标签: Suriname

苏里南

  • Een broeierige donderdag met een verfrissende bui

    Een broeierige donderdag met een verfrissende bui

    A warm, sticky weather pattern is set to unfold across the Netherlands this Thursday, starting from the earliest hours of the morning, according to the latest local weather update published September 17.

    When dawn breaks on Thursday, initial temperatures will already hover between 23 and 29 degrees Celsius. What makes the conditions feel more oppressive than the numbers suggest is the unusually high atmospheric humidity, which pushes perceived temperatures well above the actual readings shown on thermometers.

    As the day progresses into midday and afternoon, the heat will ramp up dramatically. Depending on the region across the country, maximum actual temperatures will surge to between 33 and 39 degrees Celsius. When combined with the persistent high humidity, it will feel as hot as 40 degrees Celsius or even higher in many areas. Skies are expected to be partly cloudy through most of the day.

    There is one potential refreshing break in the hot conditions, however. Forecasters note a considerable chance of rain showers or thunderstorms developing through the afternoon and early evening. These storms could bring heavy downpours that are intense in localized areas. Winds will blow from the east to northeast, and they will remain mostly calm for the duration of the event.

    Once the sun sets and the day moves into evening and overnight, temperatures will gradually cool down to a range between 23 and 27 degrees Celsius. High humidity will remain in place, leaving the evening warm and somewhat stuffy for most of the country.

  • BRICS Pay: kan het nieuwe betaalsysteem de macht van SWIFT en de dollar uitdagen? (1)

    BRICS Pay: kan het nieuwe betaalsysteem de macht van SWIFT en de dollar uitdagen? (1)

    The global competition for influence over the international financial system has entered a new phase, as the expanding BRICS bloc advances an initiative to streamline intra-bloc cross-border payments and reduce reliance on Western-dominated financial infrastructure. During the 18th BRICS Summit held in New Delhi on 12 and 13 September, bloc leaders formally backed further development of local currency trade mechanisms and cross-border payment systems, highlighting the strategic role of BRICS Pay, a project led by the BRICS Business Council. First proposed in 2018, BRICS Pay is designed as a digital payment and settlement ecosystem that connects existing national payment systems across member states, aiming to make cross-border transactions faster, more affordable, and less vulnerable to external geopolitical pressure. Contrary to widespread speculation, the initiative is not positioned as an immediate full replacement for the SWIFT global financial messaging network, or major Western card networks like Visa and Mastercard; instead, it operates as a complementary alternative infrastructure that works alongside existing global systems. There are also no current plans to launch a single centralized BRICS payment system or a common BRICS currency, a distinction that reflects the divergent economic and geopolitical priorities across the bloc’s 11 current members.

    To understand the urgency behind BRICS Pay, one must look at the shifting geopolitical landscape of recent years, which has turned financial infrastructure into a core tool of international statecraft. Western sanctions imposed after Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine cut off major Russian financial institutions from the SWIFT network, exposing the profound risks emerging economies face when critical components of their international financial infrastructure are controlled by external powers. For Russia, the exclusion made clear how dependent even large economies are on systems outside their sovereign control, and Moscow has since become a leading advocate for alternative payment arrangements and expanded use of national currencies in intra-bloc trade. But the push for alternatives extends far beyond Russia: many emerging market economies across BRICS have growing concerns over the concentration of control over global financial infrastructure in a small group of Western nations and institutions.

    A common misconception about BRICS is that it acts as a unified geopolitical and economic bloc with a single shared financial agenda. In reality, member states hold widely divergent interests, shaped by their unique trade relationships, existing financial systems, currency policies, and diplomatic ties to Western powers and the U.S. dollar. For example, India maintains deep economic and strategic ties with both Western nations and fellow BRICS members, while Brazil’s policy priorities differ sharply from Russia’s, and China already operates a robust cross-border payment infrastructure of its own. This diversity rules out a fully centralized, one-size-fits-all BRICS payment system in the near term. Instead, the bloc is pursuing a more pragmatic model: an interoperable network that links existing independent national payment systems, rather than building an entirely new centralized system from scratch.

