongoing military campaign in Gaza, which has killed more than 73,800 Palestinians since October 2023 and left most of the territory in ruins. A 2025 report from United Nations Special Rapporteur Francesca Albanese named major U.S. AI and tech firm Palantir as one of the companies supporting Israel’s military campaign and displacement of Palestinian populations in violation of international law. Google and Amazon have also faced widespread backlash over their $1.2 billion Project Nimbus deal, struck in 2021, to supply cloud and AI-powered surveillance infrastructure to the Israeli government and military.

    Notably, Anthropic itself has clashed with the U.S. Pentagon over military AI use, refusing to allow its models to be used for fully autonomous weapons or large-scale domestic surveillance.

    China has publicly criticized the growing militarization of AI, warning against ceding life-or-death decision-making power to algorithms. But independent investigations have also raised red flags over Chinese military and surveillance use of AI: a July 2026 Reuters investigation found researchers with ties to the Chinese military have used outputs from leading U.S. AI models to enhance Chinese defense capabilities, including for surveillance applications. A 2025 Associated Press investigation documented how AI has become a core component of a massive Chinese mass surveillance system targeting dissidents and ethnic minority groups including Uyghurs and Tibetans, and found U.S. tech firms played a key role in supplying core technology for that system. In February 2026, both the U.S. and China refused to sign a joint declaration regulating military AI use at an international military AI summit in Spain.

    AI industry analysts say the high-profile calls for a slowdown from top tech leaders have raised new questions about whether the private sector can or will regulate the rapidly advancing technology responsibly. Aya Ibrahim, senior visiting fellow at the AI Now Institute, told Al Jazeera that warnings from tech leaders come as private firms face intense financial pressure to roll out ever-more powerful AI systems as quickly as possible to capture market share. “So much money is riding on getting these new systems to market and performing well, and there is growing doubt that companies can both deliver profit and manage risk,” Ibrahim explained.

    She also questioned the dominant framing of AI development as a geopolitical and commercial race, arguing this narrative pushes firms to prioritize speed over safety and accountability. “The race narrative is inherently problematic, because it pushes us toward a race to the bottom,” Ibrahim said. “You might win, but what do you actually win, and at what cost?”

  • BIS noemt zich eerste digitale ministerie van Suriname

    BIS noemt zich eerste digitale ministerie van Suriname

    In a landmark step for public sector digital transformation in Suriname, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, International Trade and Cooperation (BIS) officially rolled out its custom digital platform BIS Online on Monday, 14 September, marking the country’s first fully digitized government ministry.

    The new platform is designed to streamline core ministry operations by digitizing dossier tracking and administrative workflows, gradually phasing out the outdated paper-based filing systems that have long hampered government efficiency. Through BIS Online, ministry staff can remotely access real-time updates on case location, current processing status, and assigned responsibility for each dossier, bringing unprecedented transparency to internal operations.

    Luziano Truideman, Director of General Management and Consular Affairs at BIS, noted that the digital overhaul does more than just improve organizational clarity: it also drastically cuts the risk of lost or misplaced physical documents, a longstanding pain point for public administration in the country.

    What sets BIS Online apart from most government digital projects is its development model: rather than outsourcing construction to an external third-party ICT firm, the platform was built entirely in-house. Ambassador Gilbert van Lierop led the development effort, working alongside BIS’s internal ICT department and integrating iterative feedback from frontline ministry staff to tailor the system to the department’s specific needs. The project also leveraged existing government-owned technology infrastructure and software licenses to keep costs low.

    This in-house development approach delivered substantial fiscal savings for Suriname’s public coffers. Ministry estimates show the project avoided at least $100,000 in external development fees that a contracted build would have required. Additionally, a comparable commercial off-the-shelf system for roughly 200 users would carry an annual recurring licensing cost of at least $36,000, expenses that are entirely eliminated with the custom in-house build.

    Speaking at the official launch ceremony, van Lierop emphasized that successful public sector digitalization is far more than a technical undertaking. He noted that meaningful digital transformation also requires committed leadership, active engagement from frontline staff, and a willingness to adapt long-standing work practices to new ways of operating — all elements that were central to BIS Online’s development.

