标签： Suriname

During parliamentary debate on Suriname’s proposed General Tax Law (Algemene Wet Belastingen, AWB) in the National Assembly on Tuesday, the National Democratic Party (NDP) caucus has announced its support for the long-awaited tax reform legislation — but it has drawn a clear line: the full law will only enter into force once the country’s Tax Administration is fully prepared to roll out the new system.

Rabin Parmessar, NDP caucus leader and chair of the rapporteur committee tasked with preparing the draft legislation, put forward 11 non-negotiable conditions for the bill’s passage, with core priorities including robust legal protection for taxpayers, personal data privacy, digital security, and verifiable operational capacity of the Tax Administration.

Parmessar emphasized that his caucus fully recognizes the urgent need for a unified overarching legal framework for tax collection in Suriname. The current system scatters formal tax rules across dozens of separate pieces of legislation, and the AWB is designed to harmonize these regulations, standardizing processes ranging from tax filing and assessments to appeals, information requirements, audits and penalties. The NDP also backs broader efforts to modernize and digitize the Tax Administration, strengthen crackdowns on tax evasion and profit shifting, and deepen international tax cooperation — all longstanding priorities for fiscal reform in the country.

But these reforms must be paired with a strong system of legal safeguards for taxpayers, Parmessar argued. One of his central conditions is that the AWB cannot be implemented in isolation. The new legislation must be fully aligned with the existing Collection Law, the Introduction Law, and the Tax Cases Jurisdiction Act, to prevent a scenario where the Tax Administration gains new investigation and penalty powers before the accompanying legal protections for taxpayers are operational.

The biggest point of contention surrounds the proposed effective date of the law. The current draft sets entry into force for the day after its proclamation, but Parmessar argued that the Tax Administration’s actual operational readiness should be the only determining factor for the timeline. The new regulatory framework relies on fully functional digital infrastructure, secure electronic communication, sufficiently trained staff, safe processing of sensitive fiscal data, timely processing of appeals, and a fully operational tax judiciary — none of which are confirmed to be ready at present. To address this gap, Parmessar proposed a phased rollout, where individual provisions of the law only take effect once independent verification confirms all implementation preconditions have been met.

For full national implementation of the AWB, Parmessar is calling for a concrete, public implementation roadmap and a mandatory readiness assessment that verifies the new system is prepared on legal, organizational, and technical levels, and that all implementation costs are fully funded.

Another major concern centers on the broad information-gathering powers granted to the Tax Administration under the draft law. The legislation allows tax inspectors to request personal data, financial records, documents, and digital files, and requires third parties to share information with authorities under certain circumstances. While Parmessar acknowledged these powers are necessary for effective tax enforcement, he is calling for clear, explicit legal limits, rooted in the principles of necessity, proportionality, purpose limitation, data security and auditability. This requirement is particularly urgent, he noted, because a separate draft law on personal data privacy is still under debate in the National Assembly, leaving no existing regulatory framework to protect taxpayer information.

Parmessar also pushed for additional safeguards around the proposed reversal and increase of the burden of proof for taxpayers. Under the draft, if a taxpayer is found to have failed to meet their information disclosure requirements, the burden of proof shifts to the taxpayer to demonstrate they do not owe additional tax. Parmessar is requiring that any taxpayer in this situation first receive clear, written notification outlining what information is missing, what deadline they have to correct the issue, and what consequences will follow non-compliance, before any shift in the burden of proof takes effect.

The NDP also objects to the proposed maximum one-year standard decision period for tax objection applications. While Parmessar acknowledged the Tax Administration currently struggles with backlogs and that complex cases require extended processing times, he argued that a one-year standard timeline is unnecessarily long. Any extension of the standard period should be reserved for exceptional cases and require explicit public justification, he said.

Additional provisions put forward by the NDP address equity in digital tax reform. Parmessar stressed that digitization cannot leave vulnerable groups behind: accessible, in-person support must remain available for taxpayers living outside the capital Paramaribo and for people with limited digital literacy. The government also needs to outline clear contingency rules in advance for cases where government digital systems fail, preventing taxpayers from meeting filing deadlines through no fault of their own.

