标签： Haiti

On September 29, 2026, the United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 2829 (2026) in a 12-0 vote with three abstentions from China, Pakistan, and the Russian Federation, extending the mandate of the Gang Suppression Force (GSF) operating in Haiti for an additional six months, pushing its expiration to March 31, 2027. The resolution-backed text calls for the rapid full deployment of the Multinational Security Support Mission (referred to as FRG in the original text) to retake territorial control from heavily armed gangs that have paralyzed much of the country, reestablish the Haitian government’s sovereign authority across the nation, and lay the foundational conditions for long-delayed general elections.

Under the terms of the new resolution, the UN Secretary-General is required to submit progress reports to the Council every six months aligned with the objectives laid out in the 2025 Resolution 2793 that first authorized the mission. The Security Council also formally acknowledged the July 27 agreement between the Haitian government and the FRG that codifies the mission’s legal standing, urging all UN member states to recognize this status and extend required privileges and immunities to the force and its deployed personnel.

Following the vote, council members and regional representatives delivered divergent reactions to the mandate extension, reflecting differing perspectives on how to address Haiti’s years-long spiral into crisis. Haiti’s Permanent Representative to the UN, Ambassador Pierre Ericq Pierre, welcomed the vote as a critical step forward, but stressed that the mission can only deliver results if it receives the full complement of personnel, military equipment, and operational resources needed to function at full capacity. He outlined the incremental goals of the mission: supporting Haitian security forces to retake gang-held territory, secure critical civilian infrastructure, and create space for elections, adding that securing territory is only the first step. “It is not enough to take territory from the gangs,” Pierre noted. Recaptured areas must be stabilized, core public services restored, and sustained security measures put in place to prevent gangs from reestablishing control, he said, adding that the FRG must coordinate closely with the Haitian National Police and national armed forces while prioritizing long-term capacity building for Haiti’s domestic security institutions and upholding the country’s sovereign authority.

The U.S. representative to the council reflected on decades of inconsistent international engagement in Haiti, noting that the country has “limped from crisis to crisis,” with short-term missions that came and went, and hundreds of millions in international spending that failed to deliver lasting stability. “We must ask ourselves: for what?” he asked, acknowledging that gangs have grown increasingly powerful while Haitian state institutions have eroded over time. He argued that the current FRG mission is different, noting that it “exists and, better yet, it is beginning to work,” and paid tribute to early deploying countries including Chad, El Salvador, Guatemala, Jamaica, Mongolia, and Sri Lanka whose personnel are already on the ground. Their work, he said, will lay the groundwork for Haitians to “win back their streets, their lives and their futures for their families.”

China, one of the three abstaining countries, justified its vote by arguing that the Haitian crisis cannot be reduced to a simple security challenge. “The Security Council should never have asked itself whether to support Haiti, but how to support it,” the Chinese delegate explained, expressing skepticism that an external military force alone can resolve the crisis, which he described as a deeply rooted problem of governance. He pointed to systemic issues including documented collusion between elements of the Haitian police and criminal gangs, and the widespread economic desperation that pushes thousands of Haitians, including children, to join armed groups as the only means of survival.

The Russian Federation, which also abstained, recalled that Moscow did not block the creation of the mission a year prior, despite raising persistent questions about the mission’s operating model and long-term financing structure. Russian representative noted that the initiative has faced significant setbacks to date, with delays in deployment already pushing back preparations for Haiti’s planned general elections. “It is in the hands of the international community to stop the external supplies of Haitian criminals with weapons and money,” he insisted, highlighting that transnational arms and funding flows are core drivers of gang power that have not been sufficiently addressed.

Pakistan, the third abstaining country, echoed the argument that Haiti’s deep-seated challenges require a comprehensive, nationally led solution rather than a purely security-focused response. While abstaining on the vote, the Pakistani representative expressed hope that the FRG would achieve full deployment in the coming months and secure sustainable long-term funding to sustain its operations.

Other council members voiced broad support for the extension, while adding nuanced warnings and calls for accountability. Colombia’s delegate warned that gangs are increasingly accessing new transnational funding streams, most notably linked to regional drug trafficking networks, that sustain their operations. He noted that the mandate extension ensures continuity of progress toward full deployment, and will give the council time to gather full data on the mission’s deployment progress and operational effectiveness to make any necessary adjustments when the mandate comes up for review again in March.

