Carib Scope

标签： Suriname

苏里南

  • Guyana houdt veto bij Amerikaanse deportaties

    Guyana houdt veto bij Amerikaanse deportaties

    During an on-site interview with Al Jazeera in Doha, Qatar on September 14, Guyanese President Irfaan Ali pushed back against growing criticism of a newly emerging deportation reception arrangement with the United States, stressing that Guyana will retain full sovereign control over all entries to its territory regardless of the bilateral deal.

    The agreement, which has not yet been fully detailed publicly, would see Guyana accept third-country nationals that the U.S. government has ordered deported. Critics have raised alarms that the deal would turn the small South American nation into a dumping ground for deportees expelled from the U.S., with no sufficient safeguards for the rights of deported individuals or Guyana’s national security. Addressing these concerns directly, Ali emphasized that the U.S. does not have the authority to unilaterally deport individuals to Guyana without prior approval from Guyanese authorities.

    “This is not a scenario where the U.S. shows up with a plane and just dumps people on your shores,” Ali told reporters. He laid out the formal two-step process that governs any planned deportations under the arrangement: first, U.S. authorities are required to share the full list of proposed deportees with Guyana before any travel is arranged. Guyanese officials will then conduct independent screenings and vetting of each individual on the list, and only after the process is completed to Guyana’s full satisfaction will the country approve the names. If Guyana rejects any individual, that person will not be accepted into the country.

    Ali added that the agreement does not set a binding precedent for future cases, meaning Guyana retains the full right to turn away any proposed deportee at any time, regardless of past approvals. He also confirmed that the International Organization for Migration (IOM) is involved in implementing the arrangement, though he did not elaborate on the organization’s exact role. The interview took place during Ali’s diplomatic visit to Doha, a major hub that has increasingly hosted high-level international diplomatic talks for parties across the Middle East and beyond, giving the Guyanese leader a platform to clarify his government’s position to a global audience.

    Human rights organizations have already raised multiple red flags about the deal, warning that Guyana lacks sufficient oversight mechanisms to ensure that deportees are not sent to the country without adequate due process, and that the arrangement could open the door to large-scale deportations that strain Guyana’s resources. In his comments, Ali rejected claims that Guyana has ceded sovereign control over its border policies, but he declined to provide key details that critics have called for. These missing details include the specific criteria Guyana uses to approve or reject proposed deportees, the exact nature of security and human rights screenings carried out by officials, whether an independent appeal mechanism exists for rejected or approved deportation decisions, and whether Guyana has already rejected any deportation proposals from the U.S. to date.

    While Ali reiterated that Guyana’s sovereignty remains fully intact because of the country’s final say over who enters its borders, the practical implementation of this commitment and the question of whether the agreement will eventually be expanded to accommodate much larger numbers of deportees remain unanswered for the time being.

  • EBS introduceert dagelijkse planning voor loadshedding

    EBS introduceert dagelijkse planning voor loadshedding

    Suriname’s national power utility De Energie Bedrijven Suriname (EBS) has rolled out a new structured system to manage rolling power cuts, giving consumers the ability to check daily if their electricity connection is scheduled for shutdown during periods of generation deficit. The update comes after weeks of unplanned load shedding that disrupted communities across the country, replacing ad-hoc outages with a pre-planned, transparent framework that uses a custom-built digital portal for consumer access.

    To use the service, customers simply enter their meter number or connection ID on the portal to see if their address appears on the updated list of potential outages. EBS updates the schedule twice daily: an initial version is released for morning and afternoon hours, followed by a revised schedule for evening outages posted later in the day. Utility officials have advised customers to check the portal two times per day to stay informed of any changes to their potential outage status.

    Importantly, inclusion on the schedule does not guarantee a power cut. EBS emphasized that the daily list serves only as an indicative planning tool, and shutdowns will only be implemented if load shedding is deemed necessary to maintain overall stability of the national grid.

    The new scheduling system was introduced in response to ongoing power supply challenges that began in late August. On August 25, EBS announced that electricity consumption during the current dry season had grown far faster than initial projections, leaving available generation units under extreme strain with no reserve capacity to meet unexpected demand spikes. At that time, the utility warned that rolling outages lasting a minimum of three hours per rotation would be implemented across the EPAR network, which covers most of Suriname’s coastal region and supplies power to the vast majority of the country’s households, businesses, and public institutions.