Finally, Parmessar called for ongoing parliamentary oversight after the bill is passed. He proposed adding a mandatory evaluation and reporting requirement directly into the text of the AWB: the government would report annually to parliament on the functioning of the new law in its first five years, followed by a comprehensive full evaluation at least once every three years after that. Ahead of the final vote on the legislation, Parmessar also called for a final thorough technical legal review of the draft to check numbering, cross-references, and alignment between legal provisions and explanatory notes, to avoid costly legal disputes down the line.

Summing up the NDP’s position, Parmessar said the caucus supports building a stronger, more effective Tax Administration, but not granting that administration unlimited, unregulated power. “Effective tax collection must be matched by clear regulation, transparency, accountability, and robust legal protection for all taxpayers,” he said. “The quality of this new law will ultimately be judged not by what we codify here in parliament, but by whether the system actually works for all Surinamese in practice.”

A new US campaign of economic pressure targeting Iran’s global financial ties has a major limiting factor that Washington cannot ignore: China, the Islamic Republic’s largest trading partner and the top buyer of its crude oil. As the United States pushes to isolate Tehran from its remaining economic partners, US President Donald Trump is preparing to host Chinese President Xi Jinping in Washington next month, with the core goal of preserving a fragile bilateral trade truce that has calmed tensions after years of friction.

When US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent unveiled what the administration has dubbed “Operation Economic Outcast”, he offered no specific details on how the Trump White House would address China’s ongoing extensive economic engagement with Iran. That lack of clarity has fueled growing questions about just how effective the new sanctions campaign can ultimately be, as Washington faces a delicate balancing act: it needs to ramp up maximum pressure on Iran without triggering a major escalation with Beijing that would damage the already fragile US economy.

Edgard Kagan, senior advisor for China studies at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, noted the intentionally vague language in Bessent’s announcement was a calculated choice to avoid disrupting the planned high-level summit. Both sides view the upcoming meeting, which will mark Xi’s official state visit to Washington, as critically important to their respective policy goals.

This balancing act leaves Washington and Beijing navigating what Kagan described as a “delicate dance”. The core open question remains: is there any room to convince China to scale back its trade with Iran, without Beijing rejecting the request as unreasonable and pulling back from even limited cooperation?

Analysts broadly expect China will adopt a stance of minimal compliance with US demands. In its official response to the new US sanctions campaign, Beijing reiterated that all of its economic cooperation with Iran has always been conducted “within the framework of international law”. Currently, China receives more than 80 percent of Iran’s total oil exports, most of which flow through indirect trading channels to avoid existing US restrictions.

A spokesperson for China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs stressed that China’s normal cooperation with Iran “should not be disrupted or undermined”, and added that Beijing will “take all necessary measures to resolutely protect its own legitimate rights and interests”. China has repeatedly made clear its opposition to what it calls “illegal unilateral sanctions” imposed by the United States on other nations.

Kagan characterized China’s official response as a calculated holding position, saying Beijing will do the absolute minimum to meet US demands while stopping short of openly confronting Washington. He added that existing evasion practices, such as ship-to-ship oil transfers designed to hide the origin of Iranian crude, will almost certainly continue uninterrupted.

Sun Yun, a China analyst at the Stimson Center, projected that China will only show limited cooperation if the US campaign’s goal is to pressure Iran into making concessions on issues like security in the Strait of Hormuz, rather than demanding a full break in economic ties. In that scenario, Sun noted, China could slightly reduce its imports of Iranian oil to signal a willingness to compromise without severing long-standing economic links.

With the Trump-Xi summit fast approaching, both sides have made clear they want to avoid a major escalation of bilateral tensions. Analysts agree that China will need to offer Washington some small concession to keep talks on track, while the US will have to accept that it will not achieve all of its demands regarding Iran-China trade.

So far, the Trump administration has declined to impose sanctions on major Chinese banks and corporations that are connected to the US financial system, leaving them vulnerable to US punitive measures. While Bessent announced penalties on nearly 60 Iran-linked entities tied to Tehran’s nuclear and missile programs, cyber activities, and oil trade – including a small number of companies and individuals based in mainland China and Hong Kong – no major Chinese financial or industrial institutions were targeted.

Analysts say that with Xi’s visit just weeks away, Trump has little incentive to take a hard line against Beijing. The US president is keen to preserve the existing bilateral trade truce and has emphasized his positive personal relationship with Xi, making it unlikely he will seek a direct confrontation on the eve of the high-profile state visit.