    BIS Minister Melvin Bouva framed the launch of BIS Online as a key milestone in the current administration’s broader push for governance reform. The adoption of a centralized digital document management system was one of the core recommendations from a rapid organizational assessment conducted after Bouva took office, carried out on instructions from Suriname President Jennifer Simons.

    Looking ahead, BIS officials see significant potential to expand the use of BIS Online across other levels and departments of the Surinamese government. The internally developed platform could serve as a foundational framework to accelerate digital transformation across the entire public sector. At the launch ceremony, Bouva presented van Lierop with a certificate of appreciation to recognize his leadership and contribution to the project. Closing the event, Bouva emphasized the significance of the milestone, saying: “BIS is the first digital ministry of Suriname. Let us ensure it is not the last.”

  • Guyana’s oliefonds passeert voor het eerst G$1 biljoen

    Guyana’s oliefonds passeert voor het eerst G$1 biljoen

    Fresh data released by the Bank of Guyana has revealed a dramatic surge in inflows to the country’s Natural Resource Fund (NRF) in August, driven by a three-fold jump in profit oil receipts that pushed the sovereign wealth fund’s balance to its highest level since it was established.

    Last month, the NRF received 161.86 billion Guyanese dollars in profit oil, far outpacing the 48.4 billion Guyanese dollars recorded in July. Supplementing this major inflow were 2.85 billion Guyanese dollars in investment returns generated by the fund’s assets, plus a small 20.85 million Guyanese dollar signature bonus from new oil operations. Even after the government transferred 52.125 billion Guyanese dollars from the NRF to the state’s Consolidated Fund to cover public spending commitments, the fund’s total balance still grew to a new record, the central bank confirmed.

    The skyrocketing inflows coincide with a pivotal expansion phase for Guyana’s fast-growing offshore oil sector. Four production platforms are currently operational at the Stabroek Block, the country’s core oil-producing region, delivering a combined output of roughly 900,000 barrels of crude per day. In August, the fifth floating production storage and offloading (FPSO) vessel, the Errea Wittu, arrived in Guyanese waters, and is on track to push total national production above 1 million barrels per day once fully commissioned.

    A second key factor boosting August inflows is a rising share of production profits allocated to the Guyanese government, as international oil operators have now recovered the vast majority of their upfront capital investments in the country’s offshore projects. Data from Guyana’s Ministry of Natural Resources shows the government’s share of total production rose to 39.8% in August. Separate central bank figures put total August oil-related revenue at approximately $778 million U.S. dollars, the vast bulk of which came from profit oil allocations.

    Established to manage revenues from Guyana’s nascent oil and gas sector in a transparent, rule-based framework, the NRF collects all resource-related earnings and only allows transfers to the national budget through formal statutory procedures. The Bank of Guyana publishes regular updates on the fund’s performance on a monthly and quarterly basis.

    The rapid growth of the fund underscores the transformative economic impact of offshore oil development for the small South American nation. At the end of 2025, the NRF held approximately $3.25 billion U.S. dollars in total assets. Just eight months later, despite regular transfers to cover government spending, that value has climbed to $4.89 billion U.S. dollars. The Guyanese government initially projected total 2026 profit oil revenue of $2.4 billion U.S. dollars, plus an additional $375.3 million U.S. dollars in royalties. With production expanding faster than forecast and the government’s profit share growing, ongoing tracking of NRF inflows has become a critical indicator for the country’s 2026 fiscal outlook.

  • Typische tropische dag, warm, benauwd met mix van zon en wolken

    Typische tropische dag, warm, benauwd met mix van zon en wolken

    On September 15, Suriname will face a day defined by sweltering tropical heat paired with high atmospheric humidity, according to local weather forecasts.

    In the capital city Paramaribo and its surrounding districts, the day will open with extensive cloud cover, and the early morning hours may bring thin haze or light fog that reduces visibility slightly for early commuters.

    Temperatures will climb steadily through daylight hours, peaking between 34 and 35 degrees Celsius. Overnight temperatures will remain mild, dropping only to 23 to 24 degrees Celsius, meaning little cooling relief after sundown. The combination of high heat and thick humidity will push the apparent temperature, or how hot conditions actually feel to the human body, as high as 37 degrees Celsius – far above the actual thermometer reading.