    Over the past weeks, persistent power deficits and rotating outages have sparked widespread public debate over Suriname’s current generation capacity and the large-scale investments needed to strengthen the country’s power infrastructure long-term. Energy sector analysts and advocates have also called for greater public transparency around the root causes of the shortages and the utility’s long-term mitigation plans.

    Compounding the current supply crunch is a temporary capacity reduction at the Brokopondo hydropower plant, one of the country’s largest generation sources. Ongoing maintenance work on the facility’s turbines has cut available output, with EBS currently able to draw a maximum of just 130 megawatts from the plant, down from the full 160 megawatts generated when all six turbines are operational. To partially offset the lost hydropower output, EBS has increased thermal power generation from the Tout Lui Faut facility.

    With the launch of the new digital portal and daily scheduling system, EBS aims to bring much-needed predictability to households and businesses navigating potential outages, allowing them to plan work, personal activities, and critical operations around potential disruptions. The utility has also stressed that voluntary energy conservation by consumers can reduce overall demand enough to eliminate the need for scheduled shutdowns, urging the public to cut non-essential electricity use during the current supply crunch. Consumers can access the load shedding portal at any time to check their daily outage status using their connection or meter information.

  • Olie boven $107 terwijl Washington “overwinning” uitroept

    Olie boven $107 terwijl Washington “overwinning” uitroept

    On Monday, global crude oil prices jumped more than 3% following two high-stakes energy infrastructure disruptions over the weekend: an attack on an Iranian vessel in the Strait of Hormuz and a drone strike that damaged Saudi Arabia’s critical East-West oil pipeline. Benchmark Brent crude climbed $3.21 to settle at $107.82 per barrel, while U.S. West Texas Intermediate gained $3.17 to reach $103.22 per barrel. This uptick extended an existing rally, after Brent closed at $101.21 on September 9 — its highest level since late May. Market analysts note the price increase is not driven by a single isolated incident, but rather markets pricing in the probability of a prolonged regional conflict that disrupts global energy supplies.

    Washington has pushed back against growing anxiety, claiming that transit traffic through the Strait of Hormuz, one of the world’s most vital energy chokepoints through which roughly one-fifth of global oil and gas supplies pass, is improving despite a ongoing diplomatic deadlock between the U.S. and Iran. U.S. Energy Secretary Chris Wright said Sunday that an average of 10 million barrels of oil passed through the strait daily over the previous week, adding that volumes have recovered to two-thirds or more of pre-conflict levels. Former U.S. President Trump echoed these claims, asserting that U.S. forces have “full control” over the waterway and are escorting vessels carrying millions of barrels of oil through the passage.

    Iran has directly disputed these U.S. claims. Tehran maintains it retains control over access to the Strait of Hormuz, and has warned vessels against using unapproved shipping routes. Last week, Iran announced a new restricted shipping zone around the critical waterway, tightening its leverage over transit.

    Independent shipping data from tanker trackers backs up Iran’s implicit assertion that traffic remains far below normal levels. Preliminary tracking data cited by Reuters shows that the number of daily transits through the strait dropped to single digits over the weekend, well below the 10-day average of 14 transits per day. In total, just 14 vessels passed through the waterway over the entire weekend, with four exiting the Persian Gulf and 10 entering. Before the U.S.-Israeli war against Iran began in February, more than 100 vessels transited the strait daily, carrying an estimated 20 million barrels of oil. Reuters notes that the data remains preliminary and may be updated, as some vessels travel with their Automatic Identification System transponders disabled to avoid detection, placing them outside official counts.

    The disruption has put massive pressure on alternative supply routes that Saudi Arabia turned to after Iran’s blockade of the Strait of Hormuz. Saudi officials confirmed that the kingdom’s East-West oil pipeline, which carries crude to Red Sea export terminals, was temporarily shut down after a drone strike launched from Iraqi territory. If the pipeline remains offline, roughly 4% of global oil supply could be taken off the market. A wave of recent rocket and drone attacks by Yemen’s Houthi movement on southern Saudi Arabia has further amplified uncertainty over energy exports from the world’s largest oil producer.

