A devastating maritime disaster that claimed 76 lives has exposed a cascade of systemic failures in training, regulation, and safety protocols at the U.S. Maritime Administration (MARAD), according to sworn testimony given to a formal Commission of Inquiry (COI) investigating the July 18 sinking of the MV Barima ferry.
The incident unfolded just after 10 p.m. roughly 10 miles off the Essequibo Coast, when the overloaded passenger ferry went down with 179 passengers and crew on board. To date, official counts confirm 76 people have died in the disaster, making it one of the deadliest maritime accidents in the region in recent decades. As the COI continues to piece together what led to the capsizing, senior MARAD officials have laid bare the agency’s longstanding gaps in basic safety and operational standards.
Christopher Clarke, MARAD’s chief engineer who has spent 20 years at the regulatory body, told investigators that the agency does not issue formal professional licenses to marine engineers. Instead, promotions and qualifications are issued solely via informal letters of appointment after basic in-house training. “When you complete the training, you get a letter from management confirming you attended, and then you’re promoted to second engineer or third engineer,” Clarke explained. His account was echoed by MARAD maritime officer Tremel Argyle, who told the COI he rose from the rank of ordinary seaman to his current position only after completing a short course and submitting his paperwork to the department, with no formal licensing process required.
Clarke also acknowledged he took part in repair work on the MV Barima roughly 18 years before the sinking, but could not recall whether the work was preventative maintenance or corrective repairs for existing damage. He also told investigators he could not remember key details about the vessel’s design, including the location of its onboard water tanks. Most alarmingly, Clarke confirmed that MARAD-operated vessels have no formal Planned Maintenance System (PMS) — a standardized protocol that outlines mandatory scheduled inspections and upkeep for all critical vessel systems. While he noted that engine oil and filter changes are conducted based on main engine working hours, there is no structured framework to track or address other potential mechanical failures over time. He also admitted that no regular safety drills are conducted for crew aboard any MARAD vessels, a core requirement for international passenger shipping safety.
Further testimony from MARAD Captain Anthony Williams, who was formally confirmed to his captain rank only in April 2026, raised additional red flags about the agency’s promotion and training standards. Williams told the COI he transitioned to a maritime command role from maintenance engineering just two years prior, earning a grade three boat master’s license via examination in 2024 before upgrading to a grade two license in 2025. Before his confirmation as captain, he only had experience piloting small pilot boats. Williams also admitted he has never received formal training in Search and Rescue (SAR) protocols, despite having taken part in a 2012 boat accident response at Crab Falls in Region Seven Cuyuni-Mazaruni.
When questioned about basic maritime navigation and safety knowledge, Williams declined to comment on his familiarity with the Douglas Sea Scale, the globally recognized 10-point system used to measure sea roughness and tidal current speed. He also told investigators there is no formal system in place for MARAD crews to access up-to-date information on coastal hydrological conditions, and could not recall any details about wind conditions in the area on July 19, just hours after the ferry capsized.
A former second engineer with the Transport and Harbour Department, who was seconded to MARAD for basic training and worked on the MV Barima back in 2010, confirmed that the vessel had a long history of mechanical issues. He told the COI he carried out repeated corrective mechanical maintenance on the vessel before its engine and crane were replaced, noting that “At that time, Barima still had a Blackstone engine, and most of the time the engine or the generator was under repair just to keep the vessel running.”
Recalling the night of the disaster, the former engineer said that at 12:20 a.m. on July 19, shore coxswain Mr. Benjamin contacted him to request the use of the survey tug MT Arau to assist the MV Barima after the ferry reported engine failure. Shortly after, he was informed the vessel had already capsized. Multiple vessels, including pilot boats HAKIWA and HAIMA, were deployed to the disaster zone for rescue operations, which recovered survivors and transported them to Pomeroon. Captain Williams, who commanded one of the response vessels, told the COI his crew did not recover any survivors, only arriving to find debris from the wreck floating across the water.
“When we got to the coordinates plotted on GPS, all we saw was wreckage floating,” Williams said. “Everything was there: ice boxes, gas bottles, book bags, clothes, shoes, all personal belongings. We even saw two or three empty life rafts bobbing on the water.”