    Manoj Kewalramani, chair of the Geostrategy Programme at Indian think tank Takshashila Institution, framed the initiative to Al Jazeera as an iterative exploration of tools to reduce the vulnerability of intra-BRICS trade and financial ties, rather than a direct challenge to the existing global order. At its core, the development of BRICS Pay touches on a fundamental geopolitical question: who controls the infrastructure that underpins global trade and international financial transactions?

    How does BRICS Pay work in practice? The core premise is that each member state retains its existing domestic payment infrastructure, while BRICS Pay builds the technical bridges to enable these separate systems to communicate with one another, via tools like QR codes, digital wallets, and mobile applications. For consumers, this could mean a traveler from India visiting Brazil would be able to use their existing Indian payment infrastructure directly, rather than relying on international card networks or traditional cross-border payment services. The same model applies to business and banking transactions: an Indian firm trading with a Chinese partner could settle transactions directly in their respective national currencies via connected domestic systems, arranged through agreements between their financial institutions.

    Andrey Mikhaylishin, CEO of BRICS Pay, pointed to existing cutting-edge national systems as the building blocks for the network, including India’s Unified Payments Interface (UPI) and RuPay, Russia’s Mir card network and Fast Payment System. Currently, these advanced national systems operate in isolation: an Indian payment app does not work automatically in China, a Brazilian domestic network cannot connect seamlessly to Russian banks, and China’s infrastructure does not natively interoperate with India’s. BRICS Pay’s core mission is to close these gaps.

    Many member states already operate world-class national payment systems that can serve as a foundation for the expanded network:
    – India’s UPI is one of the most advanced instant payment systems globally, enabling fast person-to-person and business-to-consumer transactions directly from bank accounts. While it dominates domestic retail payments and has been rolled out in a small number of partner countries, its role in facilitating large-scale international trade remains limited for now.
    – Brazil’s Pix is another wildly popular instant payment system that has rapidly become a core part of the country’s domestic payment ecosystem. Like UPI, its main gap is the lack of established international interoperability. A successful domestic system does not automatically translate to a functional global payment network.
    – China’s Cross-Border Interbank Payment System (CIPS) is a dedicated infrastructure for cross-border renminbi payments. It is important to note that CIPS does not fill the exact same role as SWIFT: CIPS handles the processing and settlement of cross-border renminbi transactions, while SWIFT is primarily a secure messaging network that allows financial institutions to exchange payment instructions and transaction information.

    This distinction is critical for anyone comparing BRICS Pay to SWIFT. The Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication (SWIFT) is not a global settlement system that moves money between accounts itself. Instead, it is a standardized, secure messaging network used by more than 11,000 financial institutions worldwide to exchange transaction information. Its massive scale, built up over decades of operation, creates a self-reinforcing network effect: the more institutions that join SWIFT, the more valuable the network becomes for every user. Beyond technology, SWIFT represents a decades-old global framework of trust, standardized rules, regulation, and financial relationships that cannot be easily replaced overnight.

    In their joint declaration from the New Delhi summit, BRICS leaders emphasized the need to prioritize national sovereign priorities, noting that no universal solution exists for all member states. BRICS Pay is also open to use by friendly non-BRICS countries, expanding its potential reach over time. For now, the initiative remains a work in progress, focused on incremental connection of existing systems rather than a sudden overhaul of the global financial order.

  • Column: Schoenmaker blijf bij je leest

    Column: Schoenmaker blijf bij je leest

    A landmark legal change approved one week ago is set to reshape international football opportunities for both players and the South American nation of Suriname. The amendment formally allows professional footballers with Surinamese heritage to represent the country at international competitions while retaining their Dutch nationality, unlocking a deep pool of untapped talent for Suriname’s national squad.

    This regulatory shift delivers mutual benefits for players and the Suriname Football Association alike. For eligible athletes, the rule change removes the long-standing barrier of being forced to give up Dutch citizenship to play internationally, opening up a new path to earn senior caps, raise their profiles among top global club scouts, and continue competitive football at the international level even if they do not earn a call-up to the Netherlands’ iconic Oranje national team. In an era of deepening sports globalization, the change also aligns with new scouting realities: unlike decades past when the Netherlands was seen as the only gateway for Surinamese-born talent to access European opportunities, social media now allows scouts from top clubs across the continent to identify and evaluate talent playing anywhere in the world, making international caps for Suriname just as valuable for a player’s career.