    On Tuesday, Houthi forces struck civilian and economic sites across the Saudi cities of Abha, Khamis Mushait, Jizan and Najran, leaving 73 people injured including women and children. The attack marks a sharp escalation of the long-running Yemeni civil war, which reignited in July after nearly four years of relative calm under a UN-brokered ceasefire.

    Despite repeated U.S. reassurances that the strait is open for business, market analysts warn that upward pressure on oil prices will persist as long as Hormuz transit remains disrupted. “Despite American claims to the contrary, Hormuz is not under U.S. control, and oil is not flowing freely,” said Chris Beauchamp, chief market analyst at IG Group. Beauchamp explained that transits through the strait remain severely restricted, vessels continue to face attack risks, and Houthi strikes on energy infrastructure add an extra layer of uncertainty for global energy markets. “Near-month futures are still trading at a premium to spot prices, which reflects market expectations that supply disruptions will continue, putting additional pressure on the already fragile global economy,” he added.

    Christopher Haines, Global Head of Oil at Energy Aspects, also forecasts that crude prices will keep rising, pointing out that flows through the Strait of Hormuz remain drastically lower than pre-conflict levels, while global inventories that helped stabilize markets over the past six months have shrunk considerably. “The U.S. Strategic Petroleum Reserve has very little capacity to add additional supply now that planned releases have been completed… Meanwhile, China will not be able to cut back on crude purchases as it did this summer, as seasonal winter demand is ramping up,” Haines told Al Jazeera. “Crude buying has remained robust because refineries have to run at higher rates to produce the heating fuels the Northern Hemisphere needs for the cold season. We believe oil prices can continue climbing, because without the inventory buffers we had in previous months, prices will have to rise to cool demand.”

    Over the weekend, new security incidents reinforced the ongoing risk to transit. Early Sunday, the UK Maritime Trade Operations reported that a vessel was hit by an unknown projectile while transiting Hormuz. Then on Monday, Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps announced it had intercepted and destroyed an advanced U.S. MQ-1 drone flying over the strait.

    Diplomatic efforts to de-escalate the crisis have also hit a wall. A planned meeting between Gulf states and Iran in Oman, scheduled for Monday to discuss potential agreements on Hormuz transit, was postponed — a major setback to diplomatic efforts to end the six-month conflict. Iran said Monday that Saudi Arabia requested the postponement in response to recent events in Yemen. U.S. Energy Secretary Wright also poured cold water on hopes for a near-term diplomatic breakthrough, telling Bloomberg that “betting on a consensus agreement with Iran today is certainly not a good wager.”

    Growing Houthi control over another critical global shipping chokepoint, the Bab al-Mandeb strait off Yemen’s western coast, is adding further upward pressure to oil prices, according to maritime experts. “The Bab al-Mandeb, which connects Asia to Europe, is now largely under Houthi control,” Abdul Khalique, head of the Liverpool John Moores University Maritime Centre, told Al Jazeera. After seizing the port of Mocha and the Hanish and Zuqar islands earlier this week, Iranian-aligned Houthi forces captured the strategically vital island of Perim (also called Mayyun) and the mainland town of Dhubab, giving the group effective control over Yemen’s entire Red Sea coastline.

    Khalique added that war risk insurance premiums for Hormuz transits have skyrocketed, jumping from roughly 0.25% of a vessel’s hull value before the war to between 3% and 10% today, depending on the vessel and route. “For a $100 million tanker, that works out to a war risk premium of $3 million to $10 million for a single transit, before adding coverage for cargo and additional freight costs,” he said. “The U.S. may have substantial military control over the theater of operations, but it has not restored the conditions needed for normal commercial shipping to resume. That gap is exactly why oil prices keep rising even as Washington declares victory.”

    With no diplomatic breakthrough on the horizon and multiple key chokepoints remain disrupted, Beauchamp says a return to the March 2024 price highs is only a matter of time. “With no party rushing to negotiate, it looks like oil prices will keep climbing, and a return to the March peaks is a question of when, not if,” he said.