Greece’s representative stressed that the international community must provide the mission with sufficient time, political backing, and material resources to complete deployment and reach full operational capacity. The United Kingdom’s representative emphasized that a successful FRG deployment is non-negotiable to reversing Haiti’s instability and “turning the tide against the gangs.” London condemned widespread human rights abuses carried out by gangs, including the use of civilian human shields and systemic sexual violence, and expressed hope that an effective security force will deliver the “stability that the Haitian people deserve and pave the way to credible elections allowing Haitians to choose their next leaders.”

Panama’s representative highlighted that the vote reflects broad international solidarity with the Haitian people, noting that “behind each decision adopted in this Council are the lives of millions of people.” He added that lasting peace and stability in Haiti will require complementary action that addresses every dimension of the crisis, not just security.

Regional bodies also weighed in on the decision. Speaking on behalf of the Caribbean Community (CARICOM), Jamaica’s representative welcomed the mandate extension, noting that while there has been discernible progress on the ground since the FRG’s initial deployment, rollout has been slower than initially projected. He urged the mission to reach full operational capacity as quickly as possible, and called for sustained international support to the FRG, the Haitian National Police, and the Haitian Armed Forces, particularly in the form of sustained financial, logistical, and operational resources. He specifically called on countries with capacity to provide critical enabling support including troop airlift, air and maritime surveillance equipment, and technical assistance. Security, he stressed, must be the foundation for credible elections and the “full restoration of democratic governance in Haiti, led and owned by the Haitian people,” declaring: “Armed gangs will not be allowed to determine Haiti’s future nor, indeed, that of the Caribbean region.”

The Dominican Republic, Haiti’s neighboring country, emphasized that the six-month extension is not an end goal in itself, but a window of opportunity for the mission to complete its deployment. A fully operational force, he said, will create the conditions for elections and allow the Haitian people to “control their destiny,” noting that the success of the council’s decision hinges on sufficient resourcing. “Security opens the way, but security alone is not enough to keep that path open,” he added.

For Haiti, one of the hemisphere’s most economically vulnerable nations, diaspora remittances are far more than a transfer of personal funds — they form the backbone of the entire national economy. These cross-border payments currently account for roughly 16 percent of Haiti’s total gross domestic product, underpinning everyday household spending for millions of people and serving as the country’s single largest source of much-needed foreign currency. Now, a new academic study is sounding a warning about the potential economic fallout that could follow changes to the U.S. Temporary Protected Status (TPS), a policy that allows thousands of Haitian migrants to live and work legally in the United States. The analysis was presented as part of the Inter-American Development Bank’s “Reflection Wednesdays” public lecture series, prepared by three researchers — Kensley Blaise, Jean Marie Cayemitte, and Jean Gardy Victor — from Haiti’s Department of Economic and Financial Research (DREF). The research team centered its work on modeling what could happen if Haiti experienced a large, unanticipated drop in remittance inflows, a scenario that could unfold if TPS is terminated. Currently, close to 80 percent of all remittances sent to Haiti originate from Haitian communities living and working in the United States. If the U.S. government ends TPS protections, thousands of Haitian migrants could lose their legal right to work, face deportation, or otherwise be forced into informal employment that would curtail their ability to send money back to family members in Haiti, the study notes. The research’s key findings point to clear, cascading risks across multiple sectors of Haiti’s economy. A sustained decline in remittance volumes would put gradual but consistent downward pressure on Haiti’s exchange rate, worsening existing currency instability that already drives up the cost of imported goods, which Haiti relies on for much of its food and energy supplies. The study adds that the most pronounced and long-lasting impact of a drop in remittances would fall on Haiti’s public finances, which are already chronically unstable amid the country’s ongoing political and social crisis. Crucially, the researchers emphasize that these outcomes are not inevitable: the study models potential impacts, it does not predict that a sharp decline in remittances will automatically occur following changes to TPS. The full 38-page report, published in French, is available for public download to allow policymakers, civil society groups, and researchers to review the findings in detail as discussions around the future of TPS for Haitian migrants continue.

In a remote assessment mission concluded September 25, 2026, International Monetary Fund (IMF) staff reached a preliminary staff-level agreement with Haitian authorities on the fourth review of the country’s ongoing staff-monitored program (SMP), a deal that remains pending final approval from IMF senior management. The agreement comes as the Fund publicly underscores the unprecedented challenges facing the Caribbean nation, which is mired in an overlapping political, security, and humanitarian crisis that has stretched its economic system to breaking point.