    The timing of the amendment’s passage could not be more critical. Suriname is set to kick off its Concacaf Nations League campaign later this month, and the rule change means the national team can now field a squad made up primarily of professional players, a marked shift from previous rosters that relied more heavily on domestic amateur and semi-professional talent. The full squad has already been announced, and football fans across Suriname are currently counting down to the first match.

    Still, the road ahead presents significant challenges. Team officials face a tight timeline to get the newly assembled squad, most of whom have not played any official warm-up matches together, into peak competitive form. Some observers have argued that local players, who have already been training and competing together in regional domestic leagues, should start the opening matches to address this lack of cohesion. However, this proposal has been ruled out: recent regional competitive assessments confirm that Suriname’s domestic club leagues do not meet the required competitive standard to prepare players for Concacaf League A, the top tier of the regional competition.

    Even with the addition of a full complement of professional players, earning a spot out of the group stage in League A will be an enormous uphill challenge. Amateurs are no longer viable options for the roster when the national association has set the clear goal of advancing past the group stage. National team leadership has emphasized that lessons learned from Suriname’s 2026 FIFA World Cup qualifying campaign will be integrated into this new tournament cycle, and as the ultimate decision-maker, the head coach is tasked with pulling every lever available to hit the team’s performance goals. The Surinamese football community has expressed confidence that the coach will field the strongest possible squad, and has called for giving him the benefit of the doubt through the early stages of the campaign.

    In a closing reflection on the public debate surrounding the legal amendment, opinion writer Mireille Hoepel noted that over the course of the legislative process, many people without professional expertise in sports policy or international football law offered unsolicited, strongly held opinions on the bill, often positioning themselves as uninvited advocates for Dutch national interests. While constructive public criticism is appropriate, Hoepel argued that this pattern of overreach into fields outside one’s own professional expertise is disappointing. She emphasized that members of every profession would deliver better collective outcomes by focusing on improving their own work rather than expending energy criticizing and interfering in work done by trained experts in other fields, closing with the classic reminder: “Let the cobbler stick to his last.”

  • Braganza kreeg duizenden hectares terwijl bedrijfsplan financiële onzekerheid vermeldt

    Braganza kreeg duizenden hectares terwijl bedrijfsplan financiële onzekerheid vermeldt

    In January 2026, Suriname’s Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock and Fisheries (LVV) awarded a conditional 20-year lease for nearly 9,400 hectares of state-owned land in the Para region to Braganza Marketing Group, clearing the way for the firm to develop a large-scale commercial agricultural project on the site. A portion of the already deforested land is currently being worked on by Mennonite farmers recruited by Braganza to move to Suriname for the initiative. But newly public documents from the project’s founding raise serious questions about whether Braganza ever proved it had the financial capacity to meet the strict development requirements tied to the lease agreement. The project was approved in large part based on Braganza’s 10-year business plan covering 2022 to 2031, whose final version was published in May 2023. In that document, the company itself explicitly acknowledged that its financial standing and cash flow were major weaknesses at the time the plan was drafted, noting its overall financial position remained uncertain when the proposal was submitted for government review. It remains unclear whether Braganza has addressed these financial vulnerabilities and shored up its capital position between the publication of the business plan and the January 2026 approval of the land lease. According to Braganza’s own accounting, all early operations up to the approval date were funded by its founding partners, and the company had not yet finalized key funding streams including first-revenue generation, external bank lending, outside investor commitments, government subsidies, and additional state support. At the same time, the business plan notes that there was strong interest from international investors looking to deploy direct capital into Suriname’s agricultural sector, with planned investments covering row crop production, cattle rearing, and dairy processing. Braganza outlined its overarching funding strategy in the plan around two core pillars: equity contributions from existing shareholders and commercial bank lending. What remains unconfirmed to date is what level of financial due diligence LVV conducted on Braganza prior to the ministry’s January 13, 2026 decision to hand over such a large tract of public land for 20 years of commercial development. The terms of the lease agreement impose significant mandatory development requirements on Braganza: the firm must bring a minimum of 10% of the total 9,366.72 hectares under active cultivation every year, which equals roughly 937 hectares of new development annually. The company’s own business plan actually called for a far faster rollout of development than the lease’s minimum requirements. Braganza initially projected that it would have 5,000 hectares in active production after its first full year of operations, targeting annual output of 11,250 tons of soybeans and 25,000 tons of corn. It aimed to have 10,000 hectares in production by the end of the fifth year of the project. Achieving that aggressive timeline requires massive upfront investment in land preparation, agricultural machinery, road and utility infrastructure, on-site storage, processing facilities, and transport logistics. Beyond financial questions, Braganza itself openly acknowledges in its business plan that Suriname currently lacks the full supporting infrastructure needed to sustain large-scale commercial soy and corn production. The document notes that large volumes of required production inputs are either entirely unavailable or only available in insufficient quantities within the country, meaning many key raw materials would need to be imported to keep the project running. The lease agreement grants LVV full authority to conduct regular inspections, ongoing monitoring, and periodic evaluations of the project’s progress. It also explicitly states that the lease will automatically terminate if Braganza fails to meet its mandatory annual cultivation requirements. However, based on all publicly available documents related to the approval, there is no public record of what financial guarantees Braganza submitted to LVV when the lease was signed in January, nor any confirmation that the ministry completed a formal pre-approval verification to confirm the company held enough capital to actually meet its mandatory development obligations over the course of the lease.