  • Meer politie en toezicht in uitgaanscentrum Paramaribo

    Meer politie en toezicht in uitgaanscentrum Paramaribo

    PARAMARIBO – Suriname’s national police force has announced plans to ramp up its visible presence and construct additional police posts in Paramaribo’s busy entertainment and tourist core, responding to widespread safety concerns raised by local business owners. The new security measures were finalized following a high-stakes roundtable discussion that brought together entrepreneurs, local district commissioners, and senior police leadership including the national police chief.

    The meeting, organized by the Foundation for the Promotion of Entrepreneurship and Tourism, centered on growing public order challenges that have disrupted operations in the popular Waterkant district and surrounding areas. Business owners in the area used the closed-door session to outline the most pressing issues impacting daily activity, including persistent petty theft, unregulated homeless encampments, unlicensed street vending, and unauthorized individuals acting as private parking attendants to collect unregulated fees from visitors.

    Among the clearest demands put forward by attendees was a call for a greater number of uniformed officers deployed to the area, particularly across the central city’s high-traffic tourist zones. Participants emphasized that increased visible policing would not only deter criminal activity but also reassure both local visitors and international tourists. In addition to more on-the-ground patrols, authorities are currently assessing locations for new permanent police posts in key hotspots, and are planning enhanced targeted surveillance at sites that have recorded frequent incidents.

    The foundation, which spearheaded the discussion, noted that similar stakeholder conversations were held in years past, but the current effort aims to reestablish regular, recurring dialogue between the business community and government security agencies. The long-term goal of the renewed partnership is twofold: to enable faster, more targeted responses to emerging public safety issues, and to build a safer, more welcoming environment for Paramaribo’s key entertainment and tourism sector that drives local economic activity. All proposed measures are now moving into the detailed planning phase for implementation.

  • Column: Wie de chokepoints controleert, controleert de wereldeconomie

    Column: Wie de chokepoints controleert, controleert de wereldeconomie

    The recent Houthi seizure of the Yemeni port city of Mocha and the strategic island of Mayyun, also known as Perim, marks far more than a simple military victory for the group. It is a tectonic geopolitical shift that lays bare the deep fragility of the global trade and security architecture that underpins the modern world economy. With full control now established over Yemen’s entire Red Sea coastline — a strip of territory sitting just 20 kilometers off the coast of East Africa — the Houthi movement holds critical leverage over the Bab al-Mandeb strait, a key maritime chokepoint through which roughly 12 percent of total global trade flows, including 11 percent of the world’s seaborne oil shipments and 8 percent of its liquefied natural gas.

    To be clear: the public reassurance from Houthi politburo member Hazem al-Assad that commercial shipping will remain “safe and orderly” through the strait is little more than rhetorical comfort that no major shipping line is willing to take at face value. Data from the International Monetary Fund’s PortWatch monitoring platform tells a stark story: between 2023 and 2025, shipping volumes through the Red Sea have plummeted by between 50 and 55 percent. Leading global shipping firms are now rerouting the vast majority of their vessels around the Cape of Good Hope, a detour that adds more than 20 extra days of transit time and drives up global freight rates sharply. In the end, the entire global trading system is footing the bill for a protracted conflict unfolding in one of the world’s poorest nations.

    Another claim that bears scrutiny is Tehran’s insistence that the Houthi movement is an “independent group.” A quick look at the geopolitical map tells a different story. Iran already holds strategic control over the Strait of Hormuz, the chokepoint through which roughly one-fifth of the world’s global energy supplies flowed before the outbreak of the 2025 escalation between Iran and Western powers. Now, the Houthi movement — armed and funded by Iran — controls Bab al-Mandeb. This means two of the world’s three most critical maritime chokepoints for global energy and trade are now effectively held by the same Iran-led axis. This is no coincidence: it is a deliberate, long-planned strategic gambit. The real question is not whether the Houthi are truly independent; it is why the West continues to indulge the fiction that they are.

