As the final contingent of US troops packs their equipment to leave Iraq, Baghdad faces two interconnected critical deadlines that will shape the country’s security and political landscape for years to come. However, most powerful Shiite militias have already made clear they have no intention of laying down their arms, leaving major unanswered questions about what Iraq will look like after the full US military withdrawal.
The US-led international coalition is accelerating its drawdown of forces, according to a senior anonymous US military official, who spoke on condition of anonymity because he was not authorized to speak publicly on the matter. All remaining US troops stationed in northern Iraq, numbering in the hundreds, will complete their withdrawal by the September 30 deadline. Most troops will be redeployed to Jordan and other regional countries, and key military equipment including air defense systems will be relocated alongside personnel.
The timeline of US military engagement in Iraq stretches back more than two decades: the US invaded Iraq in 2003, ousted longtime leader Saddam Hussein, withdrew all forces in 2011, then returned in 2014 at the request of the Iraqi government to combat the rise of the Islamic State (IS) terror group. With the IS threat largely diminished after years of counterterrorism operations, Washington and Baghdad reached a 2024 agreement to gradually end the US combat mission. Last year, US troops withdrew from bases across most of Iraq, leaving only a small presence in the semi-autonomous Kurdistan region in the north.
After the full withdrawal is complete, the US will open negotiations for a “normal bilateral security cooperation” framework with Baghdad’s central government, the official confirmed, though the exact structure of this future partnership remains undecided. The official noted that the counterterrorism base in Erbil, the capital of Iraqi Kurdistan, has lost strategic importance for US forces as the IS threat has receded. While northern Iraq was never used as an offensive launchpad during the period of heightened US-Iran tensions, US troops stationed there were repeatedly targeted by attacks from Iran and Iranian-aligned Iraqi militias. This withdrawal will therefore “reduce our exposure” to such attacks, the official added.
The Iraqi government tied the US withdrawal to a separate ultimatum requiring all armed militias to disarm by the same September 30 deadline. Iraqi Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi promised after his July meeting with US President Donald Trump at the White House that the disarmament of Iraq’s powerful armed factions would be finalized before the end of September, aligning with the coalition’s withdrawal timeline.
However, Iraqi government officials have sent conflicting signals about whether September 30 is a firm disarmament deadline. Government spokesperson Sabah al-Numan said last week that discussions and dialogue are still ongoing, and the disarmament issue will not be resolved until after the international coalition completes its withdrawal. Qasim al-Araji, the prime minister’s security advisor, clarified that September 30 is only the deadline for coalition troop withdrawal, not for militia weapons handover.
For many observers of Iraqi politics, the failure of the September 30 disarmament goal is already a foregone conclusion. “On September 30, no armed groups will have disarmed. I think that is clear to anyone who follows Iraqi politics,” said Iraqi analyst Sajad Jiyad during a recent workshop hosted by the Washington-based think tank Atlantic Council.
While a small number of less influential militias have agreed to hand over weapons, the most powerful factions with close ties to Iran — including Kataib Hezbollah, Harakat al-Nujaba and Kataib Sayyid al-Shuhada — have either outright rejected the disarmament demand or attached conditions the Iraqi government is highly unlikely to meet in the near term. These conditions include bringing the Kurdish Peshmerga security forces in northern Iraq under full central Iraqi military control, and expelling Iranian Kurdish opposition groups and the PKK, which maintain bases in the northern border region.
One senior official with a pro-Iranian Iraqi militia put the position even more bluntly: “After these preconditions are set, discussion will shift to regulating weapons holdings, not surrendering them. The factions have absolutely made no decision to give up weapons, and we have not handed over any weapons to date.”
Forcing full disarmament by military means is widely seen as an enormous challenge for Baghdad. The militias are organized under the “Iraqi Islamic Resistance,” an umbrella group of roughly 10 hardline Shiite armed factions that together command around 50,000 fighters and possess advanced weaponry including long-range rockets and air defense systems. The group has claimed responsibility for dozens of rocket and drone attacks targeting Israel and US forces in Iraq and Syria over the past several years.
Beyond their military power, the militias have deep and entrenched economic interests across Iraq’s construction, real estate, and currency exchange sectors, giving them powerful incentives to retain their autonomy and armed status.
Most of these militia factions are formally part of the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), an umbrella organization that was officially integrated into Iraq’s national security forces in 2016 and nominally falls under the authority of the prime minister. However, many of the most powerful factions operate with near-total autonomy and maintain close strategic and political ties to Iran.
A senior Iraqi government official outlined the administration’s current strategy: the government aims to bring all armed factions under the full command of the Iraqi army. Baghdad hopes factions will transfer high-risk “dynamic weapons” such as rockets and long-range systems to the central command of the PMF, before the independent factions are dissolved and integrated into the PMF and national army structure.
Concerns are growing over the security outlook for Iraq’s semi-autonomous Kurdistan region following the US withdrawal. While the drawdown removes a key target for attacks from the area, analysts warn it will not end the threat of violence. Mohammed A. Salih, a non-resident senior fellow at the US-based Foreign Policy Research Institute and an expert on Kurdish and Iraqi affairs, noted that Iran and its aligned groups have already targeted other sites in the Kurdistan region unrelated to US troops, including bases of exiled Iranian Kurdish opposition groups, energy infrastructure, and even the office of Kurdistan Regional Prime Minister Masrour Barzani.
“The withdrawal will further expose the Kurdish region and make it an easier target for attacks,” Salih said.
Kurdistan Regional Government officials declined to comment on the record, but Barzani has publicly stated his concern that the removal of US air defense systems will leave the region far more vulnerable to attack. In response, al-Numan said last week that the Iraqi central government is finalizing purchases of new air defense systems from South Korea, Turkey, and the United States, which will be deployed according to a carefully crafted military plan to ensure full protection of Iraqi airspace, including the Kurdistan region.