Led by senior IMF economist Camilo E. Tovar, the review team conducted its assessment of Haiti’s policy progress between September 14 and 25, working remotely due to ongoing security instability across the country. In his closing statement following the mission, Tovar outlined the cascading crises that have shaped Haiti’s macroeconomic landscape: persistent gang-related violence, a catastrophic humanitarian situation, fragile political transition ahead of upcoming national elections, and a string of external shocks that have eroded living standards for millions of Haitians.

Among the most pressing headwinds, Tovar noted, are soaring global oil prices that have strained national budget balances, widened external deficits, and pushed up the cost of basic goods for households. A looming additional threat comes from the upcoming end of Temporary Protected Status (TPS) for roughly 350,000 Haitian nationals residing in the United States, a change that the IMF projects could reduce inflows of private remittances—one of the most critical pillars of Haiti’s economy— and worsen existing economic and humanitarian vulnerabilities. The U.S. Supreme Court has already authorized the federal government to end the TPS program, which has protected Haitian migrants from deportation since 2010 following a devastating earthquake.

Against this backdrop, the IMF projects that Haiti will record its eighth consecutive year of economic contraction in fiscal year 2026, with gross domestic product forecast to shrink between 1.5% and 1.9% according to estimates from Haiti’s Central Bank. Persistent insecurity, which has shuttered hundreds of businesses and displaced nearly 1.5 million Haitians internally according to June 2026 data from the International Organization for Migration, continues to cripple production and trade. Weak export demand for Haiti’s key textile and apparel sector has further dragged on activity. On a more modest positive note, relative exchange rate stability has helped pull inflation down from a peak of more than 32% year-on-year in October 2025, with the 2026 full-year projection coming in at roughly 16%.

Haiti’s external sector currently remains supported by strong remittance inflows and adequate international reserve buffers, with gross reserves standing at roughly seven months of projected imports as of mid-2026, and the current account expected to stay in surplus despite a chronically weak trade balance. Still, the IMF warns that sustained high fuel import costs represent a major ongoing vulnerability for the country’s external position. Net international reserves hit approximately $1.9 billion by the end of June 2026, which was well above the floor target set under the SMP. The central bank’s cap on financing for the non-financial public sector was also met, the review confirmed.

On fiscal policy, the country faces growing strain from chronically low government revenue, higher energy costs, and urgent unmet needs for security spending, humanitarian aid, and development investment. To create necessary fiscal space for these priorities while preserving hard-won macroeconomic stability, the IMF says Haiti must accelerate efforts to boost revenue collection, continue reforming tax and customs administrations, implement realistic and prioritized spending plans, and avoid high-risk non-concessional borrowing.

Program implementation overall has remained on track despite the extreme operating environment, the review found. As of the end of June 2026, all quantitative and indicative policy targets were met except for the requirement to avoid accumulating new external arrears. A temporary buildup of arrears occurred due to administrative and institutional capacity constraints, but the arrears were cleared quickly by Haitian authorities. Structural reforms have progressed, albeit with some delays tied to capacity gaps and the broader crisis.

Looking ahead, the SMP will continue to center on five core priorities. First, strengthening governance and financial integrity to rebuild public confidence in state institutions and the rule of law. Second, boosting revenue mobilization to fund priority spending, highlighted by the planned January 1, 2027 entry into force of a new consolidated, modernized national tax code—a major milestone for Haiti’s long-running tax reform agenda. Third, improving public financial management: strengthening cash management, public investment planning, and treasury operations, consolidating the Treasury Single Account, improving payroll integrity, and enhancing targeting of social assistance programs to ensure aid reaches vulnerable households. The Fund emphasized that transparent, accountable use of residual resources from the 2023 IMF Food Shock Response Window assistance will be critical to supporting struggling households. Fourth, preserving credibility for monetary and exchange rate policy: the Bank of the Republic of Haiti (BRH) has reaffirmed its commitment to maintaining price and exchange rate stability, and continues to implement reforms to strengthen financial sector supervision and improve the quality and timeliness of economic data. The BRH has already published its 2024 audited financial statements, and is working to address past audit findings to boost transparency. Fifth, coordinating support from international development partners, which the IMF says is critical to addressing urgent needs and supporting sustainable recovery. The Fund notes that timely grant and concessional financing, paired with capacity building and strict transparency requirements for donor funds, will help preserve debt sustainability, support reform implementation, and lay the groundwork for growth that improves living standards for Haitians.