    For Egypt, which earns billions of dollars annually in foreign currency from Suez Canal transit fees, the fallout has already been severe. Between 2023 and 2024, the country lost roughly $7 billion in canal revenue, equal to a 60 percent drop from pre-crisis levels. Yet Cairo has opted for deliberate strategic restraint, maintaining the long-standing policy of non-intervention in Yemeni affairs it has held since the 2015 Gulf intervention. This is not a sign of weakness, but a pragmatic calculation: a country already grappling with deep economic crisis cannot afford the risk of a new military entanglement in Yemen. The paradox is a bitter one: Egypt loses billions in critical revenue, but cannot risk intervention because it cannot bear the military and economic costs that would follow.

    The shifts along the Red Sea have also created uneven impacts across the East African coast. Sudan and Somalia face growing security risks from the new geopolitical order, while Eritrea and Djibouti have gained unexpected strategic leverage. Eritrean President Isaias Afwerki, who spent decades in international isolation, is now leveraging his country’s Red Sea position to deepen ties with Washington and Tel Aviv. It is pure, unadulterated geopolitical opportunism.

    The Bab al-Mandeb strait is narrower than the Strait of Hormuz, a geographic feature that makes it far easier for Houthi forces to target passing commercial and military vessels. Recent public comments from a Houthi commander, released in a video stating that the group can deploy artillery to strike targets in Yemeni territorial waters, underline how immediate and concrete this threat is.

    Even more concerning is the fact that the repositioning of global maritime military assets toward the Bab al-Mandeb and Hormuz amid rising tensions with Iran has created a security vacuum along the coast of the Horn of Africa. That vacuum is being filled by transnational organized maritime criminal groups. The resurgence of piracy off the Somali coast is directly linked to this redistribution of maritime power. As major powers shift their naval assets north to address the Houthi threat, Somali and international seafarers are left to bear the cost of the resulting insecurity.

    What is unfolding in the Red Sea is not a distant regional conflict. It is a critical test for the existing global order, and its impacts reach all the way to major European ports like Rotterdam. As Europe’s largest container port and one of the most critical links in the global container supply chain, disruptions in the Red Sea are felt directly here. When shipping lines reroute en masse around the Cape of Good Hope, freight costs rise, delivery timelines slow, and the impact is passed on to European consumers at the checkout. European energy prices are already highly sensitive to any disruption in Red Sea shipping. Meanwhile, NATO naval forces operating in the region do so under mandates that are ill-suited to counter the current threat landscape.

    The European Union has the financial resources, naval capabilities, and direct economic stake in securing the strait. What it lacks is the political will to update its operational mandates and act collectively. The EU’s existing Operation Atalanta anti-piracy mission is a starting point, but without an expanded mandate to counter Houthi threats, it amounts to little more than a shield without a sword.

    The long-term implications of this shift are far-reaching. Global supply chains are growing more vulnerable to disruption, freight costs are rising, and those increases are ultimately passed through to end consumers. Nations dependent on Suez Canal revenue, such as Egypt, face gradual economic erosion. Most notably, the multilateral system tasked with guaranteeing global maritime security has proven unable to respond quickly and decisively to this new threat.

    The core lesson could not be clearer: whoever controls the world’s critical maritime chokepoints controls the global economy. The Houthi movement understands this reality. Iran understands this reality. Whether the broader international community has also come to terms with it remains to be seen. So far, all evidence suggests the international community has opted primarily to stand by, reroute traffic around the Cape of Good Hope, and hope for the best. That is not a strategy. It is merely kicking the bill down the road.

  • 37 staaroperaties tijdens medische missie Boven-Suriname

    37 staaroperaties tijdens medische missie Boven-Suriname

    A collaborative medical team made up of Surinamese and Belgian healthcare providers has just wrapped up a six-day outreach mission that brought life-changing specialized care to underserved rural communities along the Upper Suriname River, completing 37 cataract surgeries and treating 148 dental patients. Among the cataract recipients was a 95-year-old woman who had previously lost her vision to the condition.