    Winds across most of the country will blow predominantly from the east to southeast, with sustained speeds ranging from 10 to 25 kilometers per hour. As the afternoon progresses into the evening, the chance of scattered rain showers and thunderstorms will increase significantly, with inland areas facing the highest risk of storm activity. For Paramaribo, the probability of precipitation sits at around 39 percent, though forecasters do not expect heavy or widespread downpours that would cause flooding or major disruption.

    Along the nation’s coastline, including the district of Nieuw Nickerie, conditions will remain warm but slightly more bearable. Coastal temperatures will hover between 25 and 29 degrees Celsius, tempered by steady, strong onshore winds blowing in from the ocean. In the southern and eastern regions of Suriname, including the areas around Stoelmanseiland and Sipaliwini, light rain is expected to develop later in the day.

  • India helpt Nepal met elektriciteit

    India helpt Nepal met elektriciteit

    In a critical response to Nepal’s deepening energy crisis following last month’s devastating natural disasters, India has approved a temporary accelerated power export plan to help the neighboring Himalayan nation bridge its severe electricity deficit. India’s Ministry of Energy announced the new arrangement on Monday, outlining that up to 654 megawatts of power will be supplied to Nepal for 18 hours daily through the end of December 2026. The arrangement officially entered into force on September 13, with delivery scheduled from midnight to 6:00 PM local time each day.

    Under the agreed framework, the vast majority of the exported power – up to 600 megawatts – will flow through the 400 kV double-circuit Muzaffarpur–Dhalkebar transmission line, while an additional 54 megawatts will be transported via the 132 kV single-circuit Tanakpur–Mahendranagar link. Officials confirmed that the supply volume for the period starting January 2027 will be reviewed and adjusted in December 2026, based on Nepal’s progress in infrastructure recovery and domestic generation capacity.

    The energy crisis that prompted this cross-border support stems from a catastrophic ice and rock avalanche that struck the Nepal-Tibet border region on August 26. The avalanche triggered massive flooding along the Bhotekoshi and Trishuli river corridors, marking one of the deadliest natural disasters to hit central and northern Nepal in recent history. As of September 11, Nepalese authorities confirmed the disaster had claimed 1,385 lives, with more than 5,100 people still listed as missing. Roughly 900 of those unaccounted for are employees of local hydropower plants, a loss that has compounded the already severe disruption to the country’s electricity generation sector.

    At least 12 major hydropower projects were either completely swept away or suffered irreparable damage in the disaster. Notable affected facilities include the 216 MW Upper Trishuli-1, 111 MW Rasuwagadhi, 120 MW Rasuwa Bhotekoshi, and 60 MW Upper Trishuli 3A plants.

    Hydropower accounts for nearly all of Nepal’s domestic electricity production. Before the disaster, the country maintained a total installed generation capacity of roughly 4,200 megawatts, and regularly exported surplus energy to India. The disaster wiped out an estimated 550 megawatts of usable capacity, leaving Nepal with a domestic deficit of between 350 and 400 megawatts. Faced with this gap, Nepal was forced to immediately halt all power exports to India and begin sourcing emergency imports from its southern neighbor to meet domestic consumer and industrial demand.

    Beyond the immediate human and generation losses, the disaster has laid bare the significant structural vulnerabilities of hydropower infrastructure across the Himalayan region. Industry analysts point out that risk extends far beyond dam structures themselves: when entire river corridors are inundated, power plants, substations, transmission lines, access roads, and worker housing all become critical weak points that can disable entire generation systems. Recovery efforts have been further slowed by the fact that access routes and transmission networks needed to reach damaged plants were also destroyed in the floods.

    Electricity support is not the only assistance India has extended in the wake of the disaster. India has also deployed personnel and resources to support Nepal’s search, rescue, and early recovery operations, and has delivered more than 70 tons of emergency relief supplies to affected communities. Multiple other countries and international bodies have also pledged financial and material support, including the European Union, Germany, Switzerland, Sri Lanka, and the Maldives.

