Political commentator Yves Ephraim has advanced a compelling case for constitutional amendments in Antigua and Barbuda, focusing specifically on constraining executive authority and enhancing governmental accountability mechanisms. The proposal centers on two fundamental reforms: establishing prime ministerial term limits and empowering the Governor General to initiate independent national inquiries.
The analysis begins with a philosophical foundation that constitutions must serve as vigilant guardians against state power concentration. Historical evidence demonstrates that nations can unfortunately elevate individuals with criminal tendencies to their highest offices, making constitutional safeguards essential for preserving rule of law, protecting individual rights, and ensuring blind justice administration.
Ephraim identifies a critical vulnerability in Antigua and Barbuda’s current constitutional framework: the Prime Minister wields absolute power to such an extent that even criminal acts committed publicly cannot be investigated by the Police Commissioner. This creates a perception that legal equality remains absent for those in leadership positions.
Regarding term limits, the proposal notes that Antigua and Barbuda already mandates term restrictions for directors of public companies and credit unions—a practice established for over fifteen years. The argument follows logically that if term limits protect financial institutions, they become exponentially more crucial for national leaders who can potentially damage entire countries.
The commentary dismantles counterarguments about losing effective leadership through term limits. Historical analysis reveals that truly capable leaders inherently cultivate successors as part of their leadership philosophy, recognizing that effective delegation and succession planning constitute essential leadership qualities. By contrast, ineffective leaders typically micromanage and surround themselves with inferior talent, creating unhealthy power dynamics.
Empirical observations indicate that administrative corruption frequently emerges during third-term administrations, with most productive governance occurring during initial terms. International examples include Margaret Thatcher’s British government, where early economic successes became overshadowed by corruption scandals during later tenure. Nations with regular leadership transitions, such as the United States and Barbados, demonstrate greater prosperity and democratic resilience.
The specific proposal recommends a maximum of two successive terms (not exceeding ten years) for any Prime Minister, followed by a mandatory five-year hiatus before potential reelection. This structure balances experience with regular leadership renewal.
Regarding inquiry mechanisms, the proposal highlights the fundamental legal principle ‘Nemo debet esse judex in propria causa’ (no one should be judge in their own cause). The current requirement for government consent to investigate itself represents an obvious conflict of interest. The reformed system would empower the Governor General to initiate national inquiries based on Senate recommendations and citizen petitions (minimum 1,000 signatures), particularly in cases involving fraud allegations. The Prime Minister would be excluded from the process, with the Governor General receiving authority to revoke ministerial appointments for process obstruction.
These proposed constitutional amendments aim to establish robust accountability frameworks and enhance civil liberty protections in Antigua and Barbuda’s democratic system.