    The mission ran from September 6 to September 11, serving communities scattered across river villages stretching from Sukunale to Goejaba. The mixed team paired Surinamese and Belgian ophthalmologists with Belgian dental practitioners and dental students, with coordination led by Dr. Gaytree Baldewsingh of Medische Zending and ophthalmologist Jerrel Pawiroredjo from the Suriname Eye Center. Dr. Leen van den Abeele headed up the Belgian dental contingent. Organizers noted that the overwhelming turnout of patients waiting for care underscores the unmet need for specialized eye and dental services in this remote region.

    A temporary operating room was set up specifically for the mission at Ladoeani, the team’s main base of operations. All 37 cataract procedures were performed at this site, with most patients being low-vision elderly residents. Many of these patients face limited mobility, making the long trip to the capital Paramaribo for specialized care prohibitively difficult. In addition to restoring sight to dozens of people, the mission addressed widespread dental health issues across the river villages.

    Dental providers documented severe oral health problems that were surprisingly prevalent even among child patients. The team linked these widespread issues to rising consumption of sugar and sweetened sodas paired with insufficient access to oral hygiene education and resources. As part of the mission, participating dental students delivered hands-on tooth-brushing training and community education on the importance of consistent good oral hygiene to prevent long-term problems. Most of the dental procedures performed were extractions of teeth that had already suffered advanced decay and were causing painful complications that could not be reversed.

    The outreach initiative was made possible through private funding: Conrad Issa of Lucky Store covered the majority of the mission’s financial costs, while Anaula Nature Resort sponsored accommodation for the entire medical team. Looking ahead, organizers plan to reinstate these annual medical missions to remote inland villages as a permanent, structured program. The core goal of the program is to bring specialized ophthalmic care closer to residents who face significant barriers to accessing treatment due to their isolated geographic locations.

    Unmet demand for cataract and eye care extends far beyond the Upper Suriname River region. The Suriname Eye Center is already preparing for the second large-scale surgical mission of 2025, scheduled to take place in November in Nickerie. More than 600 patients are already on the waiting list for the upcoming mission, with organizers expecting to complete approximately 200 cataract surgeries during the outreach.

  • Saudi-Arabië sluit East-West pijpleiding na aanval; Houthi’s versterken controle over Rode Zee

    Saudi-Arabië sluit East-West pijpleiding na aanval; Houthi’s versterken controle over Rode Zee

    A dramatic escalation of regional unrest in the Middle East has sent shockwaves through global energy markets, after Saudi Arabia ordered an emergency temporary shutdown of its critical East-West crude oil pipeline on Saturday, triggered by a damaging drone attack.\n\nSpanning 1,200 kilometers across the Arabian Peninsula, the East-West pipeline serves as a linchpin of global oil exports from the Middle East, a role that has grown increasingly vital in recent months as the Strait of Hormuz, another key energy chokepoint, has been largely rendered unusable by ongoing regional conflict. Satellite imagery captured by Planet Labs PBC on September 11, 2026, shows visible damage to infrastructure along the pipeline’s route, located southeast of Medina. The assault left multiple casualties and destroyed multiple structures, including a local mosque in the Jazan region.\n\nBoth Baghdad and Riyadh have pinned responsibility for the attack on Iran-backed militias operating within Iraqi territory. In response to the security breach, Iraqi military officials have dismissed a senior regional military commander amid the fallout.\n\nThe pipeline shutdown has immediately disrupted global oil flows. The route carries 4 to 5 million barrels of crude daily, accounting for roughly 4% to 5% of total global oil supply. Saudi Arabia’s ability to maintain consistent export volumes is now under threat, piling unprecedented pressure on already tight energy markets worldwide.\n\nCompounding the crisis, Yemen’s Houthi rebels have expanded their military control over key Red Sea shipping lanes by seizing the strategic island of Perim, which sits at the heart of the Bab el-Mandeb Strait—commonly known as the “Gate of Tears,” another of the world’s most critical chokepoints for global oil trade. The capture significantly strengthens the Houthi’s ability to disrupt maritime traffic in the region.\n\nGrowing insecurity around major energy transit routes has already triggered sharp volatility in energy pricing. Global crude benchmarks have risen steeply over the past week, while diesel prices in the United States have surged to an all-time record, topping $6 per gallon.\n\nIn response to the expanding threat, Saudi Arabia has formally requested direct military support from the United States to counter Houthi advances. U.S. President Donald Trump confirmed he has held discussions with Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, but clarified that Washington will not deploy direct military intervention at this stage. Instead, the U.S. will provide intelligence sharing support to Riyadh. Separately, Houthi representatives confirmed they have reached out to the U.S. government to request that Washington avoid direct involvement in the conflict.