Xi’s upcoming visit also paves the way for Trump to travel to China in November for the APEC Economic Leaders’ Meeting. In his second term, Trump has adopted a far less confrontational stance toward China than he did in his first term, regularly praising his strong relationship with Xi following the intense trade war that rattled global markets last year.

The US business community has broadly welcomed Xi’s upcoming visit as a positive sign for bilateral relations, even as many acknowledge that sweeping new trade deals are unlikely to be finalized during the meeting.

Craig Singleton, a senior analyst at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, noted that Beijing is betting that Washington will not risk the positive dynamic of the upcoming summit by targeting major Chinese entities with new sanctions before the meeting even begins.

A senior Surinamese coalition parliamentarian has sounded the alarm over deep-seated mismanagement and financial collapse at the country’s state-owned fisheries infrastructure company Cevihas N.V., calling on the administration to step in immediately to clean up the troubled enterprise.

Raymond Sapoen, a member of the National Assembly (DNA) from the ruling National Democratic Party (NDP), outlined the scope of the crisis in a parliamentary address Tuesday, stating that years of improper governance have left Cevihas – the Central Fisheries Ports Authority of Suriname – saddled with an estimated $6 million to $8 million in accumulated debt over the past five to seven years. Sapoen, who has previously raised red flags about issues at the parastatal, told the legislature that conditions have only deteriorated sharply since he first flagged problems, leaving the company mired in a full-blown financial crisis with no visible path to pay down its massive liabilities on its own.

Beyond the crippling debt, Sapoen levelled sharp criticism at widespread failures in Cevihas’ core services to the national fishing sector. He detailed multiple critical shortcomings, ranging from non-compliance with critical safety regulations to inadequate sanitation, poor hygiene standards, and crumbling physical infrastructure that is supposed to support port operations for domestic and international fishing vessels. Notably, the lawmaker revealed that even the Venezuelan government has publicly raised dissatisfaction with Cevihas’ service quality. Approximately two weeks ago, Sapoen said, the Venezuelan embassy conveyed its discontent to Suriname’s government through official channels. The ongoing dysfunction, he argued, is damaging the international reputation of Suriname’s entire fishing industry, harming both domestic commercial interests and cross-border partnerships.

Sapoen also drew attention to unfair and unstable working conditions for Cevihas employees, noting that workers face deep uncertainty over their pension benefits and are subject to what he described as biased, inequitable personnel policies. In a striking rebuke of company leadership, he accused top executives of living in luxury while rank-and-file staff confront persistent job and benefit insecurity, a gap he called unacceptable for a state-owned enterprise meant to serve public interests.

After cataloging the financial, operational, and workplace failures, Sapoen concluded that the company is suffering from systemic severe mismanagement and financial misrule, and the time for incremental fixes has passed. He is calling for a full, comprehensive audit of the company to uncover all wrongdoing and lay the groundwork for restructuring. The Surinamese government did not provide a substantive response to Sapoen’s allegations during Tuesday’s question period, and has committed to delivering a formal answer to parliament on Thursday.

For weeks, cross-border travel and trade between Suriname and Guyana have been thrown into chaos after the Canawaima ferry was forced out of operation by a safety ban. Now, top Surinamese transport officials say a provisional resumption of the critical service could be just days away, but political leaders are demanding far-reaching structural reforms rather than quick fixes to the long-troubled operation.

The Suriname Maritime Authority (MAS) imposed the operating ban on the Canawaima after a routine inspection uncovered serious gaps in mandatory safety equipment, including faulty or missing lifeboats, life buoys, life jackets, and emergency VHF communication radios. Further concerns were raised about the structural integrity of the vessel’s steel hull, which had not undergone dry dock maintenance since 2021.

Speaking before the National Assembly on Tuesday evening, Transport, Communication and Tourism Minister Raymond Landveld reported that nearly all of the MAS’s mandatory safety corrections have now been completed. Hull thickness tests found that 99% of the sampled steel plating meets the required minimum standards, he said. Landveld has formally asked the MAS to lift the ban on a temporary basis, ahead of the vessel’s previously scheduled full dry dock maintenance set to begin August 31.