    The new emergency power arrangement builds on the already deepening energy partnership between India and Nepal. In 2024, the two nations signed a landmark long-term power trade agreement that paves the way for Nepal to export up to 10,000 megawatts of electricity to India over the next decade. Several additional cross-border transmission lines are currently under construction to support this expanded long-term collaboration.

  • Column: Het ruikt fishy

    Column: Het ruikt fishy

    When Venezuela’s interim president Delcy Rodríguez spoke publicly on Friday, her message required no complex translation for the local audience. In the presence of senior Surinamese government officials, she announced in Spanish (with an official translation provided) that 200 Venezuelan fishermen from the states of Nueva Esparta and Sucre would soon receive official permits to operate in an Atlantic fishing corridor designated by Suriname. What nobody in the official delegation seemed to anticipate, however, was that this offhand announcement would spark immediate uproar across Suriname’s fishing sector.

    This public backlash is far from surprising. Fishing access permits are far from a trivial administrative matter: for years, Suriname and neighboring Guyana have been locked in bitter public disputes over fishing rights, with tensions escalating to diplomatic standoffs and cross-border political accusations. That is precisely why Suriname’s government had an obligation to lay out all details of its new agreement with Venezuela clearly and proactively from the start. That obligation was never met.

    It was only after Rodríguez’s comments were published by local outlet Starnieuws and public outcry erupted that Suriname’s Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock and Fisheries released a full explanation. Officials clarified that the 200 permits are not for brand new fishing vessels entering Suriname’s waters – instead, they apply to Venezuelan boats that have been operating illegally in Surinamese territory for years. Even with this clarification, a critical question remains: why was this key context not shared immediately when Rodríguez made her announcement?

    The roots of this confusion stretch back to 2007, when the original bilateral fishing agreement between the two countries was first signed. That agreement has not been updated or renewed in the 19 years since it came into force. Parveen Amritpersad, director of Suriname’s fisheries department, confirmed that this lapse means there has been no formal bilateral legal framework in place to authorize foreign fishing vessels accessing Suriname’s waters for nearly two decades.

    Over those 19 years, four consecutive Surinamese administrations – the Venetiaan III cabinet, the Bouterse I and II terms, and the current Santokhi government – all failed to renew the expired agreement. Venezuelan authorities also did not push forward to resolve the gap in the framework. Despite the lack of formal legal standing, fishing operations continued uninterrupted: under Suriname’s domestic rules, permits were issued through local processing companies that held private contracts with the Venezuelan vessels, even as the required bilateral treaty remained expired.

    An expired agreement is an expired agreement. By the same logic, a driver cannot argue that an expired driver’s license is still valid just because they held a valid one years ago. To make the urgency of this gap even clearer, the European Union has already flagged the lack of formal legal framework to Suriname, and recommended that the country resolve the issue as a matter of priority. This new agreement, therefore, is far from a meaningless bureaucratic formality: it is intended to fix an irregular situation that has persisted for nearly two decades.

    So who is to blame for the current confusion? Rodríguez did not make her comments in an off-the-record private meeting; she spoke as Venezuela’s acting head of state during an official state visit. If her wording created a misleading impression, Suriname’s government could have immediately stepped in to clarify: that there are no new boats entering the corridor, and the deal simply renews the long-expired 2007 framework for the existing fishing arrangement. If that clarification had come immediately, there would have been barely any controversy at all.

    Instead, clarification only came after Rodríguez’s comments were published and public anger grew. Worse, official communications framed the controversy as a response to “recent misleading reporting”, which created the easy but unfair impression that local outlet Starnieuws had spread inaccurate information.

    That accusation is unfounded. Any outlet that accurately quotes Rodríguez’s public comments cannot be blamed for the resulting backlash. If her statement was incomplete or poorly phrased, the responsibility to correct and clarify immediately fell to the Surinamese officials who were present for the announcement.

    This means Suriname’s government and its communications team need to examine their own mistakes first. A sensitive deal like this requires full transparency from the start. The public deserves clear answers to basic questions: how many vessels will be permitted, what type of permits will they receive, what areas are they allowed to fish in, what terms govern their operations, and why did it take 19 years to renew an expired bilateral agreement?