  • Het Pinglu-kanaal: China’s nieuwe toegangspoort tot Zuidoost-Azië

    Het Pinglu-kanaal: China’s nieuwe toegangspoort tot Zuidoost-Azië

    On September 16, 2026, China officially opened the Pinglu Canal, a landmark infrastructure project that marks the country’s first nationally planned and constructed modern river-sea waterway. Stretching 134.2 kilometers across the Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region in southern China, the canal directly connects Nanning, the capital of Guangxi, to the Beibu Gulf, creating the closest access to the ocean for China’s landlocked southwestern interior and cutting more than 560 kilometers off the traditional trading route through Guangdong Province.

    With a total construction investment of 72.7 billion yuan (approximately 10.75 billion U.S. dollars), the project took just over four years to complete. Engineers overcame significant technical hurdles, most notably a 65-meter elevation difference across the canal’s length—roughly the height of a 20-story building—by building three double-chamber lock complexes to accommodate vessels up to 5,000 deadweight tons. The project set four global engineering records: the strongest shipping capacity among comparable canals worldwide, the fastest lock operation for similar waterways, the largest water level difference for a water-saving lock, and the world’s largest water-saving inland waterway lock. Environmental sustainability was integrated into construction from the start: more than 98% of the 315 million cubic meters of excavated earth and rock was reused, and the canal includes a 480-meter fish passage as well as a dedicated crossing for local terrestrial wildlife such as leopard cats and squirrels.

    The Pinglu Canal is a core component of China’s New International Land-Sea Trade Corridor, a strategic initiative linking China’s inland regions to ASEAN and global markets. On opening day, 30 cargo vessels transited the new waterway, and two new shipping routes were launched: the international Nanning-Can Tho (Vietnam) route and the domestic Nanning-Yangpu (Hainan) route. Four additional passenger routes were also opened alongside the cargo lanes, with initial shipments including containers, bulk construction materials, coal, ore, steel, and fertilizer.

    Ding Xuexiang, a member of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the Communist Party of China Central Committee and Vice Premier of the State Council, attended the opening ceremony in Qinzhou and emphasized that the completion of the canal creates an opportunity to develop the Beibu Gulf Port into a world-class international trade gateway and expand opening-up in western China. As a critical multi-modal infrastructure hub integrating water transport, rail, and maritime shipping, Ding noted that the Pinglu Canal must leverage its unique advantages in coordinating land-sea connections and linking domestic and international markets to operate as a safe and efficient “golden waterway” between China’s interior and the ocean.

    The opening of the canal comes in the first year of China’s 15th Five-Year Plan (2026-2030), a period in which the world’s second-largest economy has prioritized more balanced regional development and expanded high-quality opening-up. For southwest China, a region that has long lagged behind the more prosperous eastern coast and faced high logistics costs for accessing ocean ports, the Pinglu Canal marks a transformative shift. It is projected to cut annual transportation costs by more than 5 billion yuan and reduce overall logistics costs by between 18% and 30% for regional trade.