“Nearly all of the MAS’s requirements have been satisfied,” Landveld told lawmakers. “I expect that a clearance certificate allowing the ferry to resume operations will be issued in the very near term.” After the Canawaima enters dry dock, the Guyanese ferry Sandaka, which is currently also undergoing maintenance, will take over the route on an interim basis.

The shutdown has already caused widespread disruption, leaving hundreds of passengers stranded on both sides of the border, and cutting off critical supply links for local businesses and agricultural producers that rely on the ferry cross-border service. Lawmakers have also raised alarm over unregulated informal “backtrack” crossings that have surged since the shutdown, with reports of passengers including children crossing open water without life safety equipment.

Political leaders have made clear that resolving the immediate travel crisis is not enough. Opposition National Democratic Party leader Rabin Parmessar pushed Landveld to take immediate administrative action to overhaul the ferry service’s management, arguing that the failure to maintain basic safety equipment is the result of systemic mismanagement, not a one-off technical error.

“We hold you accountable right now, and that means you must intervene in the governance of this service,” Parmessar told the minister, doubling down on his demand for immediate action. National Party of Suriname leader Jerrel Pawiroredjo echoed that criticism, noting that both governance and regulatory oversight of the service have failed to meet basic standards, requiring root-and-branch reform. ruling party lawmaker Rawien Raghoenandan also emphasized the urgent human cost of the shutdown for stranded travelers.

Minister Landveld acknowledged that the crisis cannot be dismissed as a simple technical failure, admitting that systemic problems have built up at Canawaima over years of inadequate management. He conceded that the service has long operated on a day-to-day reactive basis, without long-term planning, regular performance reporting, or structured forecasting for maintenance and investment needs.

The 1998 bilateral management agreement that forms the basis of the Suriname-Guyana cross-border ferry partnership has never been updated or re-evaluated as required, Landveld confirmed. The service’s boards of commissioners have now been ordered to draft an updated agreement to reflect modern operational and safety standards, while a full audit of the Canawaima’s current business operations is already underway, with findings due by August 31.

Landveld emphasized that his immediate priority is to restore safe service as quickly as possible to end the current disruption for travelers and businesses. Once service is provisionally restored, he said, the government will move forward with structural changes to the service’s governance, management and operating models to prevent a repeat of the crippling shutdown that has disrupted cross-border ties between the two South American nations.

On August 25, the extra-parliamentary Surinamese political party De Nieuwe Leeuw (DNL) formally delivered three interconnected draft pieces of legislation to Suriname President Jennifer Geerlings-Simons, outlining a framework for more equitable and sustainable management of the country’s lucrative natural resource sectors. The proposals cover the establishment of a national sovereign wealth fund, mandatory local content requirements for large investment projects, and updated regulations on transfer pricing to protect national tax revenue.

DNL chair Dharmvir Mungra and vice chair Yerry Khoesial presented the full set of drafts to the president during an official meeting. While the sovereign wealth fund proposal is new, the two remaining drafts on local content and transfer pricing had previously been shared with relevant cabinet ministers and the speaker of the National Assembly, Suriname’s legislative body.

The cornerstone of DNL’s policy package is the proposal for a Sovereign Wealth Fund, which would create a binding legal framework for managing revenue generated from Suriname’s core natural resource exports, including oil, gas, and gold. Under the proposal, a portion of annual resource revenue would be professionally managed and invested as a long-term national asset, designed to deliver benefits to both current and future generations of Surinamese. DNL argues that the fund would also strengthen the country’s overall financial stability by reducing the economy’s exposure to volatile global commodity price swings, a longstanding source of economic instability for resource-dependent developing nations like Suriname.

The second proposal, focused on mandatory local content, seeks to expand opportunities for domestic Surinamese businesses and workers in large-scale resource and infrastructure projects led by foreign investors. The draft would require foreign firms to prioritize engagement with local suppliers, hire domestic workers, and invest in knowledge transfer to local partners. DNL says the policy will boost national employment rates, accelerate the spread of technical expertise across the domestic economy, and grow the footprint of local business activity in high-value sectors.