  • Barbados kijkt naar Suriname voor import bouwmaterialen

    Barbados kijkt naar Suriname voor import bouwmaterialen

    As the Caribbean nation of Barbados ramps up its push for large-scale infrastructure development, it is actively exploring opportunities to import key construction materials – silica sand and crushed stone aggregate – from neighboring CARICOM member Suriname, according to recent high-level diplomatic talks held this week. The push for imports comes as Barbados’ own domestic reserves of these critical building materials have declined significantly, creating a supply gap that needs to be filled to support the government’s accelerated infrastructure agenda.

    Senior Minister Kerrie Symmonds of Barbados confirmed the country’s interest in Friday’s discussions, which were held at the Lloyd Erskine Sandiford Centre with Surinamese officials and a delegation from N.V. Grassalco, Suriname’s state-owned mining enterprise. “Historically, we have relied heavily on our domestic deposits to meet our needs for silica sand and aggregate, but those reserves have dropped off dramatically in recent years,” Symmonds explained during the talks. “That means we now have to source a large share of our required construction materials from international suppliers, and Suriname stands out as a natural, strategic partner.”

    As a fellow member of the Caribbean Community (CARICOM), Suriname, located on the South American mainland, holds abundant untapped natural resources that can deliver tangible economic benefits to Barbados at a competitive advantage over non-regional suppliers. The ongoing discussions with Grassalco are also part of a broader initiative to revitalize bilateral economic cooperation between the two nations, which was disrupted by the COVID-19 pandemic after the signing of the landmark Brokopondo Agreement in 2018.

    The Brokopondo Agreement outlines cooperation frameworks across multiple key sectors, including maritime and air connectivity, tourism development, agriculture and food security, trade and investment, natural resource development, and renewable energy. “Now that the worst of the COVID-19 pandemic is behind us, we are working to restart implementation of the critical commitments laid out in the Brokopondo Agreement,” Symmonds noted. Beyond construction materials, Barbados has also signaled interest in exploring collaborative opportunities in Suriname’s growing oil and gas sector, as well as joint renewable energy projects.

    Symmonds emphasized that the longstanding positive political and diplomatic ties between the two CARICOM nations should now be translated into concrete, mutually beneficial economic outcomes. For Grassalco, which was founded in 1971 and specializes in the exploration and extraction of mineral resources including gold and natural stone, a new trade agreement with Barbados could open the door to expanded regional market access for Suriname’s mineral products. If negotiations progress successfully, this partnership could mark the first step for Suriname to establish itself as a leading regional supplier of construction raw materials across the Caribbean bloc.

  • Guyana verdiende ruim US$2,5 miljard aan olie in 2025

    Guyana verdiende ruim US$2,5 miljard aan olie in 2025

    Guyana, one of South America’s fastest-emerging oil producers, has released its 2025 annual report for the Natural Resource Fund (NRF) — the sovereign wealth vehicle that holds all of the country’s oil and gas sector revenue — revealing key figures that shed light on how the nation manages its newly found natural resource wealth.

    Last year, total inflows into the NRF reached $2.509 billion from the country’s offshore oil operations, representing a modest 2.3% decline from the 2024 total inflow of $2.568 billion. The vast majority of this 2025 revenue came from profit oil — the share of crude output that Guyana claims as part of its production sharing agreements with international oil companies. According to prior data published by Minister of Finance Ashni Singh, profit oil contributed roughly $2.1 billion to the fund in 2025. Royalty payments added another $330.7 million, while a $15 million signing bonus from a new production contract was also deposited into the sovereign fund.