    China-ASEAN trade has grown rapidly in recent years, surpassing 1 trillion U.S. dollars for the first time in 2025. In the first seven months of 2026 alone, bilateral trade reached 744.41 billion U.S. dollars, a 24.7% year-on-year increase that accounts for 21.8% of China’s total foreign trade. Industry analysts note that the value of the Pinglu Canal extends far beyond just reduced shipping distance.

    “The real impact lies in how much the canal can cut overall logistics costs, reduce travel time variability, and lower supply chain uncertainty across the entire China-ASEAN trade network,” explained Boonsub Panichakarn, a scholar from the Faculty of Logistics and Digital Supply Chain at Thailand’s Naresuan University. Lu Xinning, vice chairman of the Pinglu Canal project, added that the waterway creates a new direct connection between China’s 1.4-billion-consumer market and ASEAN’s nearly 700 million consumers, with benefits extending beyond just goods trade to encourage cross-border investment and deeper integration of regional supply chains.

    Looking ahead, the canal is expected to reshape regional trade flows in the near term, shifting some cargo volume from road and rail to water transport and redirecting traffic from the Pearl River Delta to the Beibu Gulf. Over the long term, lower access costs to ocean trade are projected to attract new investment to southwest China’s interior and reshape the industrial layout along the canal. The Beibu Gulf Port has already seen rapid growth in capacity, with container throughput rising from just 2.28 million TEU in 2017 to around 10 million TEU in 2025. Analysts project that the Pinglu Canal will add an estimated 3.5 million tons of additional cargo throughput in its early years of operation, rising to as much as 150 million tons annually over the long term.

  • Overeenkomst LVV basis voor landbouwproject waarbij Mennonieten zijn betrokken

    Overeenkomst LVV basis voor landbouwproject waarbij Mennonieten zijn betrokken

    Newly released public contractual documents and a 10-year business plan have cast fresh clarity on the complex structure behind a controversial large-scale agricultural development project in Suriname, confirming that Mennonite farmers who migrated to the country for the initiative do not hold any formal stake in the state land agreement at the heart of the project.

    The deal, signed January 13, 2026, between Suriname’s Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock and Fisheries (LVV) and local entity Braganza Marketing Group N.V. — the firm that recruited the Mennonite farmers to work on the project — grants the company conditional use rights to 9,366.72 hectares of state-owned land in Suriname’s Para district for an initial 20-year term. The land remains the formal property of the Surinamese state, and Braganza holds a non-transferable right to use the plot exclusively for large-scale mechanized agriculture and related agribusiness activities. Under the terms of the agreement, Braganza is required to bring at least 10 percent of the total allocated area under cultivation every year to retain its access rights. What makes the arrangement notable is that despite the Mennonite farmers being central to the project’s on-the-ground implementation, their names do not appear anywhere in the formal public contract between LVV and Braganza.

    LVV Minister Mike Noersalim had previously stated that his ministry never entered into a separate agreement with the Mennonite community, noting that the ministry’s contract was exclusively with the Surinamese registered firm for the production of commodity crops including soybeans and corn, and that Braganza did not present itself as a representative of the migrating farmers during negotiations. Braganza, however, has publicly confirmed its plan to rely on Mennonite agricultural workers for the project’s two core sites: one group of Mennonites from Belize for the Tibiti site, and a second contingent from Mexico for the Kabalebo site.

    During a recent visit to the Tibiti area by members of Suriname’s National Assembly and journalists, Peter Petersen, a Mennonite leader from Belize, explained that his group was recruited to Suriname by Lionel Blokland and Ruud Souverein, two figures connected to Braganza. Petersen said his community sold all of their assets in Belize and shipped heavy farm machinery to Suriname under the expectation that they would be able to operate large-scale farms on the Para district land. His group, he added, expects to use more than 9,000 hectares and has agreed to pay $150 per hectare for access, though details of who receives this payment and what contractual rights the group holds remain unclear.