The third proposal targets transfer pricing practices among multinational corporations operating in Suriname. Transfer pricing, the mechanism that sets prices for transactions between affiliated entities of a global company, is often used to shift profits generated in one country to low-tax jurisdictions to reduce overall tax liability. DNL’s draft legislation aims to close existing regulatory gaps to prevent profit shifting out of Suriname, ensuring that profits generated within the country are taxed domestically. The party estimates that stronger rules on transfer pricing will protect and expand Suriname’s national tax base, increasing government revenue for public investment.

DNL chair Mungra emphasized that the three proposals are designed to work as a cohesive policy package, not standalone initiatives. The overarching goal of the draft laws, he explained, is to align Suriname’s natural resource governance with the country’s long-term sustainable economic and social development goals. Mungra also noted that the regulatory framework is not limited to the country’s fast-growing emerging oil and gas sector: both the local content and transfer pricing rules would apply to all sectors with large domestic and foreign corporate operations, including mining, agriculture, and infrastructure.

According to DNL, President Geerlings-Simons expressed public appreciation for the party’s proactive policy initiative. Even as an extra-parliamentary party without representation in the National Assembly, DNL notes that it developed the three proposals to contribute to the ongoing national debate about responsible resource management and inclusive economic growth in Suriname.

After 47 years of continuous designation, the United States has formally removed Syria from its list of State Sponsors of Terrorism, a landmark policy shift that went into effect on Monday following a mandatory 45-day congressional review period. The development has been hailed by Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa as a historic turning point that will accelerate the war-torn nation’s recovery after 14 years of brutal civil conflict.

The process to lift the decades-old designation was launched in early July, when U.S. President Donald Trump formally notified Congress of his administration’s intent to rescind the labeling. Syria first appeared on the U.S. blacklist back in 1979, when the government of then-president Hafez al-Assad was accused of supporting armed militant groups. The designation remained in place throughout the rule of Hafez’s son, Bashar al-Assad, who was ousted from power in December 2024 by a rebel coalition led by the current president al-Sharaa.

For nearly half a century, the terrorism sponsor designation imposed crippling restrictions on Syria. These included a full ban on U.S. foreign assistance, prohibitions on weapons exports, restrictions on sales of dual-use civilian-military technologies, and sweeping curbs on cross-border financial transactions. Even after broader U.S. and international sanctions on Syria were relaxed in recent months, the blacklisting effectively blocked most global banks and private investors from engaging with the Syrian market, creating a major barrier to post-conflict recovery.

The delisting marks a significant breakthrough in ending Syria’s long international isolation. It clears the way for cross-border commercial investment, U.S. financial assistance, and even regulated defense trade with Damascus, opening new pathways for Syria to rebuild its shattered economy and reintegrate into the global economic system.

Beyond recognizing political changes under al-Sharaa’s new administration, U.S. officials frame the move as a calculated strategic step to shift Syria away from the geopolitical influence of Iran and Russia, two powers that embedded deep influence in Syria over decades of alliance with the former Assad regime. The policy shift is also designed to encourage Syria’s full participation in global counterterrorism efforts. As part of the broader changes, the U.S. has also lifted the terrorist designation for Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), the group previously known as al-Nusrah Front that was long labeled al-Qaeda’s Syrian affiliate.

Al-Sharaa celebrated the U.S. decision as the opening of a “new chapter” for his country, saying Syria can now turn its full focus to national development, post-war reconstruction, and long-term stability. Syria’s finance minister and central bank governor echoed that assessment, calling the delisting a historic step that will return Syria to the global economic framework and unlock access to much-needed foreign investment and modern technology.

U.S. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent emphasized that the decision aligns with the Trump administration’s pledge to deliver targeted sanctions relief to foster political and economic stability in conflict-affected regions. Analysts broadly expect the delisting to drive an increase in foreign direct investment into Syria, a critical requirement for rebuilding shattered infrastructure and reviving an economy gutted by 14 years of war. Beyond Syria’s borders, the shift is expected to strengthen regional stability by addressing the root causes of refugee flows and cross-border security challenges that have plagued neighboring countries for years.

Even with the landmark policy change, significant uncertainties remain. Russia and Iran retain deep economic and security ties within Syria, meaning the trajectory of the country’s new political independence and planned reforms will continue to be closely watched by the international community. Globally, the delisting is widely seen as a clear signal of shifting regional power dynamics, and a potential opening for full diplomatic and economic normalization between Syria and the wider international community.