    Trying to shift blame for the public commotion to the media, when clear official information was not provided in advance, is hypocrisy. It is a positive step that Suriname is finally bringing this 19-year-old irregular situation into compliance with the law. But transparency should not be an afterword that only comes out when controversy erupts.

    In the fishing industry, catch traceability is a non-negotiable requirement. The same standard should apply to government information: the public has a right to know what agreements are reached, where information comes from, and whether official public statements align with the actual terms of deals. In this case, the public was forced to piece together the facts after the fact, and the entire situation leaves a distinctly fishy taste.

  • Mennonieten verbaasd: Niemand heeft ons verteld dat we hier weg moeten

    Mennonieten verbaasd: Niemand heeft ons verteld dat we hier weg moeten

    On a Monday visit to the Tibiti region of Suriname’s Para district, a delegation led by opposition NDP Members of Parliament Rabin Parmessar and Jennifer Vreedzaam, accompanied by journalists, security personnel and environmental activist Erlan Sleur, uncovered a tangled, conflicting land dispute that has left a group of Mennonite immigrants from Belize in legal and existential limbo.

    After initial attempts to communicate through German and Spanish fell flat, the group was able to speak with Peter Petersen, a Mennonite community representative who speaks both English and Spanish. What began as a routine fact-finding trip quickly revealed a chasm between what the Mennonites were promised before relocating and the legal reality on the ground in Suriname.

    Petersen told the delegation that his community had been invited to settle in the Para district by local agents Ruud Soeverein and Lionel Blokland, who assured the group that sufficient land was available for large-scale agricultural development. Acting on these promises, the entire community sold all of their property and businesses in Belize, shipped heavy farm machinery to Suriname, and invested significant time and capital clearing the Para district land for cultivation. Work has been paused for months, however, as the Mennonites wait for promised official government permits to resume operations, according to Petersen.

    The delegation delivered a shocking revelation to Petersen that the community had never been informed of: the land the Mennonites have already invested in is state-owned domain land that was previously granted as a logging concession to Bruynzeel. Logging operations on the site were halted years ago to allow the native forest to regenerate, and the entire parcel falls within legally recognized Indigenous traditional residential and subsistence territory. Most critically, a court eviction order has already been issued ordering the Mennonite group to vacate the land – a document the community says it never received.

    Petersen explained that the group agreed to pay $150 USD per hectare for the land, with the current Para site slated to cover more than 9,000 hectares, planned for large-scale production of corn, soy, livestock feed and meat for commercial markets. This is just the first phase of the community’s planned relocation: the two additional Mennonite settlement sites would require three to four times more land, with around 30 Mennonite families already residing in Suriname’s capital Paramaribo, and more than 100 additional families waiting to move once the land situation is resolved.

    The delegation clarified that Surinamese government policy restricts large-scale agricultural development to suitable lands along the coastal plain, not in the inland forested territories that hold sensitive ecological and Indigenous land rights claims. Indigenous and tribal land rights have remained one of the most intractable policy issues facing successive Surinamese governments and parliaments for decades, adding an extra layer of complexity to the dispute.

    By the end of the site visit, it was clear that two entirely separate narratives about the settlement existed with no overlap. On one side, the Mennonite community acted in good faith on promises they received, liquidating their old lives abroad to build a new future in Suriname. On the other, the land is already claimed by Indigenous communities, protected for forest regeneration, and the settlement was never approved by any competent government authority.

    During the visit, Parmessar contacted Lionel Blokland, one of the agents who arranged the settlement, by phone, and secured a commitment that Blokland will provide official documentation of all agreements made with the Mennonites to the Surinamese National Assembly. These documents will be critical to clarifying the exact terms of the deal, which lands were promised, the nature of the $150 per hectare payment, and who had the authority to make these commitments in the first place.

    When the delegation departed the site, they left behind more open questions than they arrived with, and Petersen remains stuck in limbo, still waiting for the official permits he was promised, unaware until the visit that an eviction order was already issued against his community. The delegation, which had set out to investigate allegations of illegal settlement activity, returned to Paramaribo that evening stunned and uncertain, with far more questions about the controversial Mennonite settlement than answers.