The IMF mission held productive discussions with senior Haitian officials, including Minister of Economy and Finance Serge Gabriel Collin and BRH Governor Ronald Gabriel, and thanked the authorities for their close cooperation throughout the review. Haiti’s current SMP is scheduled to run through June 2027, an informal arrangement through which Haitian authorities commit to monitoring economic performance and implementing reforms under Fund supervision, as the country works to stabilize its economy amid crisis. Haiti is set to hold the first round of presidential and legislative elections in December 2026, with a runoff scheduled for February 2027 as part of the country’s ongoing political transition process.

The IMF outlined mixed risks for Haiti’s economic outlook going forward. Downside risks include further deterioration in security conditions, sustained high oil prices, delays in adjusting domestic fuel prices to match global costs, reduced remittance inflows following the end of U.S. TPS, and drought linked to the El Niño weather pattern. On the upside, a decline in oil prices, measurable progress in restoring security across the country, and a smooth, peaceful electoral process that reduces policy uncertainty could boost investor and consumer confidence and support a stronger-than-expected economic recovery.

Five years after the high-profile assassination of Haitian President Jovenel Moïse sent shockwaves across the Caribbean and global political landscape, the federal trial of the man accused of orchestrating the plot has officially gotten underway in South Florida. On Monday, September 28, 2026, proceedings opened at the U.S. Federal District Court for the Southern District of Florida, with Judge Jacqueline Becerra presiding over the case against 67-year-old Haitian-American pastor Christian Emmanuel Sanon.

Prosecutors from the U.S. Attorney’s Office level a serious conspiracy charge against Sanon, alleging he planned Moïse’s 2021 killing as part of a bid to seize the Haitian presidency and install himself as the country’s new leader. The charges against him include conspiracy to commit assassination and kidnapping against a foreign head of state; if convicted on these counts, Sanon faces a mandatory maximum sentence of life imprisonment.

Sanon’s detention stretches back to just days after Moïse’s assassination, when he was taken into custody by Haitian law enforcement. A search of his residence uncovered a cache of suspicious materials, including multiple crates of ammunition, 19 separate passports, and other unregulated items. After more than a year in Haitian custody, he was deported to the United States to face federal charges in early 2023. He is currently represented by lead defense counsel Zeljka Bozanic, with assistance from co-counsel Humberto Dominguez.

Public records and local Haitian reporting outline Sanon’s background: born in southern Haiti, he completed medical studies in the Dominican Republic before relocating permanently to Florida. In the years leading up to Moïse’s assassination, he began circulating online videos positioning himself as a reformist political figure who could bring long-overdue change to Haiti’s unstable political landscape.

The prosecution’s narrative argues that Sanon was the central organizer of the assassination plot, actively recruiting co-conspirators and laying the groundwork for his own assumption of the presidency after Moïse was removed from power. But Sanon has entered a formal not guilty plea to all charges, and his defense team has laid out a clear, targeted strategy to distance their client from the violent criminal act while acknowledging his long-stated political aspirations.

In opening framing of the case, Bozanic has pushed back aggressively against the prosecution’s conspiracy claims. She does not dispute that Sanon harbored ambitions to win the Haitian presidency and advance widespread political reform in his home country, but she emphasizes that he pursued these goals through plans for a peaceful, legitimate political transition. According to the defense, Sanon’s only professional connection to the private security firm CTU centered on hiring the group to provide personal security for his political activities and support infrastructure development projects he planned to launch in Haiti. He had no advance knowledge of, or involvement in, any plan to kidnap or kill Moïse, Bozanic argues.

The defense further contends that Sanon was actually manipulated and later pushed aside by more hardline conspirators and leaders of the security firm. Prosecutorial records themselves support this claim, Bozanic notes: by June 2021, just a month before the assassination, other plotters sidelined Sanon because they questioned his constitutional eligibility for the Haitian presidency and doubted he could attract enough popular support to stabilize the country after the coup. The conspirators then turned to another political figure, former judge Wendelle Coq Thélot, to front their planned post-assassination government.

In sum, the defense’s core argument positions Sanon not as the mastermind of a presidential assassination, but as an idealistic would-be politician who was outmaneuvered, manipulated, and eventually discarded by a shadowy armed group with far more violent, criminal intentions.