    Braganza’s 2022-2031 business plan, also made public, shows that plans for the Tibiti and Kabalebo sites have been in development for nearly a decade, with the firm explicitly outlining its goal to produce soy and corn across the two concessions. The plan also highlights the project’s international backing, naming Adrian Barbero of Bolivia-based Rural Real Estate Investments Ltd. (RREI) as a lead initiator. According to the document, RREI brings more than 30 years of experience investing in large-scale agriculture and livestock operations across South America, with a track record of developing and acquiring large agricultural concessions across multiple regional countries where “agricultural specialist colonies” operate. While the plan does not explicitly confirm these colonies refer to Mennonite communities, it is now verified that Braganza has specifically recruited Mennonite farmers to carry out on-ground work for its Suriname projects. RREI, alongside Blokland, is listed as a stakeholder in Braganza Marketing Group, with international investors planning to contribute their own capital to develop agriculture, livestock, and dairy projects across the allocated Surinamese land.

    The disclosures confirm a clear structural separation: the Surinamese state has granted land access to Braganza, not directly to the Mennonite farmers, who are only involved as contracted workers through the local firm. Crucially, no details of the private agreement between Braganza and the Mennonite community — including terms for land use, per-hectare payments, investment responsibilities, or profit sharing — appear in the public contract with LVV or the released business plan. This lack of transparency raises regulatory questions, as the LVV-Braganza agreement explicitly bans transferring use rights to any third party without the ministry’s prior written approval.

  • Rechtstaat ondermijnd door vrijlopende moordenaar

    Rechtstaat ondermijnd door vrijlopende moordenaar

    Four decades after the devastating December 8, 1982 killings that shook Suriname, the legacy of unresolved justice remains a open wound for grieving families and a stain on the country’s democratic institutions. In a forceful statement released September 16, Stichting 8 December 1982 (the December 8, 1982 Foundation) has issued a sharp condemnation of the Surinamese government’s ongoing failure to detain Leendert Dijksteel, a convicted murderer directly implicated in the 1982 mass killing case, who remains at large decades after his conviction.

    For the relatives of the 15 unarmed civilian victims killed in the 1982 incident, this unaddressed injustice has turned a court verdict into a hollow promise. While a court has formally handed down a guilty finding against Dijksteel, no authority has moved to enforce that ruling, leaving the convicted killer free to move across the country while victim’s families continue to grapple with the pain of losing their loved ones. The foundation describes this reality as completely unacceptable: a core violation of the basic promise of justice that a state owes to its citizens.

    Worse, the foundation argues, this ongoing failure to enforce the conviction undermines the very foundations of Suriname’s rule of law. A nation that allows convicted violent offenders to evade custody and lets suspects disappear without trace cannot credibly claim to be a functioning, rights-respecting state. The persistent impunity for Dijksteel carries four far-reaching harms that damage Suriname’s social and political fabric, the foundation outlines.

    First, it enables outright impunity for a severe crime against humanity, sending a dangerous message that grave violence against civilians can go unpunished. Second, it systematically erodes public trust in the country’s judiciary and law enforcement agencies, when citizens see that even finalized court rulings are not enforced. Third, it poses a direct, ongoing threat to public safety: a convicted mass murderer is able to move freely through communities, with no oversight to prevent further harm. Fourth, the failure to act violates Suriname’s binding international human rights obligations, as the country is a signatory to multiple international treaties that require states to guarantee equal access to justice and uphold the rule of law for all.

    In closing, the foundation issued an urgent demand to Suriname’s national authorities: launch immediate, full-scale efforts using every available resource to locate and take Dijksteel into custody without delay. Only through decisive, forceful action can Suriname demonstrate that its legal system does not bend to political convenience or bureaucratic apathy, the foundation says. Only by enforcing this conviction can the country prove that its justice system exists first to protect its citizens, and to honor the memory of the 15 people killed on December 8, 1982.

    The statement was signed by Sunil Oemrawsingh, chair of Stichting 8 December 1982.

  • PAHO opent toegang tot halfjaarlijkse hiv-preventie-injectie in 14 landen

    PAHO opent toegang tot halfjaarlijkse hiv-preventie-injectie in 14 landen

    Fourteen countries across Latin America are set to expand their HIV prevention toolkit after the Pan American Health Organization (PAHO) secured a landmark access agreement with U.S.-based pharmaceutical giant Gilead Sciences for lenacapavir, a groundbreaking long-acting pre-exposure prophylaxis (PrEP) administered just twice per year.

