Suriname is on the cusp of a transformative oil and gas boom, with billions of dollars in planned investment set to reshape the national economy. But as the country prepares to welcome these large-scale projects, one critical question remains unanswered: how much of this new wealth will actually stay in Suriname, and how will all Surinamese people, not just a select few, improve their lives from this natural resource windfall?
French energy major TotalEnergies has already announced plans to invest approximately $10.5 billion in its GranMorgu project, with first oil production targeted for 2028. Current projections estimate that around $1 to $1.5 billion of this investment will be spent locally, and the project is expected to create more than 6,000 local jobs. These are promising figures on paper, but it is important to remember that they are just projections – not guaranteed outcomes for the Surinamese people.
The good news is that Suriname does not have to build this framework from scratch. Existing national petroleum legislation already includes requirements for local hiring, procurement of domestic goods and services, skills training, and knowledge transfer. State-owned oil company Staatsolie has already integrated these requirements into its public model contracts, and the BlueWave initiative has trained more than 100 local Surinamese businesses to compete for oil sector contracts. For years, policymakers have been working on comprehensive national local content legislation, but if results are expected by 2028 when production begins, clear rules for measurement, monitoring and enforcement must be put in place now. A key gap that needs closing is the definition of what qualifies as a Surinamese company; simple local registration is not enough to guarantee long-term local benefit.
Much of the current policy debate centers on fixed percentage requirements for local content, but this approach overlooks critical questions: 40 percent of what, exactly? For whose benefit? And what value will that percentage hold for Suriname a decade from now? Author Dinesh Dinai argues that every key policy decision should be guided by one core question: which solution will deliver the greatest long-term benefit to Surinamese society as a whole?
Dinai offers a practical example to illustrate this approach. If the oil sector needs water services, why not start by partnering with the national Surinamese Water Company (SWM)? If SWM is currently unable to meet that demand, policymakers should invest in what the utility needs to build that capacity – whether that is new equipment, workforce training, capital investment, or a long-term service contract. If these contracts help strengthen SWM financially, the government will be able to reduce public subsidies for the utility. That freed-up public funding can then be redirected to high-priority sectors like education, healthcare, or public infrastructure. It could even help keep residential water tariffs affordable for ordinary Surinamese. In this scenario, even a Surinamese citizen who will never step foot on an oil drilling platform gets a tangible benefit – that is what real local benefit looks like.
This same logic can be applied to the country’s healthcare sector. Oil projects require regular medical screenings, diagnostic testing, emergency care, and access to specialist physicians. Why not leverage this demand to strengthen Suriname’s entire public healthcare system? Where possible, invest in local medical equipment, build out local laboratories, and train local healthcare workers. Of course injured offshore workers must receive high-quality emergency care, but there is no reason that new CT scanners or hired specialists should serve only the oil industry. It is unsustainable for Suriname to produce billions of dollars in oil while still sending patients abroad for specialized treatment that could be provided at home.
This approach works equally well for port infrastructure, transportation, energy supply, and technical education. It is true that not every service can be provided locally in the early years, but policymakers should systematically assess what local providers can currently deliver, what skills can be built up over time, and what investment is needed to reach that goal.
Workforce development also needs a more proactive, locally led approach. If Suriname is contractually responsible for supplying a share of the project workforce, the country should take ownership of organizing that labor pool. Priority should always go to available qualified Surinamese workers first. If specific expertise is currently lacking, the country should bring in temporary foreign specialists while training local Surinamese workers to take over those roles long-term. The default should not be “we don’t have the workers, find them yourselves” – this is Suriname’s responsibility, and we need to take ownership of organizing it.
Dinai also makes the case for intentionally prioritizing parastatal (state-owned) companies for oil sector contracts. Because the government holds these assets on behalf of all Surinamese people, it can direct profits and benefits toward public good outcomes rather than private gain. When a parastatal wins an oil sector contract, it does not just create jobs and generate revenue – it can also strengthen the delivery of public services, reduce government subsidies, and keep essential service prices affordable for everyone. This broader public benefit should always take priority over private profit that ends up in the hands of just a small group of stakeholders.
If a parastatal is not yet able to meet the requirements of a contract, policymakers should first explore whether targeted investment can build its capacity to deliver. That said, parastatals should not get a blank check: strict requirements for quality, cost control, and performance must be enforced, and the actual delivery of public benefits must be verified. Government ownership alone is no guarantee of positive outcomes for the public.
Private Surinamese businesses will always play an essential role in the oil and gas supply chain, creating jobs, paying taxes, and building domestic expertise. But when the natural resource wealth belongs to all Surinamese people, the benefit to the whole of society must be the deciding factor in awarding contracts.
To ensure accountability, it is not enough to just track how many contracts are awarded to local companies. Policymakers must also track what tangible benefits those contracts deliver to Surinamese society. Has public service delivery improved? Are government subsidies actually reduced? How many local workers have been trained and promoted into higher-skilled, better-paying roles? All of these outcomes must be made public. Without this transparency, we may end up knowing exactly how much money was spent locally, but still have no idea how much lasting benefit Suriname actually gained from the investment.
The core takeaway is that formal local content requirements do not automatically translate to local benefit. A country can hit all its percentage targets for local procurement and still miss the chance to build long-term, widespread prosperity. When this current oil boom ends, Suriname should be left with stronger public services and a more skilled, competitive workforce – not just a handful of exhausted oil wells.
For Dinai, the true test of a successful local content policy is simple: any ordinary Surinamese citizen who never works on an oil platform and never directly receives oil revenue should still be able to say that they benefited from Suriname’s oil wealth.