Jury selection was completed in the opening days of proceedings, with formal opening statements from both the prosecution and defense set to begin shortly. The trial is scheduled to hold daily sessions over the course of several weeks. A number of Sanon’s co-defendants, who have already either been convicted or entered guilty pleas in U.S. federal court, are expected to take the witness stand to testify against Sanon in exchange for potential sentence reductions. Legal observers expect the jury to deliver its verdict by the end of fall 2026, closing a years-long legal process stemming from one of the most high-profile political assassinations in recent Caribbean history.

Haiti continues to grapple with one of the most crippling security and governance crises in its modern history, and the nation’s body of Catholic bishops has emerged as a leading voice calling for collective action to pull the country back from collapse. During the bishops’ recent plenary assembly, the Conference of Bishops of Haiti (CEH) released a public message sounding the alarm over rapidly worsening insecurity, chronic governance failure, and deep uncertainty hanging over the country’s upcoming scheduled elections.

In their message, the prelates painted a grim picture of daily life across the Caribbean nation, describing Haiti’s steady descent into chaos as a source of growing alarm for the nation’s people. On one side of the crisis, armed gangs have expanded their control over residential neighborhoods, driving a sharp surge in kidnappings that have left countless families traumatized. This wave of violence has also disrupted basic public services, forcing many schools and universities to suspend operations and cut off access to education for thousands of young Haitians. On the other side, the national government has been largely ineffective, failing to restore public order or extend basic protection to vulnerable civilian populations.

The bishops point to profound leadership vacuum at the national level, with no clear long-term strategy to address the country’s overlapping crises, leaving ordinary Haitians to fend for themselves without state support. The recent horrific massacre in the mountain town of Kenscoff, which left at least 61 people dead including 14 children, remains raw in the collective memory of the nation. “The blood of the victims cries out to heaven for justice,” the statement reads.

Against this bleak backdrop, the bishops raise urgent questions about the planned international anti-gang security deployment that has been billed as a turning point for Haiti. They ask whether the incoming force will deliver tangible relief to suffering communities, whether Haiti’s own national police and armed forces can successfully retake gang-controlled territory, and whether the international community will finally follow through on its repeated promises of support. At the same time, the statement explicitly acknowledges and commends the relentless work of Haiti’s domestic security forces, noting that many officers have paid the ultimate price for their service, and their on-the-ground commitment has already helped avert even worse catastrophe.

The message also highlights how growing violence has reshaped Haiti’s political landscape, creating a climate of deep uncertainty as the country approaches its long-awaited general elections. The bishops question whether the vote can be held in a context that meets basic democratic standards: they ask whether the election will be fully inclusive, impartial, and transparent, and whether ordinary citizens will receive adequate security guarantees to cast their ballots without risking their lives.

Amid the ongoing political impasse that has paralyzed the country for years, the bishops cite papal teaching to reject anti-democratic power grabs: “The Church cannot approve the formation of narrow ruling groups which usurp the power of the State for individual interests or ideological ends.” They emphasize that a return to constitutional order through free and fair elections is an absolute necessity for Haiti’s recovery, noting that the free choice of national leaders is a core pillar of democratic governance.

The statement argues that politics must return to its original purpose: a noble form of service focused on advancing the common good. Without a peaceful security environment, impartial state institutions, and broad national consensus, the bishops warn that the upcoming election risks generating new crises rather than delivering the stability Haitians desperately crave. They stress that holding a credible vote requires more than just scheduling a ballot date; the conditions that give elections democratic legitimacy must be put in place first. The safety of citizens, they argue, must take priority over the voting process itself – no Haitian should be forced to choose between exercising their democratic rights and protecting their own life.

For these reasons, the CEH is issuing a formal call for all stakeholders – from state authorities and political parties to civil society organizations, business leaders, and international partners – to step up and meet their specific obligations. The shared priority must be protecting civilian populations, addressing the unfolding humanitarian emergency, restoring state authority across the country, and laying the groundwork for a free, fair, and credible electoral process.

In closing, the bishops urge all Haitians to set aside partisan bickering, narrow self-interest, and decades of division that have held the nation back. “It is urgent to move beyond petty factional squabbles, narrow self-interest, and fruitless hatred,” the statement reads. “Let us join hands, reconcile, and save Haiti, our shared homeland. Our Nation must relearn the art of dialogue and mutual forgiveness rooted in justice and truth.”

The message was signed by all senior leaders of the Conference of Bishops of Haiti, including Mgr Max Leroy MÉSIDOR, Metropolitan Archbishop of Port-au-Prince and CEH President, and all other sitting bishops across the country’s dioceses.