    The deal covers Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Mexico, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela, with Suriname excluded from this specific arrangement. Participating nations will be able to purchase the drug through PAHO’s Regional Revolving Fund, a bulk procurement mechanism that aggregates demand across multiple countries to secure lower prices and more reliable supply of critical health products compared to individual national purchases. Before the drug can be rolled out to at-risk populations, each country must still complete national regulatory approval and program implementation processes.

    Unlike traditional oral PrEP that requires daily adherence, lenacapavir is delivered via injection just once every six months. The World Health Organization (WHO) formally endorsed lenacapavir as an additional HIV prevention option in 2025, following clinical trial data published by PAHO showing the drug achieves nearly 100% effectiveness in blocking new HIV infections. This half-yearly dosing model fills a critical gap for people who struggle to maintain daily or frequent dosing schedules required by existing prevention methods.

    Public health data underscores the urgent need for expanded prevention tools across the region: PAHO records roughly 140,000 new HIV infections annually in Latin America and the Caribbean. “The Americas have access to increasingly effective tools to prevent HIV, but these innovations only make an impact if they reach the people who need them most,” said PAHO Director Jarbas Barbosa. He noted the new agreement will help narrow gaps in access to lenacapavir and give countries more flexible options to expand their prevention outreach. This procurement arrangement operates alongside existing voluntary licensing agreements for lenacapavir that already cover 24 Latin American and Caribbean nations, as part of a broader global access program reaching 120 countries worldwide.

    In a complementary commitment included in the deal, Gilead has agreed to pursue technology transfer to Brazil to enable local manufacturing of lenacapavir in the future. No firm timeline or specific operational structure for local production has been finalized, but PAHO projects that regional manufacturing will boost long-term drug availability and create more sustainable, affordable procurement pathways for the region.

    Rollout of lenacapavir into national HIV programs will proceed in a phased, gradual manner. Participating countries will need to update national public health regulations and clinical treatment guidelines, train healthcare workers on administration and patient support, and adapt existing care systems to integrate the new prevention option.

    Lenacapavir will complement existing HIV prevention tools currently available across the region, including daily and on-demand oral PrEP, another long-acting injectable option called cabotegravir, and condoms. PAHO frames the expansion of prevention options as a core part of regional efforts to cut new infection rates further and achieve the global target of ending HIV as a public health threat by 2030.

  • Wereldeconomie onder druk door hoge rente, dure olie en dreigende handelsfragmentatie

    Wereldeconomie onder druk door hoge rente, dure olie en dreigende handelsfragmentatie

    The global economy is currently navigating a dangerous confluence of overlapping risks, from spiking financing costs and surging crude oil prices to growing geopolitical tensions that threaten to rip apart the established multilateral trading system. The World Trade Organization (WTO) has issued an urgent new warning that accelerating fragmentation of global trade could result in trillions of dollars in cumulative economic losses across the globe, even as bond markets in major economies signal mounting pressure from high interest rates and persistent inflation concerns.

    Yields on 10-year U.S. Treasury bonds have now climbed above the 5% threshold, matching multi-year highs for borrowing costs seen across most other major advanced economies. According to industry reports, average financing costs for leading industrialized nations have reached levels not seen in decades, driven by persistent market anxiety over stubborn inflation, expanding government budget deficits, and the likelihood that major central banks will keep interest rates elevated for an extended period to bring price growth under control.

    Compounding these financial market pressures is a sharp recent rally in global crude oil prices. On Tuesday, benchmark Brent crude traded above $107 per barrel, while U.S. West Texas Intermediate crude also crossed the $100 per barrel mark. The renewed run-up in energy costs has reignited fears that inflation will remain stickier than policymakers and investors currently expect, potentially forcing further monetary tightening that would push borrowing costs even higher.

    Higher sovereign bond yields ripple out across every corner of the global economy, pushing up borrowing costs for nearly all participants. Governments face higher interest expenses when issuing new debt or refinancing maturing obligations, while business loans and consumer credit products from mortgages to auto loans also grow more expensive. Countries with high debt loads or large ongoing refinancing needs are disproportionately exposed to this pressure, leaving them vulnerable to fiscal strain in the coming months.