    The most striking takeaway from the annual report is that Guyana’s government withdrew nearly as much capital from the NRF as was deposited over the course of the year. Total withdrawals hit $2.463 billion, a more than 55% jump from the $1.586 billion pulled from the fund in 2024. This 2025 withdrawal amount aligns almost exactly with the annual approved budget ceiling of $2.464 billion, meaning the government utilized nearly 100% of its permitted withdrawal allocation for the year. Disbursements were spread evenly across 2025: two $400 million transfers to Guyana’s Consolidated Fund were made in February and April, followed by multiple $200 million installments, with a final $463 million withdrawal processed in late December.

    Under Guyana’s existing national legislation, all funds withdrawn from the NRF are transferred to the country’s Consolidated Fund, where they are earmarked for national development priorities and economic growth-driving investments that benefit the broader public. This framework was designed to ensure that oil revenue is directed toward long-term national progress rather than accumulated solely as reserve capital.

    Guyana first launched commercial crude production from its massive offshore Stabroek Block in December 2019. Over the subsequent six years, production has expanded rapidly as multiple floating production, storage and offloading (FPSO) vessels were brought online. By the end of 2025, four FPSOs — the Liza Destiny, Liza Unity, Prosperity, and One Guyana — were operating at the Stabroek Block, supporting ongoing output growth.

    Looking ahead, Guyana’s government projects that total oil revenue will grow in 2026. Forecasts call for around $2.4 billion in profit oil earnings and $375.3 million in royalty payments next year, alongside an additional $17 million in signing bonuses from a new exploration agreement for Block S7. Despite the large-scale withdrawals in 2025, the NRF still holds more than $3 billion in reserve capital, with an end-of-year 2025 balance sitting at approximately $3.25 billion.

    In just a few years, substantial oil reserves and consistent revenue growth have transformed Guyana into one of the fastest-growing oil producers in the Western Hemisphere, with far-reaching implications for the country’s economic trajectory and regional standing.

  • RR- en DR-leden binnenland krijgen training in taken en verantwoordelijkheden

    RR- en DR-leden binnenland krijgen training in taken en verantwoordelijkheden

    Paramaribo, Suriname – September 13 – Over 60 administrative officials and elected members from Regional Councils (RR) and District Councils (DR) representing the Sipaliwini and Boven-Suriname regions are gathered in Nieuw Aurora for a three-day capacity-building training focused on clarifying roles, responsibilities and official functions within Suriname’s local governance framework. Running from September 11 to 13, the program is being delivered by Zagra’s Consultancy N.V. and forms a core initiative under the Tyubi di Matu project, led by the Vereniging van Samaaka Gemeenschappen (VSG, or the Association of Saramaka Communities).

    The training curriculum centers explicitly on defining the formal position of local government officials within Suriname’s broader governance hierarchy. Participants are guided through deep dives into job scope, mandated tasks, and clear boundaries of authority and accountability. Organizers designed the program to directly address gaps in role clarity that often hinder rural public administration, with the core goal of equipping participants to carry out their work more professionally and effectively.

    Event leaders emphasize that clearly delineated roles and responsibilities are a foundational requirement for a well-functioning local public sector. When officials have a precise understanding of their individual and collective roles, the benefits extend beyond improved personal performance: clearer role boundaries also foster smoother cross-functional collaboration across different levels of local governance structures.

    Beyond theoretical knowledge transfer, the training incorporates interactive sessions that center on real-world practical scenarios and peer-to-peer experience sharing. Participants work through case studies to explore how different governance responsibilities play out in day-to-day rural administration, testing best practices for implementation in their home districts. “Professional performance starts with knowing exactly what your role entails and what accountability comes with it,” organizers explained in a statement during the event. “When every official understands their position well, they can deliver better results and complement the work of other team members within the governance structure more effectively.”

    For the VSG and Zagra’s Consultancy, the training represents a targeted investment in advancing the professionalization of local governance in Suriname’s inland rural regions. Ultimately, the program’s backers argue that stronger role clarity, expanded knowledge of mandates, and clearer accountability frameworks will translate to tangible improvements in public service delivery for local communities across Sipaliwini and Boven-Suriname. The three-day program is scheduled to conclude later on September 13, with a closing session focused on synthesizing key takeaways and developing actionable plans for participants to apply new skills and knowledge in their daily work moving forward.