On August 25, the United States took a major step in its long-running pressure campaign against Iran, with Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent announcing a sweeping new round of sanctions codenamed “Operation Economic Outcast.” The explicit goal of this action is to fully isolate Iran from the global financial and trading system by cutting off all remaining economic lifelines connecting the Iranian government to international markets.

Under the terms of the new sanctions framework, nearly 60 entities, individual actors and vessels have been added to the US sanctions blacklist. The administration has also expanded secondary sanctions, which penalize third-party entities that do business with sanctioned parties, to cover key sectors of Iran’s economy including shipping, gold trading, aviation, technology and digital assets. In parallel with the formal announcement, former President Donald Trump has been personally contacting global leaders to request that they end all commercial trade with Iran, though the administration has declined to name specific countries targeted by the request or set a formal deadline for compliance.

This new escalation comes against a backdrop of two decades of sustained Western sanctions on Iran. Over that period, Tehran has progressively pivoted its trade relations away from Europe, shifting the bulk of its commercial activity to a smaller network of Asian and regional partner economies. The most recent full-year trade data from 2024 illustrates the current structure of Iran’s global trade ties, which the new US sanctions are designed to disrupt.

In 2024, Iran exported approximately $56 billion worth of goods to at least 112 countries and territories. Its top five export partners were China, Iraq, the United Arab Emirates, Turkey, and Afghanistan, each accounting for a critical share of Iranian export activity:
– China led the list at $14.58 billion, and remains the world’s largest buyer of Iranian crude oil, handling more than 80% of all seaborne shipments of Iranian oil. Most of this oil is sold at a steep discount and transported via unregistered “shadow fleets,” meaning very little of the trade appears in official customs statistics.
– Iraq ranked second with $11.7 billion in Iranian imports. Iran supplies large volumes of natural gas to Iraq for power generation, as well as electricity to Iraq’s southern provinces, and is also a key supplier of food, construction materials and industrial goods to its neighbor.
– The United Arab Emirates (UAE) came third at $7.16 billion, having long served as a key financial and re-export hub for Iranian trade, accounting for roughly 13% of total Iranian exports. However, Abu Dhabi recently implemented an unlimited trade embargo on Iran following unproven allegations that Iran launched rocket attacks on UAE territory – claims Tehran has repeatedly denied.
– Turkey followed with $6.1 billion in Iranian imports. Iran supplies pipeline natural gas to Turkey via the Tabriz-Ankara pipeline, alongside petrochemical products, food and construction materials.
– Afghanistan rounded out the top five at $2.3 billion. Iran supplies Afghanistan with fuel, food and construction materials, while Afghanistan relies heavily on Iranian ports and overland trade routes to access global markets.

On the import side, Iran purchased roughly $68.5 billion worth of goods from 87 countries and territories in 2024. Its top import partners reflect the critical supply routes that keep the Iranian economy functioning:
– The UAE topped the list at $21 billion, accounting for more than 30% of all Iranian imports. Most of these goods are re-exports that give Iran indirect access to Western-produced machinery, electronics and consumer goods. Abu Dhabi’s recent full trade embargo has now closed this key supply route entirely.
– China ranked second at $17.8 billion, and is now Iran’s largest supplier of industrial machinery, electronics, vehicles and industrial components. China has become Iran’s most important economic partner following the collapse of most trade with Western economies.
– Turkey came third at $11.1 billion. Its shared border and long-standing commercial ties have made it a critical overland supply route for Iran, providing machinery, chemicals, vehicles and industrial products. Two-way trade between the two countries has already declined significantly since recent regional escalations.
– The European Union followed at $6.1 billion. Current EU trade volumes are only a small fraction of pre-2018 levels, and are now almost entirely limited to pharmaceutical products, medical equipment and industrial machinery.
– India rounded out the top five at $1.6 billion. Bilateral trade between Iran and India has fallen sharply in recent years, with New Delhi maintaining limited commercial ties focused largely on agricultural goods such as rice and tea, plus pharmaceutical products.

Analysts note that this new round of sweeping US sanctions represents one of the most aggressive efforts to date to cripple Iran’s international trade, with unpredictable ripple effects for global energy markets and regional diplomatic relations.