    Against this unstable macroeconomic backdrop, the WTO used its newly released 2026 World Trade Report to sound the alarm on a second, longer-term threat to global growth: the split of the global trading system into competing geopolitical and economic blocs. The organization emphasized that the current multilateral trading framework is at a critical crossroads, as it has failed to evolve quickly enough to keep pace with seismic shifts in the global economy, including changing global power balances, rising state intervention in markets, rapid digitalization, and escalating geopolitical frictions that have eroded cooperation.

    The potential economic damage from full fragmentation is staggering. WTO economists modeled two plausible fragmentation scenarios, and both project deep global output losses. In a scenario where the world splits into two geopolitically aligned trading blocs, global gross domestic product (GDP) would be 5.1% lower than a baseline scenario of continued existing cooperation, while global exports would drop by 18.6% relative to the baseline.

    The harm is even more severe in a second scenario where nearly all multilateral trade cooperation is replaced by a fragmented web of disconnected bilateral and regional free trade agreements. Under that outcome, global GDP would fall by 6.9% compared to the baseline, and global exports would contract by 26.9%. In contrast, the WTO projects that strengthening and reforming the multilateral trading system would deliver significant net gains: by 2050, global GDP would be 2.9% higher than the baseline, and global exports would expand by 17.9% if cooperation is reinforced.

    Smaller and lower-income economies face the most disproportionate risk from further erosion of the multilateral system, the WTO found. These nations typically lack the economic and geopolitical heft to negotiate favorable bilateral trade terms on their own, so they rely heavily on the rule-based multilateral framework to guarantee equal access to global markets. In a world where bilateral power dynamics dominate trade relations, these vulnerable economies would suffer far larger relative losses than larger, more powerful economies.

    Taken together, the latest bond market movements and the WTO’s warning lay bare two overlapping vulnerabilities facing the global economy today. In the short term, elevated oil prices, persistent inflation, and rising interest rates are driving up financing costs for governments, businesses and households worldwide, squeezing spending and investment. Over the longer term, growing geopolitical polarization and accelerating trade fragmentation will put additional sustained downward pressure on international trade and global economic growth.

    For small, open economies that depend heavily on international trade, energy imports and access to global capital markets, these two sets of risks are especially consequential. Higher global interest rates directly raise their borrowing costs, while disrupted trade flows and sustained high energy prices push up import costs and feed through to higher domestic inflation, creating a toxic mix of challenges for policymakers to address.

  • Een zonnige tot halfbewolkte woensdag

    Een zonnige tot halfbewolkte woensdag

    On Wednesday, September 16, Suriname will grapple with unseasonably warm, muggy conditions that will push perceived temperatures well above the actual mercury reading, according to the country’s Meteorological Service.

    The day will kick off on a calm, largely dry note. Localized patches of mist or light fog are possible in the early morning hours, but the service predicts these low-visibility conditions will clear gradually as the morning progresses. Cloud cover will build incrementally through the rest of the day, but forecasters do not expect widespread heavy downpours to hit the country. The overall chance of precipitation remains low: while isolated light showers could pop up here and there in the afternoon, the vast majority of Suriname will stay dry through the end of the day.

    Official temperature projections put maximum readings between 33 and 34 degrees Celsius across nearly all of the country’s administrative districts. Coastal districts, including the capital district Paramaribo and neighboring Wanica, are expected to hit the top end of that range at 34 degrees. In the southern interior, the district of Sipaliwini could see actual temperatures climb as high as 36 degrees Celsius. Even overnight will offer little relief, with minimum temperatures hovering between 22 and 24 degrees Celsius that keep conditions sweltering through the night.

    Winds will blow from the east-northeast to east, and are expected to remain mostly weak to moderate, with sustained speeds ranging from 11 to 24 kilometers per hour. Localized slightly stronger gusts are possible, but forecasters have ruled out dangerous wind events for the day. The main source of discomfort remains high humidity, which will push perceived temperatures to between 36 and 40 degrees Celsius across the country, creating a stuffy, oppressive feeling for most residents through the day.