In a recent letter to the editor, E Galy’s critique of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council’s role in the Jason Jones case demonstrates a profound misunderstanding of constitutional law and the judiciary’s function in a democratic society. Galy’s assertion that the Privy Council overstepped its bounds by altering the Constitution is not only incorrect but also dangerously misleading. This rebuttal seeks to clarify the constitutional principles at play and reaffirm the judiciary’s vital role in safeguarding the rule of law.
First and foremost, the Privy Council, as the highest appellate court for Trinidad and Tobago (TT), is tasked with interpreting and enforcing the Constitution. Section 2 of the Constitution explicitly designates it as the ‘supreme law of the land,’ rendering any inconsistent legislation void. The judiciary, not Parliament, is the ultimate arbiter of constitutional validity. This separation of powers is foundational to preventing elected dictatorship and ensuring democratic governance.
Second, the Jason Jones decision did not ‘change’ the Constitution but rather interpreted it in light of its guarantees of equality, privacy, and personal protection (sections 4 and 5). The court ruled that colonial-era laws criminalizing consensual adult acts in private violated these fundamental rights. This was not judicial activism but the fulfillment of the court’s constitutional duty to strike down laws that contravene the supreme law, as mandated by section 14(1).
Third, Galy’s claim that the court cannot render a law inoperable if it aligns with the Constitution is a fundamental misrepresentation of judicial review. Established in cases like Marbury v Madison (1803) and reaffirmed in Commonwealth jurisprudence, judicial review empowers courts to invalidate statutes inconsistent with the Constitution. This principle ensures that constitutional supremacy is upheld.
Fourth, Galy’s dismissal of ‘changed times’ as irrelevant to constitutional interpretation is misguided. The Constitution is a living document, as affirmed by the Privy Council in cases like Reyes v The Queen (2002) and Matthew v The State (2004). It must be interpreted in a manner that reflects evolving societal standards of dignity and equality.
Galy’s argument, rooted in theocratic posturing rather than constitutional reasoning, conflates religious morality with legal interpretation. This stance is incompatible with the secular rule of law enshrined in TT’s 1976 Constitution. Sovereignty lies with the people and the Constitution, not with religious dogma.
Finally, the assertion that judicial review ‘mutates’ civil and criminal law is legally untenable. When a law is declared unconstitutional, it is void ab initio, ensuring the coherence of the legal system. The judiciary’s role is to preserve constitutional order, not to subvert it.
In conclusion, the Privy Council’s decision in the Jason Jones case was a reaffirmation of constitutional supremacy and judicial duty. Public discourse must rise above misconceptions that equate judicial independence with political interference. The true tragedy lies in the persistence of such uninformed critiques in our public dialogue.
MOHAN RAMCHARAN
Birmingham, UK